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ABSTRACT 
This thesis sets out to explore limitations of the role undertaken by "technology transfer" 
agencies in their contribution to successful innovation in UK industry. In particular it 
identifies the limitations arising from the widely used approach of maximising information 
Accessibility. A conceptual device is introduced to distinguish the existing emphasis on 
access to information about technology, from a more interactive and customer centred 
strategy - 
Using this simple conceptual model a more detailed analysis of the mismatch between the 
needs of potential innovators and the activities of information centred technology transfer 
agencies is undertaken by the use of both survey techniques and a case-study of one 
particular agency. 
The results of this analysis suggest that the Accessibility strategy by itself fails to address 
many of the issues and concerns that UK industry has about innovating and reinforces the 
need to adopt the more consumer need centred and interactive approach suggested by the 
model. 
The implications and potential requirements of such an approach are further developed 
with respect to transfer agencies and government and European Commission policy. 
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CHAlyrER 1 
1.0 RESEARCH OVERVIEW AND PROBLEM CONTEXT. 
1.1 Research Overview. 
1.1.1 The Research Project. 
This research was sponsored by the Science and Engineering Research Council (SERC) 
under the Total Technology Programme. The scheme aims to produce research which 
is both interdisciplinary and tackles a problem of direct relevance to an industrial 
organisation or organisations. To this end, the research presented here was originally co- 
sponsored by Defence Technology Enterprises Ltd (DTE) who were a private commercial 
organisation founded to provide access to, and spin-off technology from, the Ministry of 
Defence (MOD) Research Establishments. The intial focus thus concerned the role of this 
particular intermediary in technology transfer. During the research process, the emphasis 
was changed to focus more widely on the whole intermediary industry as well as the 
potential customers for that industry. It was decided that an insufficient insight would be 
provided by considering a sole intermediary, since each intermediary appeared to present 
a different approach to the overall problem. Consequently, the evidence presented here 
is drawn from UK manufacturing industry, the UK intermediary industry as well as DTE. 
1.1.2 An Overview of the Presentation of the Research. 
This thesis sets out to present a coherent approach to a subject commonly known as 
technology transfer, but for which no commonly agreed definition exists. Rather than 
examining the subject from a purely academic standpoint, a more practical approach has 
been adopted which, by its use, has provided a greater insight than existing approaches. 
It is intended here to present the role of intermediaries in this, so far undefined, subject 
in terms of the necessary delivery of a service to manufacturing companies. In so doing, 
it is intended to present a relatively simple argument to uncover the hidden complexities 
of the subject matter. It is felt that it is of direct benefit to the reader if the 'research story' 
is presented at the outset, so subsequent information can be understood within the 
appropriate context. 
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To this end the research and evidence presented here will follow the following 'story: 
The perceived inadequacy of technological innovation within UK manufacturing industries 
has prompted considerable research as well as government initiatives to re-address the 
balance. This, amongst other factors, has lead to the formation of a wide variety of 
government, commercial and paternalistic agencies whose joint aim is to increase access 
to technology and in so doing propogate its future use. However, manufacturing 
organisations have failed to consitently innovate not simply because of a lack of access 
to technology, but because the innovation and technology acquisition processes are 
inherently complex and risky. To overcome the problems faced by individual industrial 
organisations, they require a diverse range of services to overcome internal deficiencies. 
This is particularly true of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) who most require 
assistance with processes such as technology scanning, assessment and implementation. 
In response the intermediaries have sought to provide a number of services which they 
perceive meet the needs of their clients, and potential customers. However, it has become 
evident that a mismatch is developing between those perceived needs and the services 
which many intermediaries actually provide. It is suggested that this mismatch is partly 
due to the lack of understanding of the various elements of technology transfer processes, 
which has lead with too much emphasis being placed on providing access to technology. 
Consequently, a conceptual model is developed here which defines technology transfer 
as involving three essential processes: Accessibility, Mobility and Receptivity. Acessibility 
describes the processes by which information on technology is made available; Mobility 
describes the processes by which technology is offered or moved between the source and 
recipient; and Receptivity describes the processes internal to the recipient which determine 
its response to a given technology. It is shown that more attention needs to be paid to 
understanding Receptivity in industry and that Mobility can be enhanced by overcoming 
the deficiences displayed by industrial organisations. The consequences of the current 
state of the technology transfer industry are discussed with a view not only to maximising 
the effectiveness of the intermediaries, but also with respect to Government policy and that 
eminating from the European Commission. 
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1.2. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER - THE PROBLEM CONTEXT 
1.2.1 Introduction 
The United Kingdom is generally considered to be amongst the most prolific producers 
of technology anywhere in the world. It is also generally considered to have gradually 
lagged behind many of its trading partners in putting that technology to use. This trend 
has been recognised by successive UK governments for a considerable period of time and 
though early policy making in the 1950's and 1960's was characterised by an ad hoc and 
relatively uninformed approach, more recent times have seen an attempt to formalise and 
professionalise industrial policy making (Rothwell & Dodgson 1992). This said however, 
industrial policy, especially that concerning innovation and technology transfer, remains 
an area of considerable weakness. 
Government policy, as well as much of the early (1950's) academic work, has traditionally 
concentrated on maximising the flow of technical ideas, on the assumption that scientific 
research creates technology which itself has inherent properties that compel its use in an 
industrial or other appropriate setting. Such a linear 'technology push' model of the 
innovation process was shown to have inherent faults. Funding of research and 
development activities with universities gave no guarantee of increased technological 
innovation in industry. The 1970's saw the growth of industry based research institutes 
charged with providing the technical expertise demanded by their industry. Whilst such 
research associations have played an important role in the provision in industry specific 
technology for many sectors, and are still as seen important sources of technology today, 
more recent policy has recognised that the funding of 'science' and 'technology' cannot 
be separated. Policy provision in the 1980's has concentrated on providing fundamental 
linkages, either firm to firm or university to firm, with an emphasis on the funding of pre- 
competitive collaborative research. 
Consistent with these policy changes has been a corresponding change in the audience at 
which the policy is targeted. Early policy was heavily biased towards funding fundamental 
research activities in large industrial organisations, partly because these were seen as the 
basic national income generators and partly because of the notion that technology would 
filter down the industrial hierarchy. This policy changed quite dramatically in the late 
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1970's and early 1980's with arrival of the old style Conservatism and new style 
Thatcherism. The emphasis moved towards the creation of a more entrepreneurial 
approach to industry and with it the support of Small and Medium Sized Enterprises 
(SME's) who were set to become the technological frontier of Britain. Current policy still 
favours, in theory if not actually in practice, SME's although as Rothwell and Dodgson 
(1992) point out, the trend has shifted to encouraging the growth of small high-tech 
companies. 
Though it is not the intended purpose of this thesis to undertake an indepth review of the 
role of government in the technology transfer process, it will be shown that too much 
emphasis has been, and still is being, placed on providing access to technology as the main 
stimulus of change. It will be argued extensively that the 'access' is only one element of 
a more complex and delicately balanced process. As Dorf (1988) has correctly revealed 
'Technology transfer is the exception not the rule'. A host of potential barriers exist to 
thwart the process of exchange. The potential obstacles are related to the technology under 
discussion, the source of technology and the potential user. The technology may not be 
a tangible product but rather the results of basic research or a laboratory model and as such 
will need considerable knowledge, time and money to successfully transfer, adapt and use. 
The technology source may be over ambitious towards the perceived value of their product 
and contractual problems will occur with the licensing procedure. The potential user may 
prove to be unable to successfully adapt the technology or unwilling to go to market within 
the timescale envisaged by the source. In other words, there are a plethora of elements 
continually conspiring to prevent technology transfer. 
1.2.2 Practical Models - Commerce. Government and the EEC 
In order to emphasise the continýal theme of this thesis, that emphasis is placed too heavily 
on 6access' to technology rather than the mechanisms for its transfer, it is intended to 
explore some of the existing transfer mechanisms at the outset to demonstrate their 
potential weaknesses. Though in general there has been little academic work aimed at 
practical technology transfer mechanisms, an overview has been provided by Dorf (1988). 
Although the distinction drawn between various 'models' as Dorf calls them, is not strictly 
in agreement with the analysis to be presented later, the Dorf paper nonetheless provides 
an appropriate starting point for the current discussion. Dorf has examined an number of 
practical models of technology transfer around the world which are currently being used 
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by Governments to facilitate technology transfer from government laboratories and 
universties. The literature which supports his observations is very diffuse and therefore 
diffcult to identify as an homogenous body of literature. However, it is not the intention 
of the follwing discussion to academically investigate the models themselves, but rather 
to identify some of the mechanisms which are currently being used to transfer technology 
from government laboratories, since one such mechanism will form a case study 
throughout this thesis. 
A full examination of how the AMR framework can be used to examine and evaluate 
various transfer mechanisms will be presented in Chapter 3 and later in Chapter 7. 
1.2.2.1 The Information Dissemination Model 
This basic model pioneered by the Federal Laboratories in the United States involves 
information dissemination on a 'scientific culture' basis. Since the policy of successive 
US governments has been that the results of any publicly funded research should be 
available to the public (with the obvious exception of sensitive defence related work) early 
attempts at technology transfer there, focused on providing such results. Information was 
disseminated via seminars, databases, publications and conferences. The process relied 
heavily on stimulating the scientific curiosity of industry and in so doing filter down 
technological information which would eventually appear as innovation in the marketplace. 
It also followed the principle that the information should be 'freely' available to all. 
1.2.2.2 The Licensina Model 
This is a derivative of the first model, but where the emphasis has shifted from 'information 
for all' to 'information to those best placed to use it'. The principle was that products or 
processes initially developed in Federal Laboratories would be licensed to industrial 
organisations for further development and eventual utilisation. This did cause problems 
with the question as to whom the knowledge should be transferred. Although licences 
could be made available on a non-exclusive basis, this would usually preclude any major 
investment by a licensee; such investment was essential for most government produced 
technology. Other solutions were tried with either the laboratory selecting the potential 
licensee on the basis of selecting the company most capable of commercialising the 
technology, or potential licensees were allowed to bid for the licence. 
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1.2.2.3 The Venture Capital Model 
This model involves providing entrepreneurs with capital in order that they might establish 
firms to commercialise specific technology or technologies. This approach allows the 
venture capitalist to decide which projects are worthy of funding on the basis that such 
organisations are better placed to judge suitability than the government. Such a model 
would often allow for a scientist or engineer to leave the laboratory and work as either a 
consultant to industry or the chief scientist of a newly formed organisation. The theory 
here being that it is the developer which is best placed to commercialise the technology. 
1.2.2.4 The Larae Company - Joint Venture Model 
This model encouraged collaborative projects between government laboratories and large 
industrial organisations with suitable Research and Development (R & D) facilities. By 
involving industry in government based research, technology transfer would be increased 
as the research became more industrially relevant. Hence both production and market 
considerations would be combined with government facilities. Technology transfer was 
to be further enhanced by the movement of researchers from the laboratories to industry 
to facilitate and speed the learning process. It was further believed that commercial 
organisations could be charged for this collaboration if exclusive rights could be obtained. 
1.2.2.5 The Incubator - Science Park Model 
'Science parks are, in the simplest terms, property developments which aim to support to 
research-based commercial activity' (Quintas et al 1992). Science parks work on two basic 
assumptions. Firstly, that scientific research leads to innovation and secondly that 
fledgling spin-off companies need a supportive environment. The theory is that the science 
park provides a forum for either university researchers to set up companies to exploit their 
work, or that small high-tech companies will benefit from the close proximity to university 
researchers. In both cases it was assumed that start-up companies would need business 
expertise and facilities over the initial growth period. The UK science park boom which 
started in the 1980's now boasts some 40 or so sites (Quintas et al 1992). 
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1.2.2.6 The 'Ferret' Model - Defence TechnoloRv Enterprises Ltd 
The 'ferret' model as Dorf calls it, refers to a UK company Defence Technology 
Enterprises Ltd (DTE) who were the original industrial partner for this research study. 
DTE were established in the mid 1980's by the government to transfer technology out of 
the Ministry of Defence (MoD) Research Establishments. In brief, DTE used a number 
of highly qualified scientists, called 'ferrets', to search for technology within the MoD 
establishments for an elite number of member companies. The idea was that using such 
staff the MoD could ensure security whilst also minimising the number of technologies 
which would have previously been graded as classified. Since this model is a mechanism 
for the transfer of technologies from one extreme of the technology spectrum, it will be 
referred to regularly throughout this thesis. 
1.2.3 An Initial Analvsis of some Practical Models 
Each of these basic 'models' attacks one particular element of the complex processes 
involved in technology transfer and each therefore has clearly defined advantages and 
disadvantages. The information dissemination model, whilst being easy to implement, 
is totally unfocused and relies too heavily on an unstructured process for information 
exchange. Licensing will at least be directed towards an appropriate audience and could 
in theory lead to a financial return. However, sufficiently patenting the number of 
technologies likely to emerge from government sponsored laboratories would be 
prohibitively costly. More difficult would be the selection of 'winning' technologies for 
patenting, as would identifying the best companies to receive the technology. The venture 
capital model aims to support a very limited number of technological developments with 
private capital. Whilst this at least would bring a greater level of commercial reality to 
government laboratories, the private capital markets are likely only to be interested in near 
market ready technologies with a large potential payback. Such technologies are less likely 
to emerge from establishments traditionally removed from market forces. Even if this 
could be implemented successfully, only such a very small number of cases would reach 
the market that the payback would probably not ju stify the effort. The large company joint 
venture model has the advantage that it would draw upon the financial muscle and industrial 
and technical expertise of companies with a proven record in technology management. 
However, it is equally as likely that the integrated R&D departments, culture and 
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personnel from two radically different organisations would lead to considerable management 
problems. Though employees from the industrial partner could be seconded to the 
government laboratory, it would probably be more appropriate if the personnel exchange 
occurred in the opposite direction, since the development of the technology must be based 
on commercial realities. 
The science park model is more complicated. It has the potential to encourage 
entrepreneurial activity in the university sector as well as to facilitate closer ties between 
small high-tech companies and centres of excellence. In offering a number of business 
support activities it also offers a 'safer' environment for the embryonic entrepreneurial 
activity. However, science parks consume a large amount of financial resources without 
any guaranteed payback. There is also an inherent assumption that universities are full 
of entrepreneurs with potential market beating products j ust waiting to be exploited. The 
evidence for this assumption is most notable by its absence as is the proof that academics 
make good businessmen. 
Finally, the DTE model was supposed to have the advantage of being market led in that 
member companies could drive the technology searching activity, but it proved far more 
difficult than expected. This technological scanning process was over complicated by 
using 'ferrets' who were not sufficiently close to their customers to undertake anything 
but a fully specified technology search. Indeed DTE soon found themselves in the 
technology push game by 'ferreting out' a large number of technologies and trying to 
stimulate interest in these discoveries within their membership. The membership itself 
acted as a limiting factor to the dissemination process since companies had to pay to 
examine the database of available technology. This has been described by several potential 
clients as 'paying to enter the supermarket'. 
1.2.4 Some Conclusions on Existing Models 
Although a seemingly wide diversity of current practical models used for technology 
transfer has been presented in the previous sections, each with different advantages and 
potential disadvantages, it is one of the purposes of this thesis to show that they are in fact 
all very similar in their approach. The consistent theme of this thesis is that technology 
transfer defines a complex innovation process and not just the apparent movement of 
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technology from one organisation to another. The models presented here thus far are all 
similar in that they aim to increase the 'access' to a potential technology pool, whether 
this be a government laboratory or a university. Partly in response to the failure of various 
'models' for achieving technology transfer, a number of agencies have been formed to 
assist the process. These agencies will serve as a major focus of this study and are discussed 
in the next section. 
1.2.5 Technolo2v Transfer Aizencies as Intermediaries 
A host of transfer organisations have formed over the last ten years in response to a 
perceived need to transfer more technology into UK industry, so that it might become more 
successful on a European and worldwide basis. These organisations, commonly referred 
to as technology transfer agencies or intermediaries, are not a single homogenous body. 
Indeed, in the Standard Industry Classification (SIC), or that used by large company 
database providers, no single such classification exists. Some of these organisations have 
their roots in commercially based technical consultancy, others are newly formed and are 
'dedicated' to technology transfer, whilst others owe their existence to government policy. 
In general, the roots of each organisation have determined its particular industrial bias, 
whether this be based on a well understood generic technology, or a given geographical 
region of the country. Indeed, geographic regions may cross country boundaries as 
individual agencies specialise in increasing co-operative activity between particular 
countries. It is also worth noting that this growth in technology transfer organisations is 
not a uniquely British phenomenon, but rather is mirrored across Europe and the USA. 
The precise mechanisms utilised by such agencies to facilitate technology transfer are also 
varied, but are usually determined by the technology sources accessed, the perceived 
customer base, or by political consideration. All the agencies possess a considerable 
amount of information in order to affect some 'useful' exchange. Indeed, the term 
technology transfer can lead to the belief that it is 'hard' or physical technology that is 
always the focus of the exchange. This is far from being the case. The 'technology 
transfer' under consideration may involve basic scientific research, prototypes, data on 
processing or manufacturing techniques, complete products or processes, or more general 
commercial exchanges leading to cross-distribution agreements or joint-ventures etc. 
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One of the elements which most characterises each organisation are the sources of 
technology utilised in its activities. For some agencies, universities or Government 
Research Establishments will predominate, others will use the depth of technology 
available from industry itself, both in the UK and elsewhere, whilst other agencies will 
either specialise or generalise. 
This picture has become more complex in recent times with an increase in inter-agency 
co-operation, usually in the form of information exchange. Such activity, whilst arguably 
essential to increase the 'pool' of technologies and clients to sufficient levels to make 
commercial and practical sense, has been greatly increased by the activities of the 
European Commission. Programmes such the Strategic Programme for Innovation and 
Technology Transfer (SPRINT) and the so-called Technology Transfer Days Scheme, are 
aimed, to a large extent, at inter-agency collaboration. By increasing the quantity and rate 
of information exchange it is believed that a relatively inefficient process can be made 
to produce efficient results to justify the investment of public monies. This process is not 
helped by the diversity of activities undertaken by intermediaries which, in association 
with technological specialisms and niche client bases, prevent a truly homogenous 
population of agencies evolving. 
This idea of specialism is particularly relevant to this thesis and in particular the 
relationship between technology sources, (and hence technology 'types'), clients serviced 
and the services offered by intermediaries to affect technology transfer. It is intended to 
show a direct relationship between the sources of technology and the 'attributes' of those 
technologies; between types of industrial customers and their technological needs and 
abilities; and between the first two factors and the services which intermediaries must 
supply in order to act effectively to encourage and achieve successful and sustainable levels 
of transfer. The fundamental approach taken here will be one of examining and analysing 
a 'service delivery problem'. 
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CHAlyrER 2 
2.0 INNOVATION AND THE FIRM. 
2.1 Introduction 
Innovation is not something which all companies engage in regularly but rather is a 
function of the market a company serves and how it serves that market. Some sectors 
require almost constant change, electronics for instance, whilst others have remained 
basically unchanged for decades. The need for change will reflect the product life-cycle 
which in turn mirrors ultimate demand and technological capabilities. Looking across 
all markets at all manufacturing firms it is easy to see that there will be companies of all 
possible types, but even within a reasonably small sector one will find a diversity of 
companies. It is not surprising, therefore, that academic writers have struggled for many 
years to categorise companies and make predictions about the 'best' routes to innovation. 
Although it is not intended that a microscopic examination of the categorisation techniques 
should be undertaken here, some examination is essential since valuable lessons regarding 
the need for innovation will be uncovered. Since this thesis has the primary objective of 
understanding the processes of innovation via sources of technology which are external 
to the innovating organisation, one must first attempt to comprehend the innovation 
process as a whole. 
Before attempting to understand the processes at work in innovating organisations one 
must first identify the basic influences which predispose an organisation to accept or reject 
the necessity for change. Nystrom (1979) classified companies into two large groups 
which he called Positional companies and Innovative companies. A Positional company 
is one which operates in a mature market where the demand for change is low, and hence 
the main incentive for change will be a sudden change in the operating environment caused 
by some external factor. If a radically different product cannot be introduced into the 
market then, overtime, the companies operating in the market will turn to issues such as 
quality and price to ensure their competitive edge. Such actions will in turn aim the 
company towards efficiency in production which usually means rationalisation and 
automation. The Innovative company operates in a radically different fashion. Market 
uncertainty coupled with constant change will engender the acceptance of technological 
change as a necessity and thus innovative activities will be targeted towards technological 
development rather than organisational development. Production will be less integrated, 
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and hence more flexible, leaving it open to change in product design. Further, the 
organisation will need to be open to changes in the production processes to meet the new 
demands placed upon production. 
Parker (1982) notes that the differences between innovative and non-innovative firms 
manifest themselves in the types of personnel they employee. The highly innovative 
company, for example, differs strongly from other companies since it makes use of 
advanced technological research carried-out within internal facilities. The long-term 
survival of the organisation depends heavily upon its capability to maintain a high level 
of technological expertise. Such research is costly and will be slow to be converted into 
profit and thus the end products tend to be high value and often low quantity. The non- 
innovative company is a very different beast. It produces large quantities of relatively 
simple products and the emphasis is on production. It is not dependent on technical 
expertise and consequently will not employ scientist or chartered engineers. The non 
technologically based products have the advantage of being able to be changed relatively 
easily, but there is little return for such investment given the operating market 
environment. 
New product 
Nature of problem-solving involves a 
Level of task required to convert Staff required for process 
Technology idea into a new product. new product development of: - 
ONE Repetitive solution from simple 
choice of things learnt. Craftsman Evolution. 
TWO Patterned. Discriminating choice 
from past experience and existing 
knowledge. Craftsman and Technical Evolution. 
THREE New ideas. Moderate level of Evolution with 
uncertainty. Improvement main Qualified engineer some 
aim. or scientist. innovation. 
FOUR New products alien to production 
and marketing enterprise. Open- 
ended problems with an infinite 
number of possible solutions. Highly experienced Some evolution 
engineer/scientist with 
High uncertainty. innovation. 
FIVE Adaptive. Descriminating choice 
of spin-off from high/medium Engineer/scientist with an 
technology. national reputation. Innovation. 
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six Precisely formulated, and 
unambiguous high technological goals. 
New knowledge, power of abstract 
thinking. Often quantitative problems 
and singular solutions. 
Engmeer/ 
scientist with an 
International reputation. Innovation. 
Table 2.1 Technology Levels and Innovative Activity. 
Parker (1982) adapted from Langrish et al (1979), and presented here in abbreviated form. 
The most important characteristics of the six levels of technology outlined above, are the 
nature of the technological problem which needs to be resolved and the qualities of the 
personnel necessary to achieve the desired solution. Those processes which are classified 
as tevolutionary' are fundamentally technical problem-solving processes, which require 
a relatively simple selection of possible alternatives. The basis for selection is reliant upon 
existing technological know how requiring little new technological input. Such decision- 
making processes are suited to craftsmen and technicians since all the required knowledge 
to solve the problem will be internally available at those levels. Technology levels three 
and four are significantly different since they will require the accumulation and 
assimilation of knowledge which is new to the organisation. Such a process is driven by 
a problem with a extensive and diverse number of solutions and will thus display a degree 
of uncertainty not present in the lower technology levels. A more technical problem 
requires a comprehension and adeptness of generic technologies available beyond the 
prevalent technological boundaries of the existing 'product'. Consequently, problem- 
solving is a more experimental process requiring the talents of highly skilled engineers or 
scientists. The time elapse prior to solution is likely to be increased in the less certain 
environment. The highest levels of technology will encompass abstract ideas and the 
formulation and derivation of new knowledge. Such processes are purely the domain of 
the most accomplished scientists and will require time and money for results. Such 
expertise will be absent from all but the most technologically eminent organisations, and 
will reside more often in educational establishments. 
The value of this technological categorisation is realised when compared against the 
characteristics of the organisations who produce the technologies. Figure 2.1 (overleaf) 
shows some of the most predominant characteristics of the six levels of technology and 
the organisations which produce and adopt them. Column 11 shows the relative capital 
and revenue costs of developing technologies of each category. Since levels 1&2 require 
evolutionary development of known ideas, they are the cheapest to produce since no new 
plant will be required and development time should be relatively short. As one moves 
higher up the technology levels, the investment required to produce results increases as 
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It is accepted that this table may provide a slightly stalic view of technology and skills in organisations, 
but nonetheless provides a useful insight into fliese isstie. s. 
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time and equipment become more crucial to eventual success. Similarly, the risk and 
subsequent financial pay-back from the investment increases as the technology increases 
in complexity and objective newness. 
Columns IV to IX proffer information germane to the genus of organisations displaying 
technological effort focused at each technological goal. The information is best considered 
by examining the three major technological divisions separately in order to construct a 
picture of the organisations operating within that framework. Examining technology 
levels 1 &2 for the present, one finds that organisations operating within this technological 
sphere are those generating large quantities of single products, where cost minimisation 
in production is crucial. Such organisations will operate in comparatively stable markets 
where commercial fulmination will be a consequence of increased efficiency in production 
by existing competitors, or by an unforeseen challenge from imports. 
These companies will not be required to follow active innovation strategies but rather, will 
operate defensively to combat clearly articulated threats. Continued growth is contingent 
upon enlarging market share, or opening new markets, if the organisation is not willing 
to ascend the technological ladder. 
Enterprises operating at levels 3&4 immerse themselves more deeply in research than the 
previous types, expending substantial amounts of money and consequently reap larger 
rewards. They distribute a wider variety of products across many, but related, markets. 
The company will seek to increase market share and competitive advantage by concentrating 
on improving the product itself, rather than the sale price. Consequently, commercial 
threats will be related to changes in the technology intrinsic to the product and less to 
transformations in production processes. In such an environment research and development 
will be closely related to market demand, which itself will be continually redefined, and 
a more aggressive development strategy will materialise. 
The companies operating at the greatest technological elevations have a potential for 
innovation bounded only by their technological vision and organisational confidence. 
Business is based upon small numbers of market leading products produced to meet the 
needs of world based demands and expectations. Innovation leading to radical improvements 
in existing products, and the formulation of totally new products, will be orientated around 
scientific investigation. Internal skills will be supplemented by inputs from educational 
establishments and other centres of technological excellence. 
16 
Commercial threats may be the result of under-financing exploratory projects directed 
toward maintaining technological excellence and general complacency towards international 
markets. 
2-2Manufacturers who use external research, design, and development resources.. 
In the above discussion we have identified how organisations can base their operations on 
the manipulation and exploitation of alternate levels of technology, defined by a scale 
dependent upon scientific and technological input. The operational level of technology 
will be maintained, reduced or increased according to requirements, and the availability 
of internal and external supplementary expertise. It is, therefore, expected that the use 
made of external technological sources will also vary across these organisational groups. 
As Parker (1982) points out, the'high-tech' organisations operating within levels five and 
six will be both willing and able to the receive technological input of external sources. New 
ideas will present few problems since sufficient internal expertise will exist to rapidly 
evaluate and assimilate the information. Companies using technologies in the lowest two 
levels should also encounter few problems from utilising external technology sources, 
since they are concerned wholey with well understood and proven technologies. 
Innovation will be evolutionary and external expertise will be sought to cover issues such 
as design and production. The prime role for external knowledge should be the facilitation 
of improvements in overall production processes and the implementation of specific 
production technologies. 
Following the above logic, it becomes obvious that the organisations operating at levels 
three and four may well be at a disadvantage since they require radically new technologies 
to maintain viability. Such technology will not be familiar to the technical personnel of 
the organisation nor will in-house expertise allow for easy assimilation of technologies 
from higher levels. These companies are in danger, then, of either under-investing in new 
technology due to lack of confidence in internal capabilities, and over-stretching 
themselves by exceeding internal capability. 
2.3 Innovative activity and firm size. 
Certainly one of the most important factors to consider when investigating the nature of 
innovation in manufacturing companies, is the differences that company size can make on 
success and failure. Many authors have considered this issue over thepast decades but some 
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more recent studies have shed new light on the problem (see Pavitt 1983, Pavitt 1986, 
Freeman 1974). Zoltan & Audretsch (1988) have extracted five factors which they 
conclude should give large companies an advantage over small companies in innovative 
activities. 
(a) The inducement of innovation by consuming financial and human resources on 
internally generated research and development programmes is expensive and involves high 
fixed costs. The effect of these costs can only be minimised by producing high volume 
or high value products. Certainly the former, and often the latter, are operations under 
taken by large firms. 
(b) Innovation as the stimulus and indeed pre-requisite of growth, is affordable only when 
the returns can gaurantee a sufficient share of the potential market. Increasing and 
maintaining a leading role in a given market usuually requires large scale production. For 
most products, large scale production means a large, capital intensive organisation. 
(c) Research and development, especially that aimed at less well defined and long-term 
goals, is an inherently risky process. These risks remaining constant, the ultimate risk 
being taken by an organisation is that which describes the affect failure could have on that 
organisation. Naturally, a company who's activities are diverse will be less affected by 
R&D failure in a specific area, and companies with such a diversity of interests are 
generally larger. 
(d) As will be described later, simply developing a new technology or incorporating such 
a technology into an existing product/process is not a sufficient condition for eventual 
market success. There are numerous internal an external factors which will 'colour' the 
eventual output of the innovation process. Not least of the problems facing an innovating 
organisation, is whether it can generate sufficient sales to justify the original innovation 
in both human and financial terms. The marketing and distribution of products to new 
markets and customers is a particularly difficult and skilled job, for which large companies 
should, theoretically, be better positioned to affect. Success in this sphere will ensure the 
best dividend for the original investment. 
(e) Finally, the received dividend may be dependent upon size related factors. For 
example, if two companies manufacturing products of similar market value but selling 
vastly different quantities, and both make an innovation in their production process which 
reduces production costs by five percent, the company selling the larger quantity will 
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receive a greater dividend from that innovation than the smaller company. The saving will 
be useful to both companies of course, but the size of the perceived dividend may affect 
the cost-benefit calculations of innovating organisations prior to the decision to innovate. 
It would be easy to deduce from such evidence, that large organisations have a totally 
advantageous position towards innovation. However, the shear size of such organisations 
often leads to problems in organising for innovation and responding to potential 
opportunities; to this degree, smaller companies may hold an advantage. Indeed, Zoltan 
& Audretsch (1988) also identify characteristics from theliterature, which are advantageous 
to innovation, but favour the smaller company. Innovation, in all its forms, denotes 
change, and all change will require some degree of organisational flexibility. An inflexible 
organisation, one with hardened barriers to new ideas, irrespective of size will be unable 
or less able to innovate. A flexible organisation, one who's internal structure is more able 
to accommodate new functions, will be better placed to assimilate innovation. Large 
organisations, defined by number of employees and functions, are complex and require 
a number of layers of management and control. Information will be filtered from the 
lowest to the highest elements in this pyrimidal structure, and to contain and process this 
information strict controls will be enforced. A consequence of this formalised process is 
not only to slow down the processing of new ideas, but can also lead to a perception of 
change as something abnormal, and to be feared. 
2.4 Options for Acquiring Technology. 
The most obvious choice an organisation has to make when considering how to acquire 
technologies relevant to it's needs, is whether or not it can generate those technologies 
internally through Research and Development (R&D). Before examining this question 
in detail, it is pertinent to say something about the difference between research and 
development. Firstly, one can classify research into two basic types: basic and applied. 
Basic, or fundamental, research is usually considered to be activity concerned with the 
generation of scientific theories, concepts, formulae, etc and for the most part is carried 
out by "scientists". This is the type of activity which leading universities and some 
government establishments will undertake, but is only carried out in industry where "big 
science" is necessary: eg. the chemical and pharmacuetical industries. Such activities are 
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generally characterised by a high failure rate, long research times and relatively low costs, 
compared with those necessary to bring a technology through to production (Roman & 
Puett 1983). Applied research, is research nearer to technological fruition and consists 
of adapting the output of basic research in order to meet the requirements of a particular 
application. This work is generally carried out by engineers who are responsible for 
accomplishing specific technological targets. 
Development consists of all those activities which are aimed at either taking the results 
of research (including prototypes) or completed technology already developed for a prior 
use, and applying these to the specific need of the organisation, to a state where the 
'technology' can be implemented. This area of activity would also usually include design 
work used to improve some particular attribute of the product or process. 
Finally, on this distinction between research and development, the reader will have noticed 
that no definitive statement has been made. This is simply because at the time of writing 
no commonly agreed distinction exists. This was brought to the notice of the House of 
Commons Select Committee on Science and Technology in 1986, when the question of 
the comparison between the amount spent on R&D by one country and another was used 
as an indicator of economic health (Gummett 1986). Gummett emphasised the difficulty 
of such comparison given the lack of definitions for research and development. It has to 
be accepted therefore, that whenever these terms are used they only should be taken as 
rough guides. Wherever possible the emphasis should be placed upon the level of 
technological work being undertaken. Using this, in conjunction with knowledge 
-regarding the nature of the organisation undertaking the work, one can approximate the 
type of change occurring. 
Returning now to the question of which companies are most likely to be involved in R& 
D activity, the answer will depend on a whole series of factors including firm size, the 
nature of the innovation task, the relationship between R&D (where it already exists) and 
other departments, the external environment which affects competitiveness and the 
internal competence of the company. For many companies this choice is far from obvious 
however. R&D is capital intensive due to the special equipment, facilities and people 
necessary to accomplish the task effectively. Further, since technology is often transient 
and R&D goals, at all but the most practical levels, difficult to define in any but the widest 
terms, undertaking research is fundamentally a risky business. The now classic Booz, 
Allen and Hamilton (1965) study, showed that in 51 major United States corporations only 
2% of initial product ideas were commercially successful, and almost 41 % failed prior 
to market testing. For some companies, notably chemical and pharmaceutical companies, 
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this risk is not only worth taking, but is the basis of their industry. A pilot study undertaken 
for this thesis showed that one major pharmaceuticals company had 2,000 R&D staff 
which represented nearly half of its personnel. This was justified by the potential return 
on cornering a medical market which in one case was worth f1h billion. 
For many others, however, technology is needed for upgrading products and processes 
and the potential cost of in-house development, especially when a return is calculated, 
prohibits much R&D activity. Again, the pilot study uncovered one medium sized 
traditional engineering company which gave two almost contradictory reasons for not 
doing its own R&D work. One of its main markets, machinery, was perceived as being 
extremely conservative and their basic product design was many decades old. Conversely, 
one of its other machinery markets was changing annually due to the constant improvement 
in the computer technology used in the product control systems. Since they are basically 
an engineering company and not an electronic company, they cannot hope to compete in 
this area. Like many other companies they rely on component and control system suppliers 
to keep pace with the electronics technology. 
This probability of failure within any research activity is further compounded by the 
inevitable time lags between a technical development and commercialisation of the final 
product. Even the more practical development necessary to produce a new model of car 
can take three or four years (Lowe and Crawford 1984). A major commitment to R& 
D is a strategic decision and such commitments often single out companies who view 
technology as a strategic resource (Twiss 1986). 
In essence the process relies upon two levels of organisational. strategy; corporate and R 
& D. Corporate strategy will have to consider the general business environment weighing 
up both the economic and technological pressures within the relevant markets. These 
determine the necessity for technological change. Social and political pressures will 
determine the context within which technological change takes place. For example, one 
major UK car manufacturer questioned within the pilot study for this thesis, reported they 
considered change within their organisation as evolutionary and mainly followed changes 
in government legislation. 
The external 'change environment' has then to be weighed against a specific organisational 
environment. Evaluating the available resources and calculating the budget necessary to 
meet the perceived needs are vital elements in determining whether internal R&D is 
feasible or desirable. The resources necessary for any form of R&D include capital but 
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also technical personnel. An evaluation of the existing skills base would be necessary and 
some analysis of its suitability to a given area of technology, for example. 
The R&D strategy needs to identify the specific technological goals required by the 
organisation and how these are to be met. More technical analysis of the skills base would 
be necessary as well as how this affects the type of R&D to be accomplished. Will the 
R&D function include a generation of basic scientific ideas, engineering concepts or the 
application of known technology, or will the activity revolve around scanning for and 
evaluating technologies generated outside? 
In the end, some companies will opt for the 100 % internal generation of technology and 
still more will depend solely on ideas generated, and often applied previously, by others. 
It is thus important now to examine some of the various mechanisms which are used by 
industry to acquire externally generated technology. 
2.5 The Acquisition of Externally Generated Technology 
There are a number of alternative ways of acquiring technology other than attempting their 
generation by internal research and development. 
2.5.1 Contract R&D 
This is the purchasing of research, development or testing under contract by selected 
specialists. There are a number of organisations offering such services, including 
universities, government research establishments, research associations, and various 
private research companies. Most of these would specialise in a specific area of 
technology: for example, the Building Research Establishment in Hertfordshire. 
The advantages of contract R&D include making advanced technology accessible to 
companies who have no specialists of their own. This is particularly useful for 
organisations moving into a new technological discipline which can happen during market 
growth. Contract R&D can be considered and used as a flexible resource. Organisations 
with limited resources can therefore cover a wider field of technology than would be 
possible if financing their own internal R&D activity. This also allows for more effective 
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utilisation of labour and capital. Theoretically, contract R&D should prove to be a method 
of rapidly responding to a technological threat or opportunity where no internal response 
can be mounted quickly. This does depend upon two factors however. Firstly, that a 
contract organisation can be found that is already working in a relevant area. Secondly, 
that a project can be agreed upon quickly and the results expected, achieved within an 
agreed timetable. Given what has already been discussed about the unpredictable nature 
of research, if contract R&D is to reduce the time taken to acquire technology, then the 
type of research undertaken will have to be very applied. One common type of such applied 
research is prototype testing. An example would be the use of a wind tunnel by companies 
infrequently needing to test the aerodynamic qualities of the products. Large wind tunnels 
are expensive to construct and are usually needed over a relatively short period for any 
one design. It is thus common for universities or even private companies to undertake 
testing of others designs. 
If there are potential advantages to this sort of technology acquisition, then there are also 
some important disadvantages. Firstly, the uncertainty existent in all R&D activity is 
still inherent in that performed under a contract agreement. Furthermore, in all but the 
most applied venture there will remain the problem of briefing, interpreting and evaluating 
the results of contract research. This itself makes a number of demands on the recipient 
not least of which is translation of research findings into organisationally useable language. 
In many cases such analysis may itself become a time consuming and costly business. In 
all events, contract R&D will still continue as the domain of the technologically aware 
companies. 
2.5.2 People transfer 
"People are one of the most important methods for transferring technology" (Roman and 
Puett 1983). Professional scientists and engineers are a highly sought after commodity 
which consequently is very mobile. Such individuals, often working at the leading edge 
of their fields, are repositories of potentially applicable knowledge. Transnational firms 
have traditionally moved skilled personnel temporarily to subsidiaries in order to expose 
them to other parts of the organisation. This might then lead to suggestions regarding 
potential technological change in a subsidiary. There is of course, the possibility that the 
temporarily transferred scientist might learn something which could be applied in the area 
from which he came. This cross-fertilisation of ideas and knowledge, whilst of great 
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potential benefit is often limited (Roman and Puett 1983). One important potential barrier 
to the movement of people base knowledge between organisations occurs as a result of the 
type of knowledge concerned. A scientist or engineer trained and experienced in one 
discipline may have trouble adapting his knowledge to suit the demands of technological 
activity in another. This anomaly is of particular relevance when considering the potential 
transfer of technological ideas and practices from the defence sector to the civilian sector, 
or from large companies to small companies. Reppy (1985) showed a significant 
difference between defence technologies and civilian technologies. The particular 
environment and technological specifications apparent in the defence industry, produce 
products of a complex and advanced type. Such technology could not easily be applied 
directly, or even indirectly, to civilian uses, according to Reppy. Such technology is the 
work of scientists and technologists specialising in the rigours of defence requirements. 
One must seriously question how easily intellectual abilities and practices can overcome 
the change in the basic product philosophy between the two disparate sectors. Since there 
is increasing concern over the potential crowding-out deprivations of military R&D 
expenditure, not only in financial terms but also in manpower and the potential problems 
of transferable skills, serious barriers must exist to people based technology transfer. 
2.5.3 Co-operativejoint venturing 
Co-operative technology transfer covers a number of specific transfer mechanisms 
including co-production, consortiums and joint venturing. Using the property rights to 
a technology owned by another organisation under licence to the mutual benefit of both 
organisations is another form of co-operative venture. This process, known as licensing 
is becoming even more popular and many of the intermediaries studied within this thesis 
use this mechanism for releasing technology. Licensing as an activity, we will discuss 
separately. 
Co-production occurs when two or more organisations enter into an agreement to produce 
a single product. One organisation may provide the technology whilst the other may 
provide some components and the assembly plant. Such a situation is likely only to be 
used where the end manufacturer cannot obtain the required technology through more 
conventional routes such as licensing or direct purchase. All forms of co-oPerative 
venturing require the various parties to rely to greater or lesser extent on each other. Such 
24 
commitment is relatively rare since experience has shown that it is a difficult process to 
manage. 
Joint venturing is the commonly used name to describe joint research and development 
projects. One would not normally expect joint ventures in the private sector to involve 
the same level of risk and resource input as that displayed in the public sector (Roman and 
Puett 1983). More usually, the emphasis will be on technological production or marketing 
input to a relatively developed product, with the aim of 'mutually beneficial exchange'. 
It is worth noting that resource limitations are not the only potential catalysts for joint 
ventures which may equally be driven by political or economic restrictions. For example, 
several joint DTI/EEC initiatives aimed at enlarging inter-European co-operation, have 
specific requirements about the number of organisations and countries which must be 
involved. 
2.5.4 Licensin 
Licensing can broadly be described as an arrangement where a licensor, usually having 
some proprietary control (eg patent, copyright, trademark or know-how) of a product or 
process, gives the licensee the right of use of this property. This property right is usually 
dependent upon someperformance criteria to ensure that bothparties are suitably rewarded 
for their efforts. This area of technology acquisition is rapidly expanding and though exact 
world figures are difficult to calculate it was estimated that in 1978 the global international 
licensing business was worth $14 billion per annum. From 1969 - 1979 there was a four- 
fold increase in the royalties received in the UK. The 1983 figures showed that the UK 
have a E150 million surplus on technology royalties (all figures Roman and Puett 1983). 
This surplus is said to demonstrate how much better the UK is at basic research than many 
other countries. 
There are many components of licensing as an acquisition method since it is said to have 
a number of advantages over other methods. From the licensees perspective, licensing 
offers the possibility of obtaining a technology relatively quickly and, dependent upon the 
licence agreement, at a vastly reduced expense compared with internal or external research 
development. From the licensors point of view licensing their technology can allow 
financial rewards to be recovered from market sectors that they would otherwise not have 
been able to reach. To this end non-exclusive licences are now a common approach for 
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many companies wishing to see their technology exploited across a number of industrial 
sectors or geographical locations. 
Licensing is perhaps the major mechanism of technology transfer favoured by the types 
of intermediaries being studied in this thesis. Licensing has the advantage that the co- 
operation required between the two parties can be varied to suit the needs of the licensee. 
In this way a large company may simply buy a licence for a technology almost as it buys 
a product in that little co-operation is actually undertaken between the two parties. 
Conversely, licensing would also allow a much closer relationship between two parties 
where it was felt that the licensee required additional help to effectively use the licence. 
Companies such as Pilkington Glass in the UK have used the licensing of their float glass 
manufacturing process to effectively control glass production worldwide. By offering 
non-exclusive licences to all potential companies in their market, and by charging an 
appropriate fee for the use of that licence, Pilkington have been able to obtain returns on 
their original R&D investment in a way that would have been impossible if they had 
wished to remain the sole user of those property rights. However, licensing is not without 
its problems. Many of these problems stem from the licence negotiation process which 
may involve agreeing a suitable upfront payment by the licensee as well as future royalties 
from the patents use. During such negotiations conflict often occurs between the two 
parties since the licensor often seeks to receive return on his investment as soon as possible 
whereas the licensee will be looking to prove the usefulness of the licence technology in 
the marketplace before committing himself to royalty payments. Deriving a balance 
between these two opposites, constitutes the fundamental problem in licence negotiation. 
Despite this potential for conflict, licensing is, and will no doubt remain, the prime 
mechanism used by intermediaries in technology transfer. 
2.5.5 Literature 
Literature consisting of books, technical and professional journals, trade magazines, 
specialist newsletters and research documents are undoubtedly a useful source of 
information for many industrial organisations. At one end of the scale it can help to keep 
track of the products offered by competitors and on the other may allow the acquisition 
of knowledge and techniques necessary to overcome specific problems. Unfortunately, 
there are a whole host of problems with promoting the movement of technology by 
literature. 
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There is now so much literature available to industrial organisations that its surveillance 
must be on a very selective basis. Thus a company specialising in pre-moulded plastic 
might limit its 'company library' to literature dealing specifically with polymers and 
plastics. In doing so, it limits the potential acquisition of relevant knowledge from other 
fields and disciplines. If such a company chooses to throw its net wider, then the amount 
and scope of literature covered may become a problem. Literature takes time to read and 
for its implications to be properly analysed. Since this process will require a company's 
most technologically skilled personnel there is always the problem that such staff will 
spend large amounts of potentially fruitless activity. Such an occurrence may be 
acceptable to large companies with the time to consider the future, but is unlikely to be 
possible in smaller organisations. Further, a wider analysis of literature requires staff with 
a correspondingly wider knowledge. This could be achieved by acquiring more widely 
qualified staff or with the addition of more specialists. Again, such expense on a purely 
speculative venture is unlikely in SME's, other than those specialising in areas of leading 
edge technology. 
Finally, appropriate literature-based knowledge has to be recognised, assimilated, 
developed and applied before an end product is produced. This process can be demanding, 
time consuming and expensive and will therefore only be applicable if future needs and 
not present problems are the force for change. 
2.5.6 Education 
"The most obvious but perhaps the least discussed vehicles for technology transfer are 
educational institutions" (Roman and Puett 1983). Education, by definition, is a process 
of imparting information and its potential application from one individual to another. 
Technologically based information is no exception and will be imparted as a matter of 
course with both general and technical education. 
The issue of matching educational and industrial requirements is complex and not the 
subject of debate here. However, comment should be made on obtaining qualified staff 
and training as means to technological updating. The employment of graduate and post- 
graduate personnel will equip an organisation with staff able to understand and use 
fundamental concepts and techniques. Where an organisation is not able to enhance their 
knowledge by internal R&D activity, staff will rely heavily on literature, educational 
updating or may not seek to keep fully up to date with technical advances. Educational 
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institutions often take a considerable period to translate newly acquired knowledge into 
taught courses. Therefore, the employment of qualified staff does not automatically lead 
to the acquisition of technology transfer. Ensuring staff are acquainted with leading edge 
knowledge may require a continuous process of education through training. 
2.5.7 Technical consulting services and intermediaries 
Consulting services cover most aspects of business from staff training on a new 
wordprocessor, to the implementation of advanced production processes and product 
design, to marketing strategy. Government initiatives under the control of the DTI have 
targeted small and medium size enterprises for consultation services. A range of facilities 
are being supplied from support for marketing to the identification of technology based 
organisational. problems. 
Potentially, consultancy has advantages over other methods of technology transfer, since 
the transfer process is supported. That is, that consultants can potentially provide both 
access to technology in the first instance and transfer an implementation procedure in the 
second. In addition they are in a position to analyse whether the technological solution 
being sort by an organisation actually reflects the true nature of the problem. One of the 
aspects of technology transfer which frequently raises its head concerns the idea of the 
articulation of need by organisations. There is growing belief that far too often companies 
identify problems without analysing their cause, and therefore fail to realise the true nature 
of the problem. (T. Kakabadse 1983). Unfortunately, many consultants are too keen to 
take a particular job and are not prepared to question the problem given to them and hence 
fail to notice, or choose to ignore more important issues (H. Ford 1974). Not surprisingly 
people are becoming more sceptical of these modern day "witch doctors" (J. Peet 1988). 
Despite these problems, the technological consultant has the potential to transfer 
technology in a number of ways: 
(a) Specific technology based consultancy - advising on purely technological matters to 
address well identified and specified technological problems. 
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(b) Technological fix - taking a technology based problem and identifying potential 
technological solutions. 
(c) General consultancy - analysing an organisation, identifying problem areas and 
formulating problem solving strategies. Technology transfer would not be a necessity of 
such consultancy, since the consultant may decide that the fundamental problem is not one 
of technology. 
How ever a consultant operates he has the advantage of being able to offer company 
specific solutions, taking account of the particular needs of his client, the provision of an 
appropriate solution and a vehicle by which to implement that solution. 
Obviously, consultancy services can be seen as just one form of technology transfer 
intermediary. Indeed, many of the intermediaries working in technology transfer at the 
present time would consider themselves to be in effect technology consultants. However 
a fundamental difference between the two groups of organisations is that intermediaries 
in general have access to a source or sources of technology directly. A technology 
consultant would identify a technological problem and then search for a potential 
technology solution, in doing so he may well turn to other intermediaries to source the 
required technology. 
Since many of the activities of technology consultants and intermediaries will be identical 
it solves no useful purpose to try and draw an arbitrary difference between two groups. 
Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis technology consultants and intermediaries will 
be seen as a homogenous group. What will also become clear is that many technology 
consultants are in a far better position to affect successful technology transfer than many 
of their larger intermediary cousins. 
2.6 Organisational Structure and Technological Change 
Whilst an indepth study of the organisational structures associated with the successful use 
of technology, it is not the primary focus of the approach taken here to technology transfer, 
it is appropriate to comprehend something of the effect of internal structures on such 
processes. 
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This section, therefore, reports the results of nine major research projects related to factors 
associated with successful innovators and technically progressive firms: 
Rothwell 1974: Szakastis 1974: Carter and Williams 1957: Myers and 
Marquis 1969: Langrish et al 1972: Hayvaret 1957: Schock 1974: Uttback 
1975: Rothwell 1976. 
2.6.1 Factors Associated with Successful Innovation 
The contribution of good and efficient internal and external communication was found to 
be a very important factor in successful innovation. Indeed, this was one of only two areas 
in which there was complete agreement between the nine studies. Good communication 
links with outside scientific and technical establishments were found to be important, as 
was deliberate efforts to survey potentially useful externally generated ideas. Successful 
innovators were found to have effective collaboration with outside agencies, particularly 
customers, and wherever possible to collaborate with these potential users at an early stage. 
This allows for a good understanding of user needs, appreciation of the operating 
conditions of the innovation, and affords the opportunity for pre-launch trials. 
These findings have an important implication for technology transfer intermediaries whose 
task often concerns the implantation of technology into an organisation far removed from 
that which produced it. Obviously, there is no reason why externally, and separately 
generated, technology should not be incorporated into a new organisation in direct 
response to a well articulated demand from that organisations customers. However, much 
of the input from the recipient and customers found to be a positive factor in successful 
innovation would be potentially absent. Such problems will, of course, be very dependent 
upon the recipient organisation and especially the technology under consideration. It is 
not correct to say that some technologies are easily transferred and others are not. The 
transfer ability of the technology would be heavily dependent on the resources the recipient 
and often the transferer, can bring to bear in order to facilitate the exchange. 
A comprehensive understanding of marketing and user needs is the second area of total 
agreement and seems to be the most crucial factor in determining success. The majority 
of successful innovation (75 %) is need - pull related rather than technology - push 
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(Rothwell 1977). Where the technical potential for innovation already exists, then 
successful innovators determine a 'need' exists first before proceeding with a project. It 
is very important to determine user needs first so that these may be incorporated into the 
design. Failure to determine such needs have been associated with a 'we know best' 
attitude in many innovators. Again, this can have major implications for some 
intermediaries, especially those with a large proportion of university or private innovator 
generated technology. In both cases, but for different reasons, there is a danger that the 
technology offered for transfer is impractical in one or another, simply because of the 
process that originally formed it. This problem is particularly prevalent with private 
innovators who often exploit a need perceived by them, but not sufficiently examined with 
regard to the potential market in order tojustify full production. Indeed, another problem 
is that since the innovator is removed from a practical production environment, too little 
consideration is given to materials and production processes. This often leads to potential 
products being far more expensive to manufacture than is practicable. 
The quality of management as well as the management style is vital in consistently 
achieving innovation. If management have not got the will to innovate then there is little 
that other members of the company can do. Success appears to be related to an open- 
horizontal management style, one which is organic other than mechanistic, particularly 
with regard to the R&D and marketing functions. However, management openness will 
not be sufficient on its own in achieving successful innovation, but is vital to encourage 
a culture in which openness to technology is a fundamental part. 
Once a technology 'arrives' at the doorstep of an organisation, the innovation process has 
only just begun. Problems of sufficient and appropriate technological assessment, 
assimilation and ultimate use will follow. The research studies reviewed here show that 
a number of key individuals will be necessary to accomplish each of these tasks. The role 
of the so called 'product champion' is widely acknowledged and relatively well 
understood. This individual is often responsible for the introduction of the technology to 
his organisation and is either charged with, or takes it upon himself, to persuade others 
in his organisation of the potential advantages of the new technology. In smaller companies 
one would expect that this individual would be part of the directorate, but in larger 
organisations he might be a particular scientist or engineer. Given that many organisations, 
especially those with an internal R&D function, often exhibit a 'not invented here 
syndrome', it is essential that a suitably senior member of staff should support the 
technology until it is accepted by his colleagues. 
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A less well examined key individual is one referred to as the technological 'gatekeeper'. 
The role of the 'gatekeeper' is probably not officially recognised within an organisation, 
nor may it necessarily be desirable. The 'gatekeeper' is the individual who controls the 
flow of technological information from external sources. In smaller organisations this 
may well be the Managing Director who also doubles as the product champion. In larger 
organisations a given 'gatekeeper' may be either the Head of Research or Chief Scientist 
or Engineer in a particular research department. Potentially an individual who is able to 
control the influx of technology is in a very powerful position, but he must also take the 
associated responsibility. Insufficient research has been uncovered to fully discuss the 
'gatekeeper' phenomenon, but nonetheless it is a very appropriate concept for technology 
transfer intermediaries. The intermediaries have to interface directly with some element 
of the organisation of the potential client, and for the necessary flow of information to be 
effective, that interface must be with an individual able to assess, translate and diffuse the 
information within his organisation. No amount of information provision, no matter how 
high quality that information might be, will affect technology transfer if the information 
is directed at an individual ill-equipped to assess and deal with it. However, in most cases 
the intermediary will not be able to select the internal contact used for such information 
exchange and nor would the intermediary be able to assess which individual would be most 
appropriate, in any event. 
2.6.2 ImDlications of Internal Structure and the Role of Intermediaries 
What has emerged from the brief discussion above, is that innovation and technology 
transfer is not simply related to 'hard' techno-economic factors, but is also ultimately 
controlled by 'soft' socio-cultural ones. In understanding industrial organisations it is 
imperative to consider organisational, cultural and personal perspectives (this idea is 
expanded in Chapter 3). Whether an organisation is ultimately open, or perhaps 
'Receptive', to technology and technological change, will not simply be a consequence 
of its industrial sector, market position and company size, but will also depend upon 
6cultural' issues which may reflect an overall attitude towards technology, a management 
style or the age of the company, for example. Intermediaries that seek to facilitate change 
within such and organisation must be in the position to assess and understand the 
technological and cultural issues relevant to a given organisation. Failure to do this will 
most likely lead to inappropriate technological activity. The extent to which this is true, 
of course, will depend heavily upon the clarity and accuracy of the demand articulated by 
the recipient organisation. It is not only important that the technological 'gatekeeper' can 
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assess and translate information received from intermediaries in a way that can then be 
used by his organisation, but it is also important that the intermediary can understand, 
assess and translate the articulated need into a language suitable for his own organisation. 
The case study used throughout this thesis, DTE, shows clearly that this problem of 
understanding articulated need in order to affect an appropriate technology scanning 
activity on behalf of the intermediary, is potentially fraught with problems. The level of 
involvement necessary by the intermediary to cause effective innovation within the 
organisation will be discussed in later chapters. It will be seen, however, that the level 
of involvement intermediaries may need to take with some organisations presents a 
potential conundrum since it is often those organisations which can least afford such 
intervention. 
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CHAPrER 3 
3. DEFINING THE TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROCESS. 
3.1 An Initial Approach to a Definition. 
The realms of the literature dealing with technology transfer, innovation, and diffusion 
are full of the analysis of exactly what these, and other such terms, mean. Such a 
preoccupation with the definition of essential terminology is characteristic of a subject not 
yet certain of its area of study or of the most appropriate approach to that study. It is thus 
especialy important for the purposes of this study that an acceptable framework can be 
attained within which to consider the various processes set into action when technology 
transfer occurs. 
Before embarking upon a detailed discussion about the intellectual frameworks used as 
analytical tools for the study of technological change and technology transfer, it is 
important that some exploration of the term "definition", which forms the cornerstone of 
literature in this field, is undertaken. It is important to understand here that a definition 
is a product of, and can only relate to, a specified environment. As a simple example, 
an everday definition, or understanding, of a tree might be as a biological organism of the 
plant kingdom generally notable for its large size, single trunk and woody composition. 
Generally, this definition would suffice, however, to an ecologist studying the flora and 
fauna of a tropical rainforest, this definition would be useless because it fails to identify 
the inherent properties of the organism in such a manner as to provide a valuable insight 
for the study in progress. The ecologist needs, by the nature of his relationship with the 
forest, definitions of individual species which tell him more about the nature and function 
of those species with respect to the whole ecosystem. Likewise, the definitions which 
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surround the term technology transfer are no longer appropriate to the subject because they 
fail to explore the depths of the processes and environmemt in which this phenomenon 
exists. 
Superficially this argument expresses one of the central themes of the present study. That 
is, in order to fully appreciate, understand and participate within the technology transfer 
process, it is first essential that the boundaries of the working environment of the 
phenomenon are fully indentified. It is my intention to argue in this chapter that whilst 
investigators in this field insist on taking a purely technological perspective of technology 
transfer, they will fail to understand the properties of the process and hence will be unable 
to direct the course of events that lead to transfer. 
A definition of technology transfer, therefore, should not be seen as a complete or final 
statement of the process, but rather as a conceptual map which acts as the guide necessary 
to traverse the subject matter. 
Before one can start to consider a specific conceptualisation of technology transfer, it is 
necessary to place this concept within the general environment in which it operates. If 
technology transfer is most often seen as part of a general process which we can call 
Technological Change, a first priority must be to outline this more general process. A 
commonly acceptable chronology of events leading to Technological Change can be seen 
from the sequence outlined in Rothwell & Zegveld (1985). Here the authors outline three 
stages to the production of a 'new tecnology' and a fourth stage which is the ultimate 
movement of that technology. 
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The sequence and definitions of the events are as follows: 
"Research: 
... the formulation of ideas and concepts based upon a paradigm of a particular 
body of knowledge, which may be directed 
either towards a particular goal 
(Mission-oriented) or to the extension 
of that body of knowledge (fundental). 
Invention: 
... a conceptual or physical model which embodies the ideas and concepts of the 
research paradigm, but reduces this 
knowledge to a particular end. 
Invention is the initial application, 
design and development of the research. 
Innovation: 
... the 'utilisation' of that invention from a conceptual model to a practically 
reality . The innovation can be in the form of a product or process or indeed 
in the form of changes to an 
organisation. Innovations in products 
orprocesses will involve a changefrom 
a prototype model to the sale of the 
final product and will involve a series 
of management issues and techniques. 
Innovation in an organisation will 
involve a fundemental change in the way 
the elements in that organisation 
interact. 
Diffusion: 
... the process of natural dissemination throughout the potential market universe 
for that knowledge. That knowledge can 
be derivedfrom either research, invention 
or innovation. " 
It is not my intention here to argue against this traditional view of technological change, 
for in essence it covers the process well. However, this seemingly benine definition of 
technological change has had a marked influence on the way that many writers view and 
define technology transfer. Essentially, most attempts at defining technology transfer 
have, by default, been attempts to fit this new concept within the above framework. This 
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endeavour has resulted in a definitional approach to technology transfer which is bounded 
within the existing technological perspective of technological change, rather than truely 
reflecting the complex nature of the technology transfer process. Before expanding upon 
this arguement it is necessary first to explore what the literature tells us about technology 
transfer and form a taxonomy of approaches to the subject matter. 
A common definition of technology transfer is "the process by which a technology is 
applied to a purpose other than the onefor which it was originally intended" (F. Bradbury 
1978). This concept of technology transfer is very pervasive in the literature and provides 
the basis for a school of thought that will be outlined below. The origins of this definition 
are, as Bradbury explains, based on the post war movement in the United States towards 
the transfer of military technology to the civil sector. This concept, which has since been 
mirrored by a number of countries, was to make available to the civilian economy a vast 
range of technologies that would otherwise be beyond the reach of all but the largest R&D 
spenders. Basically, this definitional approach is one that considers technology transfer 
to be a movement of technology which leads to a 'new use' for that technology. This 
approach to receives support from, amongst others, Hough (1975), Gruber & Marquis 
(1969) and Essoglou (1975). Essoglou also makes the point that technology transfer is 
one aspect of the diffusion of technology. The merit of this assertion, depends upon how 
one chooses to define diffusion. Much of the literature considers diffusion to be a 
% natural', or perhaps, market determined, phenomenon which follows some innovatory 
activity or product. Bell & Hill (1978), for example, say the following: "subsequent to 
its use in innovation a technique may be replicated in succeeding technical changes. This 
spread of technical change following its innovation is often refered to as a diffusion 
process". Using the terminology of our last definition of technology transfer as a 'new 
use' of technology, diffusion according to the process described above could be called the 
% same use' of technology. The 'new use' school of definitions is probably best illustrated 
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by Jervis (1978) who considers technology transfer to be the "total sequence of events 
through which an invention which has originated in, say, a University laboratory or 
government research establishment is taken into a commercial organisation, modified and 
developed against new criteria and introduced to the marketplace". 
This 'new use' model is represented in Fig. 1. below. 
Figure 3.1 
The 'New Use' Model of Technology Transfer 
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This diagram shows clearly the concept that the movement away from the 'normally 
expected' flow of a given technology is considered to be technology transfer. 
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Brooks (1968), extends the above definition to the following: 
"... the process by which science and 
technology are diffused throughout human 
activity. Wherever systematic rational 
knowledge developed by one group or 
institution is embodied in a way of 
doing things by other institutions or 
groups, we have technology transfer. 
Importantly, however, Brooks makes a distinction between two types of technology 
transfer, Vertical and Horizontal Transfer: 
" Vertical transfer refers to the 
transfer of technology along the line 
from the more general to the more 
specific. "" Horizontal transfer occurs 
through the adaptation of a technology 
from one application to another, 
possibly wholly unrelated to the 
first... 1.9 
These new terms can, still be fitted into the scheme shown in Fig. 3.1, Brooks' Horizontal 
transfer is clearly that process shown in this diagram. The Vertical transfer is the flow 
of technology seen in the columns starting with research and ultimately leading to 
diffusion. This extension of the definition allows a wider number of processes to be seen 
as technology transfer. Any movement of know-how or technology between parties 
involved in the research to innovation stages of technological change, is technology 
transfer. Welles (1973) concurs with this view clearly stating in his definition that 
technology transfer is the movement of technology between two groups but that the use 
of that technology need not be different. Brooks and Welles, therefore, regard a particular 
direction of movement as technology transfer, whereas diffusion covers all, or a series, 
of movements of a given technology. 
Not all authors have agreed with the definitional approach which takes the 'direction of 
flow' of the technology as the defining characteristic. Rubenstein (1976), for instance, 
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prefered to define the various processes by the types of information being transferred. He 
used a general term to describe all transfer processes which was 'Technical Exchange 
Transactions' (TETs). This general term was sub-divided into three more groups. Group 
one were called 'Scientific and Technical Information' (STI) transactions. These 
generally involved communications between individuals or groups about scientific and 
technical literature. The exchange of state-of-the-art information in a given area of 
research field would be one example of this process. Group two, were called 'Technical 
Assistance' (TA) transactions. This type of transaction involved know-how relating to the 
manufacturing and processing spheres. That is, information on methods of achieving 
technical goals like the adaption of a machine to meet a new working environment. The 
third group of processes Rubenstein gave the name 'Technology Transfer' (TT). He 
describes this kind of process as involving "the transfer of a capability to not only use., 
but also adapt and modify and, in many cases, to innovate with respect to a product., 
process, piece of equipment, orfield of technology (broad or narrow)". This process 
involved a wide range of participants other than just management to achieve the technical 
goals. An example of a turnkey contract with the necessary know-how for a new plant, 
is given as an example of this process. 
It is interesting to try and understand why Rubenstein should decide to conceptualise 
technology transfer in terms of the type of information being moved. Though at first glance 
this approach would appear to hold little in common with that taken by Brooks, they do 
infact share a common paradigm. That common paradigm is the chronological 
interpretation of technological change outlined earlier from Rothwell & Zegveld (1985). 
Rubenstein's definition covers the types of information which would be passed between 
the invention and innovation stages in the chronology. This is not coincidence but rather 
a deliberate attempt to categorise information into the commonly held view of technological 
change. By attempting to do this, rightly or wrongly, the resultant definition suffers from 
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its attachment to the terms of reference previously laid out elsewhere. Since the terms of 
reference use purely technological paradigms, the resulting conceptualisation will be 
couched in these terms. 
At this stage in our quest to unveil the activities which underlie the concept of technology 
transfer several attempts have been observed to Pin-down the process, which can be 
categorised into one of two groups. The processes described are either characterised by 
the direction of movement of technology or else are products of the type of information 
being passed. Superficially different in approach, both models suffer from limited terms 
of reference and are thus securely wedged into a single, technological perspective, of what 
is undoubtedly a very complex process. 
Is technology transfer to be defined by the direction of movement of technology, or should 
it be defined as any particular movement of technology? The definitional work examined 
so far is concerned with establishing a difference between movements of technology in 
one direction and those moving in another. Indeed, since this thesis deals with the role 
of intermediaries in technology transfer, and that one could imagine that intermediaries 
would be of greater use where the technology source and potential user are 'remote' in 
some way, the 'direction of flow' definition might appear important. However, this is 
not the case, for two reasons. Firstly, by defining technology transfer according to a 
particular type of ' technolgical movement', there is an innate desire within the literature 
to make a distinction between this 'new' process and the 'better understood' process of 
diffusion. This need or assumption is based upon a narrow understanding of diffusion. 
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Fig. 3.2 shows the traditional diffusion curve. 
Figure 3.2 
Traditional Diffusion Curve 
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Fig. 5.2 shows the take-up of 'Technology A' by different comanpanies over time. 
IntiaIlly, during period 1, the take-up is limited to a few companies engaged in the basic 
R&D necessary to make use of the new technology. As 'Technology A' becomes better 
understood by the market and proves itself to be of value, the rest of the market invests 
and the take-up rate soars rapidly. Eventually, during period 3 market saturation is reached 
and any 'new use' of the technology declines. However, diffusion curves need not limit 
themselves to one technology in one market, but may describe cross-market activity or 
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even a number of technologies across several markets. Diffusion represents the sum of 
all movements of technology in a predefined environment. 
Unfortuantely, much of the work examined here has considered that when technology is 
transferred from a source in one market to a users in another, something other than 
diffusion has occurred; and that consequently, a new phenomenon is being observed. This 
is not the case if the term diffusion is used in the sense outlined here. 
Technology transfer cannot be limited simply to the movement of technology in a new 
direction simply because it does not proceed along the existing diffusion curve. If the term 
'technology transfer' is to be used, it must tell us something about the way technology is 
communicated along the diffusion curve. 
Bradbury et al (1978) say, on the question of defining an area of study, that "a broad 
definition encompasses everything, without illuminating anything, while a narrow 
definition excludes many types of activity". The attempts at defining technology transfer 
thus far in this chapter are guilty on both counts. They are broad enough, for instance, 
that any use of technology in anew environment is technology transfer and, narrow enough 
that, in characterising the process to one catergory of elements (direction of movement 
or type of information) the complex nature of the overall process is lost. Brooks (1968) 
has said that "thephrase technology transferis appliedso universally thatinfact it becomes 
afeatureless and all enveloping cloak which disguises the characteristics ofthose who wear 
it 
It becomes clear from such statements that what is needed is a definition which, whilst 
being broad enough not to narrow down the allowable events to a small part of the field 
of interest, is still capable of usefully characterising the process under investigation. 
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Brooks ( 1966 ) rightly concludes that "--- no definition can be considered adequate unless 
it encompasses the thing being transferred as well as its source and destination". 
Rubenstein (1976) makes a useful contribution in agreement with this last point. He 
effectively describes technology transfer as a series of inter-linked communications, 
events and processes forming what might be called a 'package deal'. That is, that the 
transfer of technology involves more than the simple exchange of information, but rather 
it is characterised by a complex and iterative dialogue facilitated by many participants 
fulfilling a variety of roles. This more complex definition attacks the basic premise of 
many other definitions, that technology transfer is a process solely of communication. 
Rubenstein's description is one that clearly involves an innovation process. 
This view is supported by Robbins and Milliken (1976) who suggest that "there exists a 
certain commonality in all cases of technology transfer and that commonality becomes 
evident when the transfer process is viewed as an innovation process". This they assert 
is irrespective of the technology involved. The definition of innovation here, is the one 
put forward by Rogers and Shoemaker (1971), who write that "it matters little, so far as 
human behaviour is concerned, whether or not an idea is 'objectively' new as measured 
by the lapse of time since its first use or discovery. It is the perceived or subjective newness 
of the idea for the individual that determines his reaction to it. If the idea seems new to 
the individual, it is an innovation". If technology transfer is part of the innovation process 
as described by Rogers and Shoemaker, then Robbins and Milliken's assertion that there 
is a commonality between all cases of technology transfer must be true. 
They go on to explore the nature of transfer and innovation in a manner that really begins 
to throw light on the underlying processes. "Transfer or innovation consists of three 
fuctions" they say, "(1) the technology must have a source; *(2) the technology must be 
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produced or manufactured and (3) the technology must be applied in some socially or 
economically profitable way. In all cases, a movement or 'transfer' must occur from one 
function to the next". All three functions must be fulfilled whether the innovation 
concerned is a new technology in a new surrounding, an old technology in a new 
surrounding or an old technology in an old surrounding. Failure to meet any of the three 
functions would lead to unsuccessful innovation. Not all the above cases are considered 
to be identical, indeed the authors assert that the cases are split into two subsets of the 
overall innovation process. The first subset called the 'integrated innovation process' 
consists of those instances where the three innovation functions are integrated in a single 
managerial process. This process is that which would be expected to occur in a normal 
business developing, producing and marketing a new product, process or service. The 
second subset might occur when a new product is introduced into an environment removed 
from the original production function or where the source was remote from either of the 
other two functions. This process is called the "non-integrated innovation process". 
Examples of the integrated innovtion process cited include technological developments in 
American Government Agencies, such as the Department of Defense, Atomic Energy 
Commission and N. A. S. A. These agencies are involved in integrated innovation to the 
first application, usually internal, of the technology. In such environments the technology 
developers are well informed of the intended use of the technology. Presumeably, the 
attempted movement or transfer of technology from the agencies to a wider, perhaps non- 
military use, would be an example of non-integrated innovation. Such a process is now 
a common phenomenon in many countries and is generally known as " spin-off". Any such 
*'Technology that is not embodied in apiece of 'hardware' such as anew technique or method, might only have two major functions 
in the innovation process, rather than the three functions listed. However, there is often an intermediate step of adaption required 
even for new methods or techniques. 
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innovation which exhibits a lack of managerial integration shall be considered technology 
transfer according to Robbins and Milliken. "This" they assert, "is the one element all 
examples of technology transfer appear to have in common". 
It is this conceptualisation of technology transfer as a problem of the non-integration of 
an innovation process which Robbins and Milliken feel is lacking in the literature on 
technology transfer. This view of technology transfer significantly extends the horizons 
of, and adds a third dimension to, the attempts to define technology transfer thus far in 
this paper. Not only is the type of technology being transferred and the direction of 
movement important, but also the amount of planning that has accompanied the move. 
Robbins and Milliken (1976) make one more very important point. They also point out 
that "once transfer is viewed as a non-integrated innovation process, the importance of 
the non technological factors becomes apparent. Though the variety of firms and 
institutions that engage in transfer progress, the process does begin with the abandonment 
of the view of transfer as being an exclusively technological phenomenon or a 
communications process, and with the acceptance of transfer as a comprehensive socio- 
economic process requiring management integration and planning". 
if we accept this idea, the next obvious question is what is the nature of this innovation 
process? Gee (1974) sees the process as one which involves overcoming differences in 
the understanding of the transferred technology caused by the change in technical 
disciplines between the source and user. This implication being, that if a technology is 
transferred from one use to another, it is quite conceivable that the technical expertise on 
either side of that transfer process might be very different. The importance of viewing 
technology transfer as the movement of a technology from one context to another, is that 
it introduces the idea of meeting user needs. As Bradbury et al (1978) such an approach 
"emphasises the need for the matching of technology to its environment". 
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At this stage it is necessary to stop and consider what the definitional approach has told 
us about technology tansfer. Fundamentally, definitions are useful things which help to 
identify whether a given object or process falls into a particualar category. However, it 
is also fundamental that a definition is derived from an established conceptual framework 
and not vice versa. The preceeding discussion should have established that technology 
transfer is a potentially complex process involving a change of technological environments 
and subsequent contextual fit to this new environment. It is not the direction of movement 
which is important, but rather the process of movement. Any definition of technology 
transfer must allow for this environmental change and more importantly, must reflect a 
meaningful understanding of all the processes which are potentially involved. Definitions 
of technology transfer in the literature deal with sub-elements of the overall process and 
hence fail to identify what that process is. 
3.2 Multiple Perspectives - Structured and Unstructured Problems. 
"Experimental design and validation of hypotheses are intraparadigmatic: 
they operate only within the framework of a perspective. They cannot 
prove that a model gives us the most useful or correct representation of 
reality: they cannot give assurance that the variables chosen are 
sufficiently inclusive or appropriate. They tell us nothing about other 
perspectives. " (Linstone 1981). 
In his paper entiltled 'The Multiple Perspective Concept', Harold Linstone explores the 
idea that using multiple perspectives rather than a single perspective, when performing 
technology assessment, one can build theoretical models which perform in the real world. 
This concept simply being that a single dimensional model rarely accurately describes an 
'n' dimensional problem. 
Every action we make and each decision we take is influenced by past experience and 
retained knowledge. The old adage "it's like riding a bike, once you've learnt you never 
forget", implies more than that humans are good at retaining knowledge. It equally implies 
that once we have discovered a successful method of acheiving a particular end, we store 
this information and use it wherever necessary. Perhaps there is only one sensible way 
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of riding a bicycle, but there are many ways of assessing the implications and impacts of 
technological change. The choice of method by any individual will be a direct result of 
any success, by that individual on a previous occassion using the chosen method. 
In the past assessment of technical change has often been undertaken by those individuals 
cognisant of technology. Technology assessment has involved detailed discussions of 
technical impacts, which can be easily evaluated and costed. An assessment in this sense, 
would be a very structured and well bounded problem senario; and similarly the problem 
solution would be equally well structured. One might say that there has been a tendancy 
to try a make a 'science' of all problem assessing and solving techniques. Such 'pseudo- 
scientific' techniques have been applied to subjects as diverse as Psychology and 
Management; the result of which has frequently been failure (Chalmers 1985). In his now 
famous book 'Against Method', Paul Feyerabend even goes so far as to argue that science 
itself fails to follow fixed and universal rules. 
He says: 
"The idea that science can, and should, be run according to fixed and 
universal rules, is both unrealistic and pernicious. It is unrealistic, for 
it takes too simple a view of the talents of man and of the circumstances 
which encourage, or cause, their development. And it is pernicious for 
the attempt to enforce the rules is bound to increase our professional 
qualifications at the expense of our humanity. In addition, the idea is 
detrimental to science, for it neglects the complex physical and 
historical conditions which influence scientific change. "(Feyerabend 
1975). 
If 'scientism' frequently fails to solve complex human and system problems then an 
obvious question arises as to why such a process exists. Why is it often felt necessary to 
reduce experience to the level of simple laws? The answer, of course, is that man seeks 
to understand and adapt to his environemnt, but even more he seeks to control it. In order 
to control something one needs to know what reaction will be acheived by any given action. 
Real, complex, human problems are often impossible to comprehend in this simple action 
and reaction sense. The foundation of Linstone's arguement, is that if in order to 
understand and describe a process it is necessary to examine it from several, perhaps 
opposite, viewing points, then that is what should be done. Build the complex or 'rich 
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picture' if that is what truely describes the problem under investigation. Further, we must 
not fall into the trap of believing that for every problem there is a solution. There will 
often be a multiplicity of solutions. 
3.2.1 Perspectives for Technology Assessment: 
As man seeks wider control on his environment he will, no doubt, uncover many new 
perspectives on the world. For instance, it may, in the distant future, be possible to view 
environmental systems from the individual perspectives of the life forms of which those 
systems are composed. Each new perspective should yield a unique understanding of the 
system under investigation. However, within the work presented by Linstone and within 
the confines of this research, three perspectives should suffice. The three perspectives each 
allow for description of a technical change and the process thereof. Before expounding 
these perspectives themselves it is worth considering what basic elements Linstone 
considers are emboddied within the field of Technology Assessment. 
Figure 3.3 
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Elements in Technology Assessment 
a) Technology: The start of technology assessment according to Linstone will be a specific 
technology. Relevent questions will be asked as to whether a particular technology can 
achieve predetermined goals, or what impact the implementation of a given technology 
might impose upon a predetermined 'environment'. It is worth noting here, that it will 
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be argued later in this thesis that technology assessments in many organisations should start 
with an assessment of the organisation not a technology. 
b) Physical Environinental Setting: This refers to systems which are acted upon or are 
affected by the technology being assessed. In terms of a pollution control technology, for 
example, the physical environment would mean j ust that, the air, water, soil, etc. In terms 
of a manufacturing technology within a company, there would be both purely physical 
characteristics and perhaps market related characteristics. 
c)Sociotechnological Setting: This is the interface between the implementing organisation 
and the technology being implemented. It describes the way in which both elements affect 
one another. This is often the setting most noticeably affected by radical technological 
change. 
d) Technopersonal Setting: The implementation of technology affects individuals and 
can be affected itself by the action of individuals. The technopersonal. setting describes 
how people are changed by their interaction with the technology. 
e) Organisational Actors: Organisational actors are the primary organisations involved 
in the technological change and the assessment will be of the role they play in that change. 
In major public planning enquiries, for instance, it is not unusual to find that two or three 
organisations present the bulk of all information produced. These organisations are those 
most affected by the planned change. 
f) Individual Actors: Individuals as separate units or as part of an organisation can 
have a profound affect on the successful implementation of technology. The concepts 
of 'gatekeepers' and 'product champions' were discussed in Chapter two. 
g) Political Action: Politics with either a small 'p' or a capital 'P' will be a fundamental 
part of any major change, whether that be technological or not. 
h) Decisions: Decisions are the logical outcome of assessment and follow political activity 
stimulated and directed by appreciation of the various perspectives involved. 
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3.2.2 The Three Universal PerSDectives. 
The perspectives outlined above are some of the possible perspectives which could be used 
to examine the process of technological change. It may be possible to argue that there are 
other perspectives which have been omitted and this is always the danger of closing 
boundaries around an issue. However, Linstone has built upon the earlier work of Allinson 
(1971) to argue that all of the above could be deduced from three universal perspectives. 
These perspectives are the Technical (T), Organisational (0) and Personal (P) perspectives. 
The Technical or T perspective, would obviously cover issues of technology and physical 
environemnt, in the same way that the Organisational and Personal Perspectives would 
cover primary organisational actors and individual actors respectively. The boundary 
issues such as sociotechnical setting and technopersonal. setting simply require that both 
the 0 and T or T and 0 perspectives need to be used to examine activity in these areas. 
Each time a new perspective is used to describe an organisation it serves to further 
illuminate our conception of that organisation. This idea can be compared to the concept 
of isometric projections in technical drawing. A three dimensional object can be translated 
into several (usually three) projections, each showing detail from one view point, which, 
when combined, can be used to produce an accurate three-dimensional object. Failure to 
provide sufficient projections of the object being described leads to an incorrect overall 
understanding of that object. It is exactly this problem that has been a determinant of, and 
a constraint upon, much of the conceptual work generated in the area of technology 
transfer. In the next section, which examines conceptual approaches to defining the term 
"technology transfer", it will be shown that far too much emphasis has been placed upon 
the technicalperspective in order to simplify definitions. It will be argued that only a model 
which describes a process of technology movement, and that makes suitable allowance for 
all the participants in those movements, will describe in sufficient detail the complex 
process which will be called "technology transfer" in this thesis. 
To this extent it has been necessary to move away from the traditional linear models of 
technology transfer which serve only to describe various degrees of technological 
movement without sufficiently highlighting the context of the movements, not only from 
a technological or economic perspective, but also from perspectives describing the 
organisations and people undertaking, or participating in, the transfer. In the next section 
a vrocess-based conceptual framework is discussed which approaches these criteria. 
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3.3 Towards a Process Based Model of Technology Transfer 
By applying the concepts of multiple perspectives along with the knowledge of the 
necessity for process based models of technology transfer, this allows a more useful 
understanding of the processes to be undertaken. It is by applying these concepts to real 
world and a theoretical transfer scenario which has led to the new conceptual approach 
outlined here. Consider the common case described in Figure 3.4. 
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Fig. 3.4 The Three Parties in Technology Transfer 
Here a 'technology source' (independent company, university, research establishment, R 
&D unit within a large company, individual, etc) offers a 'technology' (physical object, 
results of R&D work, conceptual model/ideas, etc) to a potential 'recipient' (independent 
company, university, research establishment, manufacturing unit of a larger company, 
individual, etc) via an 'intermediary' (technology transfer agency, industrial liaison unit, 
technical consultant, independent manager within a company, individual, etc). The use 
of an intermediary is not a divine necessity nor would its omission render the process as 
something other than technology transfer. However, for the purposes of this thesis the 
case of intermediaries is the prime focus. Further, using the term 'intermediary' in the 
widest possible sense as above, it is easy to theorise that the vast majority of cases of 
transfer includes an intermediary of some description. At the intra-company level for 
example, the product champion must often work as an intermediary between the various 
parties involved in the process. 
Figure 3.4 also infers 'relationships' between the technology source and intermediary and 
between the intermediary and recipient. The nature of these relationships are not described 
since they are infinitely variable and can only be considered in detail on a case by case 
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basis. Thus a relationship between the technology source and recipient has not been 
inferred although such a relationship may exist regardless of the role played by the 
intermediary. Indeed, at one end of a conceivable table of possible scenarios is that case 
where an intermediary is not needed, since source and recipient have the necessary 
knowledge and resources to communicate directly, or the 'technology' is such that direct 
transfer is appropriate. 
To begin to describe a process based view of this simple diagram requires initially that 
perspectives are taken which examine the individual players. Consider firstly the potential 
recipient as a manufacturing company open to technological improvements in both 
manufacturing technology as well as in components for the finished product. The company 
strategy for technology acquisition, formal or not, will be affected by the plethora of macro 
and micro factors discussed at length in Chapter 2 (the product, manufacturing techniques, 
market, position within that market, technical and financial resources, personnel, etc). 
In essence two issues proved most fundamental. To what sources of technology does the 
company have 'access' and to which technologies is 'access' actually afforded, given that 
particular technology sources offer particular types of technology (both in terms of stage 
of development and generic base) and that the company will be more 'receptive' to 
particular technologies given the macro and micro factors above. 
3.3.1 Accessibility 
The term 'access' may immediately imply a sense of physical access to sources of 
technology but a more subtle and complex meaning is intended. Fundamentally it is access 
to knowledge which is the principal concern. A number of issues arise from this definition 
of the term including availability of information on sources of technology, the physical 
location of these sources, the level and suitability of the information available on the 
technology, the appropriateness of the knowledge set necessary to evaluate and use the 
information provided and finally, a sense of cultural 'nearness' to a particular technology. 
From the perspective of the recipient in Figure 3.4 'access' to technology is thus more than 
simply having knowledge on where to look for technology. The availability of information 
on sources of technology to a greater extent will depend upon the effort undertaken by the 
organisation to monitor the external environment. This might be via various sources of 
information such as appropriate tech nology-based and industry-based journals and 
magazines and membership of relevant institutions, again both technology and industry 
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based. Vigorous use of local and national resources such as Regional Technology Centres, 
Trade Associations, Regional Training Centres, etc should also increase information, at 
least on the sources of technology. Other factors will also affect the awareness of potential 
recipient to such sources, not least the level of marketing undertaken by various 
intermediaries and universities as well as awareness programmes undertaken by organisations 
such as the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and government departments, 
especially the Department for Trade and Industry (DTI). 
The physical location of technology sources will often be a highly relevant factor when 
an organisation assesses that source's appropriateness. The degree to which this is true 
in any one case will be dependent upon the type of interaction envisaged by the user. Where 
information exchange can be achieved by methods requiring a lesser degree of interaction 
between the two parties, for example via literature, physical nearness would be of less 
importance. However, if the type of interaction needed involves closer collaboration, for 
example site visits, the location becomes that much more important. No examination of 
the effect or implications of locality on access to sources of technology has been undertaken 
in this piece of work, but it is envisaged that 'local' delivery of services will often be an 
important issue. 
The suitability of the information available on the technology and the appropriateness of 
the knowledge set necessary to evaluate and use the information, both highlight some 
elements of a phenomenon which can be described as a 'technological nearness' of the 
recipient organisation to the technological information under investigation. The suitability 
of the information provided on a given technology, means more than does the information 
sufficiently describe the technology, either by words, pictures or physical examples, but 
rather is the information sufficient for the particular recipient under discussion? This idea 
relates to the technological capabilities of the recipient organisation which are defined by 
the industry in which they operate, their position and approach to that industry and the skills 
of their workforce, particularly in the R&D and managerial levels. The principle is that 
the existing knowledge of an individual fundamentally affects the ability of that individual 
to accumulate further knowledge. A deep understanding of micro-biology does not 
necessarily help when attempting to understand solid fuel rocket propulsion systems or 
making bricks. 
An extension of this principle is the appropriateness of the knowledge set necessary to 
evaluate and use information. It is not theoretically proposed here that inability to 
understand technological terminology is a major barrier to technology transfer, but it is 
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proposed that the depth of knowledge necessary as well as the ability to effectively apply 
that knowledge, may well prove to be major hurdles to some organisations. Technologies, 
whilst often inanimate, are certainly not 'neutral'. A technology arriving at the door of 
an organisation carries with it an attribute set. Attributes might be technologically 
irrelevant, perhaps shape or colour, but others will be technologically specific, materials 
or manufacturing technique for example. Other attributes will reflect the inherent science 
and engineering base of the technology, its' production and importantly to its current use 
or uses. In order to comprehend, modify or use an object or technology it is also necessary 
to understand, in part at least, much of the knowledge set which determines that object. 
Thus the 'appropriateness' of a specific technology to a specific organisation would depend 
upon the closeness between the technological knowledge set and the organisational 
knowledge set and capability. 
The above must however, be tempered by the last of the 'access' based issues raised earlier. 
That is, the question of the cultural nearness of the recipient to both the technology and 
potential sources. Organisational culture will affect both the question of 'access' and one 
of 'organisational receptivity' to be discussed shortly. 
Both the literature discussed in Chapter 2 and the survey results recorded in Chapter 4 show 
that many companies will first seek new technology from other companies in, or close to, 
their market. Whilst it can be argued that this habit reflects the opportunity to acquire 
technology which has already been applied to the task for which it is now required, it may 
also reflect the cultural similarity between the two organisations. Two companies of 
similar size, working in related markets and using similar technologies have a great deal 
in common when undertaking technology transfer. 
The discussion in this section has concentrated on a number of ideas which are related to 
the access organisations have to sources of technology. The issues raised briefly here are 
complex in their own right, but are only one-third of the totality of the conceptual model 
which will be presented. For the purposes of this model, problems and processes 
associated with access to technology are referred to as Accessibility issues. 
3.3.2 Receptivijy 
Returning to Figure 3.4, one can also consider the potential technology transfer processes 
within the recipient organisation itself. Access to technology and the associated 
Accessibility issues are only one part of the series of processes that describe technology 
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transfer into an organisation. Another fundamental set of issues concerns how 'receptive' 
the potential recipient is to technology. Again, it is necessary not to take the word 
4 receptive' at face value. Factors affecting whether a given organisation is, at any given 
point in time, receptive to a given technology will be determined by a series of internal 
issues ranging from an overall cultural propensity towards certain technologies, through 
the role of the individual participant in the transfer processes, to issues relating to the 
potential impacts of the technology on various parts of the organisation. 
Just as with the question of Accessibility, an overall organisational culture can affect the 
likelihood of technology transfer being either considered, or successfully completed. 
Some of these issues were discussed in Chapter 2. At the macro-organisational level there 
are certainly some organisations which are more 'receptive' to technology transfer than 
others. Much academic work has been concerned with trying to understand why some 
companies are more innovative or perhaps open to change, than others. This culture for 
change or acquisition of technology is not necessarily easy to attribute to a single or series 
of factors, but is a reflection of an overall approach or strategy from top level management, 
through to all levels of the organisation. 
Often, the positive approach to technology is much more a reflection of market 
environment. In the so called innovative sectors of industry where constant technological 
change is both a reality and a necessity, organisations wishing to compete are all but 
compelled to be open and receptive to new technology. Other industries require less new 
technology in products and often in processes to compete. Even within larger 
organisations with a major research and development capability the openness to new 
technology is not necessarily extended to that generated externally to the organisation. The 
so called 'not invented here' syndrome can appear as discussed in Chapter 2. 
However the receptiveness, or 'Receptivity', of organisations to technology goes beyond 
simple considerations of an openness to external ideas, irrespective of whether support 
comes from top management or not. An organisation that is theoretically receptive will 
not necessarily have the will or capability to actually receive a technology. It is the point 
at which technology arrives at the organisations' doorstep that the true nature of the 
technology transfer process becomes apparent. 
Technology has to be assessed by a variety of measures to ensure that it correctly and 
efficiently meets the requirements of the recipient. Such assessment will include purely 
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technical evaluation , market related evaluation and an evaluation of the 
impact the 
technology will cause on the recipient. The discussion in Chapter 2 showed quite clearly 
the role of the organisation and individuals in innovative activity in general and technology 
transfer in particular. To this extent it is individuals and groups of people that have to be 
receptive to inward transfer of technology. 
Success in the process will be determined by the right people, skills and attributes being 
available to assess and implement the technology or knowledge. A dedicated product or 
technology champion may be needed to persuade management, scientists and engineers, 
or the workforce of the merits of the proposed technology. Specialist skills will be needed 
in negotiation with the technology source (and perhaps intermediary) in understanding and 
evaluating the technology within the context of the recipient organisation, and then 
applying the knowledge to maximise its effectiveness. These latter processes may be of 
particular relevance to SME's. With the exception of those organisations operating in hi- 
tech areas, most companies will have limited internal technological capability; indeed this 
may be the reason for seeking externally generated technology. Given its potential skill 
shortage, it becomes apparent that the recipient may not be well placed to effectively assess 
and evaluate incoming technology. Failure to fully analyse the technology and its 
implications at an early stage will greatly increase the chance of project failure (see Chapter 
2). 
As with the case of Accessibility therefore, it becomes obvious that how receptive a 
company is to technology transfer is not simply a reflection of managerial openness. Hence 
the term 'Receptivity' is used to infer the complex processes both undertaken within the 
organisation and between it and the 'environment' in which it finds itself. 
3.3.3 Mobility 
The conceptual model has been used to explore those issues concerning the Accessibility 
of technology sources and the technology itself as well as the Receptivity of potential 
recipient organisations. The final element of the model therefore, explores the movement 
of technology between the source and user. Mobility is essentially the mechanisms and 
channels by which technology is transferred. 
The mechanisms of transfer are the ways in which the information is actually imparted 
whether this be by the exchange of literature, a physical movement of product or process, 
the movement of a person from one organisation to another, by a joint venture, or by a 
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technical consultancy. The channels of transfer are those third-parties which are used by 
either of the other two to intervene and provide the appropriate mechanisms for technology 
transfer. Within the confines of this thesis the channels of transfer are the Intermediaries, 
but other channels would include such things as science and technology parks. 
Mobility is the key to affecting technology transfer. It is the role of intermediaries to 
maximise Mobility by overcoming the limitations of Accessibility and Receptivity. 
Potentially, an intermediary can act as an information provider, filter and interpreter 
between the two parties; it should be able to select the mechanisms which are most suitable 
for individual organisations. Mobility is the process of overcoming the incompatibilities 
between the attributes of the technology source and potential user, or the attributes of the 
technology and capabilities of that user. 
3.3.4 Summafy of the AMR Framework. 
The three elements are: 
Accessibility: - the technologies available and information about those 
technologies. 
Mobility: - the ease of movement of those technologies and the channels by 
which movement is secured. 
Receptivity: - the awareness of technology within the organisation, the 
willingness to investigate technology and the ability to assimilate 
technology in the recipient organisation. 
In short, this conceptual model describes the technology transfer process and a series of 
sub-processes which determine the technology available, the form in which it is made 
available, the potential movement of the technology and the overall capability of recipient 
organisations to assimilate and above all, use the technology. 
In so doing, the model recognises that a technology is a product of the environment in 
which it is produced and this environment will inevitably affect the inherent attribute set 
of the technology. Organisations also have a complex series of attributes defined by their 
market, their place within that market, the products made, their production technologies, 
the people who work in the organisation and their attitudes towards technology, etc. 
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Simply making technology available to an organisation, in no way assures that it is 
investigated and successfully used by that organisation. 
The model also describes the mechanisms of transfer, whether this be via literature, 
physical movement, people transfer or ajoint venture between two organisations. It also 
describes many of the activities undertaken by the so called intermediaries, whether these 
be government or European Community instruments, or private and commercial 
enterprises. Further it describes the level and type of involvement such intermediaries 
undertake in technology transfer and their role as information filter, interpreter, evaluator 
and facilitator. 
3.3.5 A Service Delivery Problem. 
It is not appropriate to examine the concept of technology transfer as a 'service delivery 
problem' at present since its' potential use will become clearer in later chapters. It has 
nonetheless proved to be a useful tool for considering an approach to current research. The 
understanding that the technology transfer process is dogged with sometimes incompatible 
attribute sets between offering and receiving organisations and offered and required 
technologies, has lead to the conclusion that the whole process might better be examined 
as a4 service delivery problem'. Service delivery itself is a question of congruence between 
the needs of those seeking technology and those who seek to provide that technology. It 
is this concept which will form the major part of the analysis of the activities of the 
technology transfer organisations undertaken here. 
Further discussion of the AMR model is undertaken in the following section which outlines 
a case study of a unique technology transfer intermediary. 
3.4 Defence Technology Enterprises Ltd: An Experiment in the Transfer of 
Military Technology 
3.4.1 Background 
In the two decades preceding the formation of the DTE, academics and industrialists in 
the United States and Europe began to voice grave misgivings about the affects of large 
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scale government financed research and development into military technologies. This 
concern centred on the possible crowding-out deprivations inflicted by the better funded 
military based companies on their civil counterparts. This crowding-out manifested itself 
in the form of the inequitable allocation of government research funds and an imbalance 
in the distribution of skilled workers in the labour market. 
Partly in response to these pressures, and with a change in government attitudes, a 
consortium of venture capitalists approached the Ministry of Defence and agreed the 
framework for a system of releasing unwanted, and less sensitive, military technologies 
from the MoD research establishments. The opportunity to indirectly help manufacturing 
and related industries, to partially diffuse the criticisms of crowding-out and to 
independently finance the whole operation, proved irresistible to government. 
In 1984, Defence Technology Enterprises was launched with the aim of spinning-off these 
newly accessed technologies by initially transferring them to a small group of Member 
companies. These early days were characterised by a belief in a latent demand for military 
technologies and that such technologies could be readily transferred with the minimum of 
effort. 
3.4.2 Modus Operandi 
Initially, DTE's operations comprised of three disciplines. 
Firstly, they established a number of personnel within the MoD research establishments 
to 'ferret-out' technologies with the potential for spin-off. The 'ferrets', as they were 
known, had both a high level of scientific knowledge and considerable industrial 
experience. It was their job to use their knowledge of various markets and identify 
technologies with potential uses within those markets. 
Secondly, the information gathered by the 'ferrets' was compiled into a comprehensive 
database of available technologies. This database was supplied to Member companies in 
the form of a hard copy, updated on a regular basi s. For reasons of economy and to protect 
property rights, each entry on the database was limited to a very basic outline of the 
available technology. 
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Thirdly, DTE undertook to transfer their technologies by offering licences based on 
singular payments and royalties. The release of detailed information about a given 
technology occurred over a period of time and was dependent upon the level of 
commitment of the potential licensee. In this way, access to DTE knowledge could be 
closely controlled and infringement of property rights prevented. 
Over a period of time these services were expanded to include technological searches 
carried out on behalf of a given company. That is, on request the 'ferrets' would endeavour 
to unearth technologies which would directly match the requirements of a Member 
company. This task was complicated by the problem of correctly eliciting the exact nature 
and detail of the technology required from a Member. Incorrect diagnosis of the problem 
situation and potential technological solutions would inevitably lead to an inappropriate 
targeting of 'ferret' activity (see Herdan, B. L. 1987 #1, #2, #3). 
3.4.3 Successes and Failures 
By considering an example of one of the technologies which was successfully transferred, 
it becomes easier to comprehend the important elements in all such attempts, whether 
successful or not. The case chosen here concerns a very small radar system which was 
marketed under the name 'Visiball'. The original product was developed by one of the 
establishments to allow the use of radar on landing craft which had hitherto been too small 
to take this type of equipment. The MoD scientists and engineers developed a very small 
ball-shaped radar which was light enough to sit atop of the most modest of masts. The 
DTE 'ferrets' working in the establishment immediately saw the potential of this radar for 
owners of all small yachts. Such pleasure craft like their military counterparts, had 
previously either been unable to fit radar or were forced to use a larger more expensive 
design. The market need for such a product was undoubtable and DTE found little trouble 
in finding a company to buy the licence and produce the product. This product is now 
being sold successfully by a British firm. 
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Behind this seemingly simple story lied a very complex process which required a number 
Of simultaneous occurrences to succeed. These requirements were: 
1 The military and civilian needs could be met by a very similar product. 
2 The civilian need was obvious and well articulated. 
3A potential recipient company was easy to identify and locate. 
4 The product needed very limited development. 
5 The receiving company already possessed the required resources to effectively 
implement the radar technology. 
Despite this success, DTE found that although it discovered many hundreds of potentially 
useful technologies hidden away, it proved extremely difficult to fulfil this potential via 
technology transfer. Why this was so, can be seen by examining the five points highlighted 
above. 
The first point identifies one of the problems of attempting to solve a technical problem 
in one organisation, with a technological solution developed in a totally unrelated 
organisation. In general a market is a very specific thing with needs specific to itself. A 
seemingly closely related market may demand a wholly different solution to its problems. 
This equally applies to those companies servicing the market. It is widely accepted that 
military markets are very remote from their civilian counterparts and hence display little 
similarity in product requirement or design (Reppy 1985). Military products are, as a rule, 
built to vastly different tolerances than civil products and thus have a series of very specific 
technological attributes. This affects the choice of materials and impacts heavily on the 
necessary manufacturing technology. Not surprisingly therefore, most military technologies 
are wholly unsuitable for the civil sector. This is not necessarily true for the science and 
engineering behind the technologies. 
The second point defines an equally important problem in technology transfer, and one 
which can act as a considerable barrier to success. To facilitate the speedy and effective 
transfer of technology, all the parties concerned must be fully aware of the need which 
has arisen. DTE operates at three levels; meeting known market needs, identifying 
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technologies which they can conceive various uses for, and identifying technologies which 
they consider their membership will conceive various uses for. Maintaining the correct 
balance of market-pull and technology-push, however well targeted, has proven to be a 
fundamental conundrum of DTE's operations. The early days of DTE's operations 
concentrated on gathering as many potential useful ideas as possible from the MoD 
establishments. After being assembled into the database, these were presented to the 
membership. However, it became quite clear that what the 'ferrets' had considered to be 
technologies with a high potential were not so considered by many of the companies. In 
essence, there was a conflict of understanding of needs between the two sides. One 
potential solution to this problem was initiated in the form of technology searches 
precipitated by Member companies. Unfortunately, there were two major problems with 
this approach. Firstly it relied upon the member being able to clearly articulate his need 
in detailed technological terms, and secondly, in doing so other appropriate solutions 
might be overlooked. That is, in specifying the need for a metal with certain 
characteristics, there is a temptation not to consider plastics which might have done the 
job equally well. 
The radar case study clearly displays an example of successful technology push. There 
was, however, a market need and an obvious recipient. Under normal circumstances this 
could not have been expected, since so few military products have an obvious civil use. 
More usually one would expect a great deal of work to be undertaken in order to identify 
potential markets and recipients. This problem becomes infinitely more complex where 
the technology under consideration is most likely to be incorporated into a manufacturing 
process. 
The fourth requirement for successful transfer was that the radar technology needed very 
little development to locate within a civil market. Such a situation is unusual since most 
of the technologies available within the MoD are only in prototype form or at the 
conceptual level. Where complete products are available, then problems of fixed 
technological attributes will apply, as discussed under requirement one. In either case one 
would normally expect, a protracted period of further development and technological re- 
shaping prior to the eventual implementation of a military technology. 
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A consequence of the above, and the fifth requirement, was that the recipient company 
already possessed the necessary resources to capitalise on the technology received. Very 
limited development required few financial or technical resources to be applied. Survey 
work carried out by the author shows that resources which can be brought to bear by a 
potential recipient are crucial factors in both the demand for, and implementation of 
externally generated technology. Many SME's search for external technologies simply 
because they have neither the financial resources or technical expertise to generate those 
technologies internally. Similarly, the absence of these resources precludes extensive 
development of technology gained from external sources. This fundamental paradox is 
at the heart of the technology transfer process undertaken by agencies such as DTE. 
3.5 Using the ANM Model as a Conceptual Framework 
The previous discussion has presented an overview of the role of DTE, but to fully analyse 
their role in a wider process, requires an examination of their activities based upon a 
conceptual framework of technology transfer process. To recap the basic elements of the 
framework are Accessibility, Mobility and Receptivity. 
Using these three dimensions of the process, and a knowledge of DTE operations, one can 
begin to analyse the effectiveness of their activities and areas of potential difficulty. The 
essential problem consists of the technology source, previously inaccessible, and a number 
of companies requiring technology. DTE was established to transfer technology from one 
to the other. A cursory examination of DTE within the framework can lead to the 
assumption that it is primarily a Mobility agent. In other words, that it acts as a mechanism 
for the movement of technology. To do this, however, is to over simplify the complexity 
of relationships and processes operating between source and recipient. 
Prior to the formation of DTE, the MoD research establishments could not be considered 
as a source of technology since access to them was difficult and often impossible. The 
dominant principle of their foundation was to create access to these repositories of 
technology, so that they might be used by industry. This principle has been assimilated 
within the DTE modus operandi so that it becomes primarily an agent of access to the 
hidden technologies. The technology database, for example, was fundamentally a 
provider of Access and not a mechanism for the delivery of technology. Similarly, the 
DTE 'ferrets' are the mechanism by which information can be provided about technology 
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across the barrier of MoD secrecy. Again, this idea was enshrined in the concept of the 
Associate Membership Scheme, which aimed at providing access to those companies 
deemed to be 'Receptive' to the transfer of military technologies. The idea that there were 
many companies who were pre-disposed in some way to the inwards transfer of military 
technology, also displays a belief that technology transfer is a problem of Access. It 
operates on the principle that there are companies which have a demand for the types of 
technology developed in the military sector, and that they possess the necessary resources 
to receive those technologies. Receptivity was only conceptualised in terms of demand 
and not ability to receive. 
It can be seen from the above discussion that the incidence of technology being made 
accessible to a company, being available in a suitable form, and the recipient being able 
to adapt the technology or themselves, will be very small. It also becomes clear that an 
agency specialising in technology transfer will have to overcome all of these problems. 
It will have to provide a range of services or mechanisms to facilitate transfer. It is this 
aspect of technology transfer which is described within this model as Mobility. In the case 
of an intermediary such as DTE, attempting to facilitate technology transfer entails 
examining both the attributes of the technology being offered and those of the companies 
to whom they are offered. Third-party sponsored technology transfer thus becomes a 
problem of appropriate service provision. 
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CHAVrER 4 
4 RESEARCH DESIGN. 
4.1 The Context. 
Having developed the AMR model as a theoretical and conceptual tool it can be used to 
analyse real world issues and, in so doing, test its ability to rationalise the current state 
of technology transfer. 
It is useful here to reiterate the problem context of the research and to express this and other 
research concerns as a number of research issues. 
Issue 1: Manufacturing industry maintains growth by meeting and stimulating market 
demand. Generally, markets are conservative but nontheless experience constant, though 
mostly evolutionary, change. Market adjustment affects, and is affected by, organisational 
and technological change in the companies servicing that market. As a result, products 
may require new design, incorporate new technologies or be produced by new manufacturing 
techniques. Thus, a constant, but not necessarily a large, demand for new technologies 
characterises manufacturing industry. 
Issue 2: Manufacturing companies have several options open to them in respect of 
monitoring changes in technology and purchasing technology appropriate to their needs. 
At one end of the scale they can maintain large and expensive R&D facilities in order to 
produce a steady flow of 'home-grown' technology and on the other, they can purchase 
previously proven technology from market leading companies in their own or nearly 
related sectors. Between the two extremes there are a range of purchase/development 
options which vary the investment required, the risk involved and of course, the potential 
reward. Past research has shown that one can reasonably expect most manufacturing 
companies to consider a limited number of routes to technology. The conservative nature 
of most firms and the relative costs of 'home-grown' technologies, leads many SMEs 
therefore to search for technologies close to their own market. 
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Issues 3: Furthermore, over the past 5-10 years there has been a steady growth in the 
number of companies aiming to service the technological needs of industry by transferring 
to them, technology developed in a wide variety of commercial environments. Such 
technology servicers are attempting to bridge the gap between sources of technology and 
potential users of technology. Most of these organisations model themselves heavily, and 
often exclusively, on Accessibility to technology (see Chapter 2 Section 2.3). 
Issue 4: It is the central argument of this thesis that access to technology is not the key 
factor in transferring technology, but rather that providing technology appropriate to a 
company's needs and abilities determines the overall level of 'transferability' of a given 
technology. 
Issue 5: In order to establish this point it is necessary to understand the technical needs 
and organisational requirements and capabilities of industry and the methods used to satisfy 
these needs and requirements by the various transferring organisations. The information 
gathering process must, therefore, examine the nature of the service offered in the light 
of the demand being articulated by the customer. Since organisations specialising in 
technology transfer are a relatively new phenomenon, and the majority of manufacturing 
companies will not yet have used their services, there will be some difficulty in measuring 
demand. It will therefore be necessary to measure the demand for technology and possible 
supporting services and relate this to the charcteristics of the transfer organisations. 
Fundamentally however, one is examining a 'Service Delivery Problem'. 
4.1.1 Information Retrieval from the Customer: Industrial Survey. 
In attempting to analyse the Receptivity of companies to the idea and practicalities of 
inward technology transfer, several elemental matters arise. Firstly, the nature of 
companies that have shown themselves to be successful in the innovation process in 
previous years needs examination. Technology transfer is an innovation process and 
therefore lessons can be learnt from companies which have shown an adeptnes at this 
process in the past. There are two basic approaches to this problem. 
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Issue 6: One can examine the 'macro indicators' of successful innovators to see 
whether any patterns consistently emerge. By macro indicators it is meant measures of 
company characteristics which can be made externally or with only the most cursory 
internal examination. Obvious indicators are company size, measured by either number 
of employees ot turnover, industrial sectors covered, market position, frequency of 
incorporation of new technology into products and processes, and other such benchmarks 
of company type and operation. Such indicators are readily measured but do not allow 
for the 'personality' of an organisation to be considered. That is, the internal workings 
of the organisation which are so important in determining attitudes towards innovation. 
Issue 7: One can, therefore, also attempt to measure these internal parameters and 
identify the organisational. factors which influenec successful innovation and technology 
transfer. Again, such factors might include measures of internal communications, 
innovation strategies, planning and management, the quality and skills of management, 
technical personnel and workforce, the role of key individuals, technical factirs and a 
whole host of organisational, technical and personnel related issues. The obvious 
difficulty with thi s approach is that it requires indepth internal study of organi sation s which 
are both time consuming and costly and would therefore limit the number of companies 
open to investigation. 
Issue 8: In addition to the above, is the argument that companies who have previously 
been innovative are not necessarily those companies who are likely to be most Receptive 
to the inward transfer of technology, aided by a third-party. One can easily argue that 
previously successful innovators are likely to be scanning for any potentially valuable 
technology and will be more receptive to transfer given their previous record of success. 
Equally, one can envisage that those that have not got an innovative pedigree or the 
resource base to experiment with technology internally might be unlikely to risk 
speculative technology venturing. Both propositions appear reasonable but grossly over 
simplify the internal mechanisms of organisations and their attitudes towards their external 
environment. That is, they assume that past behaviour is solely a reflection of 
organisational. preferences and abilities and that these are unchanging. Both scenarios 
almost certainly describe a few companies, but many more may act differently. For 
instance, previously successful companies may attempt to rely too heavily on their 
previous success and their attitudes towards their external environment. That is, they 
assume that past behaviour is solely a reflection of organisational preferences and abilities 
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and that these are unchanging. Both scenarios almost certainly describe a few companies, 
but many more may act differently. For instance, previously successful companies may 
attempt to rely too heavily on their previous success and become complacent. Equally, 
they may have decided to take a lead in their market and generate technologies internally, 
rather than relying on chance to find suitable externally generated technology. Such a 
culture can even lead to a situation where the inward transfer of technology becomes 
unaccetable to the key technical personnel; the so called 'not invented here syndrome'. 
Furthermore, companies which have previously failed to innovate due to lack of internal 
resources or aspirations may be just the types of company which might benefit most from 
aided technology transfer. 
Purley intuitive arguments therefore, fail to identify the potential targets for information 
gathering. There can be little justification for seeking to examine only either previously 
innovative or non-innovative companies. In order to develop the idea of a service delivery 
analysis, it is necessary to examine what services are needed to meet the needs of industry 
as a whole, or rather each 'type' of company. If this information subsequently divides 
itself into specific company types it would be more valuable than enforcing arbitary 
divisions initially. 
Given that no direct targetting of Organisations is desirable, but that some defining 
characteristics of organisations, which are either well disposed to or aginst inward 
technology transfer, is desirable, there follows a requirement to examine a reasonably 
large population of companies. For practical reasons gathering information from such a 
wide diversity of companies precludes detailed internal organisational. examination purley 
due to time and financial constraints. 
If the overall study is constructed to extract data which shows a divergence between service 
provision and user requirements in the technology transfer industry, then it is the role of 
the industrial survey to elicit the views and actions of industry towards inward technology 
transfer, and those that seek to facilitate it. Consequently, three main sets of information 
need to be gathered: 
A: Product development/ market definition; 
B: External technology acquisition; 
C: Attitudes towards, and use made of third-party transfer agencies. 
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Information set W: aims to extract sufficient data about a company's working 
environment so that it can be classified. 
Issue 10: When considering technology acquisition, it must be recognised that there are 
many reasons why a particular organisation may desire to make a particular acquisition. 
Both organisationally internal and external factors will play a part in creating the demand 
for technology. The details of these factors need not be debated again here since a full 
discussion has been presented in Chapter 2. Area 'A' attempts, therefore, to measure 
several things. Firstly, it ascertains the market demand for technological changes in 
products and their associated manufacturing processes. Secondly, it determines how 
sophisticated the inherent technologies are and thirdly, where a company's products place 
it in relation to the remainder of the market. 
This information is necessary to catagorise companies in such a way as to make sense of 
the effort made by those companies in acquiring technology. Combining this with 
traditional macro indicators, such as company size, will allow for examination of specific 
types of company such as the small 'high-tech' firm or the large traditional manufacturer. 
Furthermore, such information can be combined with data gathered from the other 
information sets to produce a basic understanding of how company types may affect the 
use made of the various technology acquistion instruments available. 
Inforynation set ' B': deals in some depth, with the sources of technology which companies 
access, the prefeired methods of acquisition and what factors affect these choices. 
Issue 11: The area of technology acquisition requires the outlining of the most important 
reasons for acquiring new technologies from external sources. This allows for a clearer 
understanding of the pressures of technology acquisition. An attempt must be made to 
elicit the most popular sources of technology used by industry and the width of 
technological scanning undertaken. A measure of a success or failure of this scanning 
activity might clarify preferences. 
Issue 12: An understanding of whether the level of demand for technology or other factors 
predetermines the time horizons for technology acquisition, and hence the state of 
readiness for market of the technologies required, also needs to be established. 
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Issue 13: Further investigation is needed to determine the preferred methods of acquisition 
which is of fundamental importance to any company offering technologies for sale. Since 
intermediaries generally limit themselves to licensing andjoint ventures as means of selling 
technology, closer scrutiny of the important considerations when undertaking acquisition 
will confirm the suitability of such techniques. 
Information set 'C': of investigation enquires about the effectiveness of intermediaries. 
Issue 14: Comprehending the advantages intermediaries should give industry over other 
methods of acquisition in addition to what advantages are seen to accrue from the 
relationship, will add a strong indicator of current level of matching between demand and 
service provision. 
Issue 15: Similarly, comparisons of the 'ideal' services against the actual services 
provided should strengthen this indicator. 
Issue 16: More light can be shed on disparities between the two sets of information by 
uncovering any difficulties which are considered to reduce the effectiveness of the 
customer - agency relationship. 
Overall then, the examination of industry must combine the technological and economic 
working environment with the methods of response to demand and an analysis of the 
service provision required to best meet those demands via technology. 
4.1.2 Information retrieval from the intermediary 
Understanding the role intermediaries might play in technology transfer presents some 
new problems. Little is known of such companies in the academic literature, indeed no 
commonly accepted term for such organisations exists. There is no SIC classification nor 
any other simple way of defining the population. Not knowing what the population is 
means that undertaking a study based upon obtaining statistical data to allow generalisation 
becomes a pointless task. 
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Issue 17: Rather, it is better to approach companies who can be considered as 
intermediaries, within the context of this thesis, and investigate their operations not as a 
population but as a collection of individuals. 
There are three main aims of the data collection from the intermediaries. Firstly, to 
evaluate the current mechanisms available for technology transfer via intermediaries. It 
is important to discover how the various organisations operate and whether there are any 
similarities between the various agencies. This information should allow a taxonomy of 
intermediaries, based upon their methods of operation, to be compiled. This may in turn 
allow some generalisations about such agencies to be made which would greatly enhance 
the third aim of the survey. This is to analyse the potential for servicing industry, of each 
type of intermediary, in view of the information previously obtained from the first survey. 
In order to achieve the above it will be necessary to collect the information in four 
principal categories: 
i: Basic operational indicators. 
ii: Technology sources. 
iii: Transfer services offered. 
iv: Description of customers. 
Issue 18: It is easy to assume when describing intermediaries as technology transfer 
agencies, that are wholly concerned with the physical transfer of technology. This is far 
from being the case however. Some agencies merely negotiate licences on behalf of other 
technology generators, some transfer information about specific technology, some 
provide information on various sources of technology and what those sources might yield, 
some are involved in the physical relocation of technology and still yet, others will provide 
a variety of such services. Obviously, before categorising intermediaries by other aspects 
of their work, it is first essential to understand what types of transfer process they are 
actually involved in. The discussion in Chapter 2 outlined many of the issues involved 
in technological innovation and its management. It was shown that there are a whole series 
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of technological, organisational and personnel issues to be considered in the innovation 
process. All these elements will be affected by the inward transfer of technology, but the 
extent to which this occurs will depend upon the 'closeness of fit' between articulated need 
and technological solution, the methods of transfer and, importantly, the physical state of 
the technology. It is easy to conceive that radical changes in the processing technology 
of a company will have a dramatic impact upon that company and the people working 
within it. There might even be an open conflict, like that more recently experienced with 
changes in the newspaper printing industry. Conversely, if the technology being 
transferred is only a theoretical engineering concept in the form of IPR, the immediate 
effect of the technology will be limited to a few engineers and scientists. Thus, the element 
being transferred, whether physical technology or theoretical concept, vitally changes the 
role of the intermediary and receiver in the exchange process. 
Issue 19: The second area of the survey deals with various repositories of technology used 
by the intermediaries to source their activity. Identification of these sources can help 
predict what types of technology are likely to be offered by a given intermediary and what 
level of back-up is available from the source to either the intermediary itself or the end 
user. For example, consider the case of DTE. DTE sourced their technologies almost 
exclusively from the MoD research establishments. Not surprisingly these establishments 
produce high-tech solutions to extremely complex problems. The technologies used are 
generally at the leading-edge of the scientific or engineering field from which they are 
derived. Consequently, the types of technology which DTE was able to offer for licensing 
reflect these factors. In addition, given the nature of their work, the MoD Scientists and 
Engineers have not traditionally been freely mobile to follow a technology from the MoD 
to recipient in order to enhance the transfer process. Hence, identifying the sources of 
technology used by an intermediary, helps to indicate its potential services. Comparing 
the technology sources preferred by industry with those targeted by intermediaries would 
thus also have implications to potential disparities in technological preferences. 
Issue 20: This picture is complicated to some degree by the informal and formal network 
which are involved between intermediaries. An intermediary specialising in providing 
information on potential sources of technology, but which has a formal agreement with 
another intermediary which specialises in transferring complete technologies, has a wider 
potential operation environment than might have originally been envisaged. It is thus 
important to understand whether such links exist between agencies and what such an 
agreement actually entails. That is, whether the agreements cover basic information 
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sharing, access to technology or more involved relationships such as co-operative 
venturing or reciprocal use of services. 
Issue 21. The third area of investigation must establish what services are offered by the 
intermediaries. As previously discussed this may be affected by the sources of technology 
used, but should more deeply reflect the needs of potential recipients. Obviously, what 
is perceived by the intermediaries of the requirement of industry might well deviate from 
what industry actually requires, and this must be cross-referenced against information 
obtained in the Industrial Survey. Potential services will vary from simply offering 
information on technology sources, to providing the venture capital and technical expertise 
to ensure the successful transfer, implementation and use of the technology. Since many 
of the agencies will be unable to offer some of the more elaborate services, a measure of 
the extent of involvement of the agency in the transfer process can be undertaken. The 
extent of involvement or service diversity, both of which are aimed at facilitating change, 
underly the concept of Mobility. An articulated need may be met with an imperfect 
technology, if either the technology or need can be re-defined satisfactorily, Mobility is 
not simply transportation but rather appropriate delivery. 
Issue 22: Whether or not an intermediary needs to consider adding certain services to its 
portfolio will be dependent upon its technology and customer profile. Technologies which 
are near market readiness should require little effort to successfully transfer; given the 
appropriate recipient. Conversely, technologies which are only in embryonic form, or 
require extensive re-development to suit a particular market, will have to undergo 
considerable work by the recipient. If this is not possible and the intermediary can offer 
no help, transfer will be inhibited. Therefore, it is necessary to assess what types of 
technology are being offered by a particular intermediary. 
Issue 23: In facilitating technology transfer there are two potential areas for making 
changes to the process. Firstly, an agency might consider making technical changes to 
the basic technology being transferred. This might mean running a development 
programme co-ordinating activity between the source and user, which could be financed 
in a number of ways. In some cases, small design or technological characteristics may 
need minor alteration and in others, major development may have to be applied to the 
generic technology. It is all but impossible to measure the extent to which a particular 
intermediary may be able to follow this route, since more often than not it will be 
constrained by the particular source and recipient. However, it is important to know 
74 
whether any such activity is conceived by intermediaries to be part of their basic 
operations. 
Secondly, the transfer of technology may be inhibited by lack of technical expertise in a 
recipient company. For example, if computers were going to replace existing manual 
operations, and the staff had had no previous experience of computers, some basic re- 
training might greatly increase the acceptability of the technology to the recipient. Once 
again, exact measures of capability are not possible within the context of this research, 
but knowing whether non-technical changes are considered important is valuable. 
Issue 24: The final requirement of the survey is to produce an overall profile of the 
companies which are serviced by intermediaries. The measures used need to be directly 
comparable with the Industrial Survey. Obviously it is only possible within this study to 
describe customers with secondhand information obtained from the various intermediaries. 
In effect this eliminates some of the more subtle measures of company type and therefore 
macro indicators will have to suffice. Three basic indicators are able to roughly outline 
the types of companies being serviced. The first two indicators measure the relative size 
of the customers. This is done by sub-dividing companies into one of four groups by 
turnover and one of five groups by number of employees. Firm size is the most widely 
used method of categorising companies, since size, shapes many of the internal 
organisational characteristics. In terms of this research it is necessary to devise basic 
profiles of the technological competence of customers since this will affect both the type 
of technologies they require and their ability to modify the technology. With the 
combination of all three indicators can provide valuable insight into customer abilities. For 
example, a company with less than 20 people with a turnover of less than El million but 
having a high technological competence, may well describe a relatively new organisation 
dealing in a very specific area of new technology. Whilst they might be able to technically 
modify technology, they are unlikely to have either sufficient manpower or financial 
resources to make major changes without some degree of aid. 
Issue 25: Finally, some more perceptual information is needed to add colour to the overall 
picture obtained from each intermediary. For example, not all intermediaries are run as 
purely financial concerns and some have an element of paternalism surrounding their 
activities. In addition, the level of involvement in the transfer process might affect how 
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an agency judges is its success or failure. Consequently information is required to better 
understand whether it is the final result or success in some particular part of the transfer 
process which is the fundamental indicator of organisational success. This should reflect 
the intermediaries aims and objectives, both for themselves and their customers. Data 
outlining the features which most affect the success and failure of technology transfer is 
also useful, since it may help to identify areas where intermediaries perceive problems and 
to whom they attribute those problems. 
4.2 Ouestionnaire Derivation 
[ASIDE: Within this section, respondents to the questionnaires are taken to be masculine. 
This obviates the need to constantly use reference to both genders, such as 'him/her'. No 
argument will be forwarded here to justify this choice, but the reader may wish to know 
that of the 120 or so respondents, only two were actually female. ] 
4.2.1 The Industrial Surygy 
The first section (six questions) aims to fulfil the requirements with respect to point 10 
in the research design. That is, benchmarking companies by their basic operational 
environment. This first area only requires the respondent to impart information which 
should be known readily to him. Easing the respondent into the questionnaire with 
relatively straightforward questions, can remove the inclination to regard the overall task 
as being labourious, which immediately lowers the completion rate. Furthermore, it was 
seen as important to ensure that these questions, though penetrating, were deemed to be 
neutral. Questions, the answers to which, could be used to criticise the respondents 
organisation (R&D Spend, for example) are best left until later in the questionnaire, or 
omitted altogether. 
Question one uncovers the method, or methods, of production used to make the products. 
The means of production reflects the level of commitment to a particular product or family 
of products, and affects the ease with which process-based technologies can be updated. 
Questions two and three ascertain the market demand for products, whether product 
development and technological change are coincident and the consequent rate of demand 
for technology within the organisation. From this it is possible to gauge the overall level 
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of demand for technology from the industrial sectors covered by the survey and, in 
association with information regarding sources of technology used, gives a rough 
indication of the potential market for Intermediaries. Question four is supplementary and 
determines technological input into process based innovation. One can reasonably expect 
process innovation to lag behind product innovation in most sectors, since changes in this 
area usually have far more reaching organisational implications than alterations to 
products. However, where process innovation does occur, it is frequently radical, capital 
intensive and has the potential for the largest payback. For this reason, Intermediaries 
working on the royalty system of technology licensing may be very interested in process- 
based technology. 
Ascertaining the turnover of technology within a company's products does not necessarily 
imply anything about their use of particular 'levels' of technology. Therefore, question 
five is used to reveal these technology levels. Any measure of this sort is subjective and 
limited by the amount of detail which can be elicited, but even limited information can 
aid the interpretation of technological sophistication and demand. 
Finally, in this section, the organisation is required to benchmark itself against the other 
companies in its market. Whether a company is a market leader, follower or developer 
has many implications, notleastof which will be their tendency to follow themarkettrends 
with regards to technology. Therefore, one would not usually expect a market follower 
to be the technological trend setter within that market and similarly, a market developer 
could hardly follow the lead of others. All the questions within this section can stand alone 
and provide some interesting information, but in combination they provide an overall 
picture of the organisations operating environment. This is achieved by using macro 
indicators even though the limitations of this approach are acknowledged. 
The second section of the questionnaire satisfies the needs discussed in Point 11 of the 
research design. Fundamentally the nine questions in this section reveal why companies 
may look to external technology sources, which sources they use, what types of technology 
they are trying to find and which methods are preferred for the acquisition of these 
technologies. 
Question seven establishes the reasons that externally produced technologies are sought. 
This will be determined by two main factors; either the organisation cannot generate its 
own technologies or it sees particular advantages in obtaining these external technologies. 
77 
The discussion in Chapter 2.1 has shown that lack of internal expertise and resources 
necessitate purchasing technologies developed at distance from an organisation. 
Furthermore, the pilot exercise enabled a short list of benefits of such acquisition to be 
compiled. These were incorporated directly into this question and thus helped focus the 
respondents' mind but, it is hoped, did not constrain him to an imposed answer set. In 
addition, the respondent was required to 'rank' his preferences for each of the answers 
given to this question. It was hoped that this added dimension would yield valuable insight 
into the rational behind external technology acquisition. 
Question Eight, Parts A and B, elicited the various sources of technology used by 
organisations to feed their requirements. Again, the basic answer set was derived from 
the data obtained during the pilot stage. The available sources were divided into two 
groups, conventional and Third-Party Technology Agents. Since within each of these 
groups, various sources were given as options, there was no requirement for the respondent 
to fully understand the difference between the two groups. However, once the respondent 
had answered this question, it was possible to use thi s division and be reasonably confident 
that the respondent was aware of which sources constitutes which group. This was very 
important in later sections, were general questions regarding Third-Party Technology 
Agents were asked. The set of conventional sources was obtained from the pilot study and 
included all the logical source categories. The set of Third-Party Agents was more 
problematical. Since the term Third-Party Technology Agent is simply an invention for 
this thesis, respondents interviewed in the pilot study had to be closely questioned before 
categorisation of the various Agents could be established. Even so, there is no doubt that 
the potential list could have been increased. However, since the use made of these Agents 
was discovered to be extremely small from the pilot, it was considered that little value 
would be achieved from more discrete categorisation. 
The respondents were only required to tick the appropriate boxes for this question and were 
not required to rank their answers. Again it was deemed that since the frequency of 
utilisation of many of the conventional and non-conventional sources would be very low, 
it would ask too much of the respondent, both in ti ine and memory capacity, to rank their 
answers accurately. A measure of the effectiveness of each of the sources was given by 
also marking were technology had been acquired from. This could then be matched against 
the scanning activities to identify if any particular technology sources were more 
successfully utilised. 
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Questions Nine, Ten and Eleven cover Point 12 in the research design. They seek to 
uncover the time scales involved in technology searching, development and implementation. 
Question Nine determines whether the technologies being sought need to be immediately 
implementable or whether the respondents' organisation is willing to develop embryonic 
technology to an implementable state. Preferences here reveal the willingness of 
organisations to redevelop external technologies to meet internal needs. For some 
organisations, having to do so would negate tile advantages of obtaining external 
technology outlined in Question Seven. The extent to which this is true will be very much 
dependent upon the time scales required for the implementation of any purchased 
technology, envisaged by the respondent. Hence, Questions Ten and Eleven identify the 
time scale over which a technology is required to be implemented. 
It is also worth noting here that there is considerable difficulty in categorising time when 
identifying whether a new technology is required to meet immediate needs or some long- 
term development strategy. During the pilot study, one electronics company said that six 
months was a long term in their market. In other words, the product turnover in their 
market was so rapid that a product released today could be out of date in six months time. 
On the other hand, a traditional engineeri ng co m paii y was still making products, the basic 
design for which, was conceived in the later quarter of the last century. No doubt that 
these cases were extreme, but it emphasised the very different environments which had 
to be covered by Questions Ten and Eleven. 
Questions Twelve to Fifteen cover the issue of preferred methods of acquisition outlined 
in Point 13 of the research design. Question Twelve elicits the actual modes of technology 
acquisition which are most preferred by the respondent. The complete list was compiled 
after analysing the responses to the pilot study. This question is fundamentally important 
since it uncovers how technology needs to be offered by Intermediaries if they are to 
maximise the demand for their services. In particular, licences and joint-ventures are 
likely to be preferred by Intermediaries as transfer mechanisms. Once again, the 
respondent was asked to rank the answers to this question, since it is important not only 
to reveal which mechanisms of transfer are acceptable, but also which are preferred. 
Question Thirteen adds to the above picture by allowing the respondent to comment upon 
any difficulties Perceived with using any of the above transfer mechanisms. It was hoped 
that issues such as the lack of internal expertise in licence negotiation might be explored 
by some respondents in this space. 
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Question fourteen simply asks how many licences have been negotiated by the respondents' 
organisation in the past five years. This question exists mainly to check on the experience 
being used by the respondent to answer the other questions in this section. If the 
respondents organisation has failed to negotiate any licence agreement over the five year 
period, then the answers given in question fifteen would almost certainly be biased. 
Question fourteen also served to show how many times the population as a whole had 
negotiated licences. It would then be possible to produce a curve representing this 
population which would help to identify whether any one company was involved in less 
or more licensing activity than industry as a whole. 
The last question in this section, fifteen, asked the respondent to consider what the most 
important factors are when negotiating a licence orjoint venture agreement. Again, these 
two methods are those which, it is expected, are preferred by intermediaries to sell their 
technology. The choices given in the questionnaire are derived from detailed discussions 
with the pilot study respondents. Several areas where identified from these discussions 
which could act to prohibit the successful negotiation of licensing and joint ventures. It 
was thus deemed essential to allow the main survey respondents to voice their concern. 
The final four questions covered the requirements outlined in points fourteen, fifteen and 
sixteen in the research design. The first question, sixteen, simply identified whether or 
not therespondent has had any previous dealings with intermediaries, and if so which ones. 
Once again, this helps to correctly interpret the answers given to the other questions in 
this section. Thus question seventeen and eighteen are divided into two halves. The first 
half in each case, enquires as to a preferred situation and the second to that situation as 
it actually exists. Having no previous experience with intermediaries might makejudging 
what services they offer extremely difficult, but the respondent should still be able to 
express an opinion as to which services they should ideally offer. 
Question seventeen then, requires the respondent to identify what advantages intermediaries 
should offer over conventional sources of external technology, and what advantages they 
do offer. Unusually, the pilot study failed to provide a sufficient list of advantages to allow 
them to be proposed within the question and therefore, the respondent was given space 
to answer as seemed appropriate. Identifying what industry considers to be the role of 
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intermediafies is a fundamental purpose of the qLICStionnaire. Similarly, understanding 
how industry perceives the current advantages or disadvantages of intermediaries is 
valuable for qualitative analysis as well as for the interpretation of question eighteen. 
Question eighteen parts A and B, identify the customer services which should be made 
available to industry, and compares this with the services which industry considers are 
offered. This question then allows several areas of analysis. Firstly, the answers given 
to the questions in the other sections can be compared with the desired customer services, 
to identify whether the various macro indicators can be used tojudge a company's servicing 
needs. For example, do small generally high-tech companies with tight R&D budgets 
require different services from similar companies with venture capital available to them. 
Secondly, a direct comparison can be made between the services offered by intermediaries 
and those that are desired by industry. Thirdly, given the above information and the service 
and customer profiles of intermediaries, an analysis of the appropriateness of their 
customer targeting can be undertaken. 
The final question, nineteen, attempts to elicit from the respondents any problems they 
have had in their dealings with intermediaries. It was felt from the pilot study that there 
is still a great gulf in understanding between the parties in the technology transfer process. 
This question is included to identify more closely what is causing this misunderstanding. 
It was noted in preparing the questionnaire that if, as was expected, industry had little 
experience of intermediaries, this question might be ignored by a large number of 
respondents. 
4.2.2 The Survey of Intermediaries 
The first section of this questionnaire simply identifies the responding organisation, the 
respondent, his role within the organisation and tile number where he can be reached. It 
is sometimes convenient to allow a respondent to remain anonymous so that some delicate 
areas of investigation can be approached. In this case, however, there should be no such 
sensitive areas and furthermore, it was felt necessary to be able to re-contact the respondent 
should any of the answers prove to be ambiguous. This was less likely to be a problem 
in the industrial Survey since the number of companies being contacted was somewhat 
larger. The intermediary survey was limited in number simply because of the relatively 
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small number of companies actually working in the field. In addition, it was envisaged 
thatpopulation type studies mightprove difficult and that each response could be analysed 
in its own right. This being the case, it was far more important that individual responses 
could be double-checked if necessary. 
Section two basically covers the issue of what the intermediaries are attempting to transfer, 
whether it be whole technologies or scientific concepts; this is discussed in point eighteen 
of the Research Design. The various options proposed here, as well as in many other 
questions, were derived from close discussion with personnel within DTE Ltd drawing 
on their knowledge of the other intermediaries. Obviously, room was left for the 
respondents to add to the options if this was necessary. This question was complemented 
by question seven which sought to distinguish between those intermediaries serving the 
needs of industry as a whole, and those catering to a limited number of privileged 
companies. This concept was expanded in question eight to consider whether various 
intermediaries sought to service companies within a specific locality or over a larger area. 
Since many areas of Britain tend to specialise in particular types of industry, such a 
distinction might be mirrored in the companies being serviced and ultimately in the 
services being offered. 
A final question in this section, five, uncovered how long the intermediary had been 
operating in this field. Since the concept is relatively new and most intermediaries are still 
learning their business, the few companies which have a reasonably long track record have 
a particular interest for this study, whilst newer organisations might reflect some changing 
emphasis in the field. 
Section three examined the sources of technology used by the intermediaries in accordance 
with points nineteen and twenty of the Research Design. Once again, the options were 
derived from previous experience but two 'other' categories were made available to the 
respondent. In addition, each respondent was asked to not only indicate which sources 
of technology they utilised, but also what percentage of total technologies obtained, each 
source represented. This relative weighting indicates several things but most importantly, 
reliance upon a particular technology source. Such a reliance might limit the portfolio of 
technologies, and possibly services, available to an intermediary. 
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Question eleven obtains the information necessary to consider the arguments presented in 
point twenty of the Research Design. That is, whether the intermediary has formal or 
informal links with other agencies and by increasing its potential technology, and perhaps 
service, base. The five options presented were considered to be the only logical forms 
of inter-intermediary linkages. 
Section four examines the services offered by the agencies in accordance with the issues 
raised in points twenty-one, twenty-two and twenty-three of the Research Design. Firstly, 
question twelve elicits which services are offered and the relative importance of each 
service. It was envisaged that the respondents might be tempted to indicate a larger number 
of services than actually offered, simply because they could think of one example where 
that particular service was made available. Taken on face value, the answers to this 
question might then be misinterpreted. Thus, eliciting the relative importance of the 
services offered, removed potential 'noise' from the answers. 
The portfolio of technologies was categorised in question thirteen into three basic groups. 
The groups are identical to those in the Industrial Su rvey which covers point twelve in the 
Research Design. Revealing the relative abundance of technologies in the three groups, 
together with the information obtained in section five, allows a direct comparison of 
company/technology matching with the Industrial Survey. Hence, a first measure of the 
appropriateness of an intermediary's service to particular industrial company typesis made 
possible. 
Questions fourteen and fifteen are used as indicators to the issues raised in point twenty- 
three of the Research Design. They are only able to indicate whether or not technological 
and training services are available. It is impossible to take this issue further within the 
confines of a postal questionnaire. Even if more detailed information could be obtained 
by face-to-face contact, anything but the most meticulous enquiry into these services would 
only provide purely qualitative data. 
The final section covers points twenty-four and twenty-five of the Research Design 
regarding customer profiles and organisational objectives. Questions sixteen and 
seventeen categorise customers into sizes by the two macro indicators discussed within the 
Research Design. The boundaries of each category are, to some extent, entirely arbitrary. 
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Such macro indicators are frequently used in academic literature but no fixed size 
categories are accepted within that literature. Therefore, the categories chosen reflect 
those used in the original selection of the recipient companies for the Industrial Survey. 
These categories were laid down by the computer database from which the recipient 
companies were drawn. In the final analysis, it is always going to be impossible to have 
a finite definition of what constitutes a small or large company. Since the proposed analysis 
of the data obtained here does not concern population studies but, rather individual analysis 
of intermediaries, one is only trying to obtain a general feel for their customer base. To 
this extent the categories chosen should suffice. 
The final categorisation of companies is undertaken in question eighteen and involves 
judging the technological competence of custorners as a whole. So that an intermediary 
might say that about 20% of its customers have a high technological competence, 40% 
have moderate competence and a further 40% have low technological competence. One 
could reasonably expect that these figures would be incorrect to some degree. Indeed, the 
very process of evaluating the technological competence of companies is prone to be purely 
subjective. However, in the real world it is possible to gauge levels of even subjective 
elements and still have something useful to say. Thus whilst any measure of competence 
used here will be open to objective criticism, providing one accepts that the respondents 
have some ability to categorise their customers, that this ability will not be an extreme 
variant between respondents and that the final analysis does not require or profess to be 
wholly objective, then such a measure is worthy of analysis. 
The last three questions are open-ended and allow the respondent to express views about 
their ultimate goal, how theyjudge their own success or failure and finally, the important 
discoveries they have made about attempting technology transfer; see point twenty-five 
of the Research Design. The use of this type of question is often limited in structured 
questionnaires since textual information is difficult to code and objectively analyse. Itwas 
considered appropriate to use them in this context simply because it was felt that the 
opinions and experience of the respondents would add to the overall richness of the 
questionnaire data. 
Question nineteen, for example, enquires as to the objectives in technology transfer not 
only for the respondent organisation, but also for the customer. The value of this question 
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is dependent upon the time spent by the respondent in answering it. However, it was hoped 
that it might be possible to better understand the reasons why some of the intermediaries 
work in the way they do from this type of approach. It was already known that some 
intermediaries had a very paternalistic view of their role in regenerating British industry 
and that consequently, some of the more rational approaches to business would not be 
appropriate to them. 
Similarly, question twenty asks how the respondent judges the success or failure of his 
organisation. For some intermediaries success might bejudged by the number of licences 
negotiated, for others it might be the total revenue earned from their operations and for 
others success might be related to some imponderable like feeling as though they had 
helped local business. Again, it is not proposed to objectively analyse any data obtained, 
simply to use this information to further our understanding of the perceptions of the 
respondents to their business. 
Finally, question twenty-one allows the respondents to reveal their experiences of the 
technology transfer process and which factors have most influenced that process, for better 
or worse. 
4.3 Questionnaire Implementation. 
It is usual to explain in some detail the theory and practice behind methodologies used in 
a thesis. However, since many of the methodological descisions taken before and during 
the survey work were taken for practical rather than methodological reasons, the following 
discussion will be kept brief. 
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4.3.1 Survev One - The Industrial Surve 
Given that this survey needed to uncover a large number of macro indicators rather than 
indepth data, and that it was intended to use the data to make statements about wider 
industrial needs than the sample population, it was felt that a suitable sample size would 
be approximately one hundred companies. Although it might have proved interesting to 
be able to classify industrial organisations into a dozern or more groups using a wide variety 
of macro indicators, it was felt that the sample would have to be very significant in order 
to acheive statistically valid cell sizes. Given the time and financial constraints faced by 
all research students, it was not felt that such an exercise would be a viable option. 
Therefore, it was decided to place less emphasis on rigid company classifications and more 
on bi-variable analysis. 
In order to acheive a sample size in the region of approximately 100 companies it was 
obvious from the literature on research design that a significantly higher number of 
companies would have to be contacted than the target sample. Response rates to various 
techniques are discussed at great length in the literature although no difinitive methods 
have been agreed. Typical figures for postal and telephone techniques ranged form 10% 
to 40 % response rates, although various authors had experienced widley differing results 
(Smith H. W 1975; KidderL. H. &Judd, C. M. 1986; Nachmias, D& Nachmias C. 1976; 
Mitchell, M. & Jolley J. 1988). Such literature was very persuasive in the decision to 
approach this particular population through a postal questionnaire. This would allow a 
larger number of companies to be apporached at a reasonable cost and in a time appropriate 
to research requirements. 
Again, it is not intended here to discuss in great detail how the sample population was 
determined. However, an explanation of how the decision on which industrial sectors to 
target was reached is appropriate. It was intuitively felt that there were some sectors of 
manufacturing industry that would have a better record on technological innovation that 
others, and that these so called innnovative sectors might reveal more about the conditions 
necessary for technological innovation. It was also thought that a population derived from 
more technology intensive markets might have greater experience of technology transfer 
intermediaries which would be useful in the analysis of the intermediaries themselves. 
The literature concerning trends in innovative activity in British manufacturing is quite 
extensive, but many of the research projects are based on a database of innovations since 
1945 held by the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) at Sussex University. At the end 
86 
of the 1970's SPRU undertook to measure the characteristics of significant innovations 
and their originating companies during the period 1945-1980. This work remains as the 
only major database on the innovative activity of UK industry, and thus forms a basis for 
much of the literature in this area (Notably: Pavitt, Keith 1983; Pavitt, Keith 1984; Pavitt, 
Keith 1986; Oakey et al 1980; R. Oakey, R. Rothwell & S. Cooper 1988). 
A thorough analysis of much of this data is presented in Oakey et al (1980). It is compared 
with data obtained from the Queen's Award for industry Scheme (QAIS) published 
annually in the London Gazette. The QAIS data was first used by Langrish et al (1972) 
in their study on the process of innovation in companies. The QAIS works by 
acknowledging either increased exports or new technological innovations, or both. It is 
not necessary to discuss in detail the results of the above research other than to say that 
several innovative sectors emerged which formed the basis for targetting the survey 
questionnaires. These sectors were: - 
SIC Code Title 
33 Office Machinery/Data Processing 
34 Electrical/Electronic Engineering 
32 Mechanical Engineering 
35 Vehicles 
36 Aerospace 
37 Instrumentation 
10/20/40 Processing 
The above sectors were targetted equally each forniing one seventh of the total population 
approached. A total number of 1000 questionnaires were distributed using mailing lables 
purchased from the Kompass On-Line Business Directory. The reader maybe interested 
to know 149 companies replied to the questionnaire (a response rate of 14.9 %). Of these, 
124 questionnaires were used for the analysis which appears in the following chapters. The 
other twenty-five were not used either because the questionnaire was incorrectly 
completed, or because they were returned after preliminary data entry and analysis 
procedures had already been undertaken. 
87 
4.3.2 Survey Two - The Survev of Intermediaries 
Since the rationale behind this survey was not to produce a representation of some known 
population, less attention was paid to sampling. Indeed, the population of technology 
transfer agencies at the time of writing was small enough that the most prominent 
organisations were already known to the author. For the purposes of this survey intuitive 
techniques were used to identify a cross-section of intermediaries from various industrial 
routes. Intermediaries were included from the government sector, Regional Technology 
Centres, private commercial agencies and university technology transfer offices. Only 
thirty agencies were contacted initially and all but two responded positively. The high 
response rate is a consequence of the ability to directly contact such a small number of 
organisations in order to obtain permission for the questionnaire to be forwarded to a 
named executive. 
4.3.3 The Pilot Studies 
4.3.3.1 The Industrial Pilot. 
A pilot study was originally undertaken with a firm of independent consultants on behalf 
of the industrial sponsor for this thesis and under the Department of Trade and Industry's 
Support for Marketing Scheme. The study involved conducting twenty face-to-face 
interviews with senior managers in some of Britain's largest companies; including Glaxo, 
ICI, Jaguar, E. W. Bliss, APV Baker and Lucas Aerospace. The interviews, which lasted 
approximately one hour, followed a semi-structured approach with open-ended and free- 
choice questions. Since this exercise was to be used as the basis for the final industrial 
survey, it was decided that the interviewees should be able to express their opinions and 
choices on a totally free basis. The answers to each question were then used to build the 
structured questionnaire which formed the basis of the final study. This approach proved 
to be very successful. It allowed structured questions with limited choices to form the bulk 
of the full industrial questionnaire, which hence reduced the problems associated with 
quantifying unstructured answers. Although, even on the questions which required the 
respondent to select from a choice of possible answers, a category called 'other' was 
included, this was very rarely completed. This showed that the pilot study had acheived 
its's main aim, in defining the predominate variables industrialists associate with 
innovation and technology transfer. 
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4.3.3.2 The Intermediarv Pilot. 
Although the main aim of the pilot conducted prior to the survey of intermediaries was, 
like that undertaken for the industrial survey, to tighten the questionnaire by illiminating 
inappropriate questions, as well as adding additional questions, the approach taken was 
somewhat different. Since the known population of agencies was limited it was decided 
not to 'waste' possible respondents by using many of the intermediaries in the pilot. This 
was made easier since much of the intermediary questionnaire was pre-determined by the 
industrial questionnaire. Many of the questions were simply adapted from the earlier 
industrial questionnaire so that a direct comparisoii could be made between actions and 
demands from industry and the corresponding services offered by the intermediaries. 
Nontheless, it was decided to use the considerable experience of managers from two of 
the better known intermediaries to examine the proposed intermediary questionnaire. In 
the final analysis only a few relatively minor changes were deemed necessary. It was 
nontheless a useful process and indeed was vital to ensure that the potential respondents 
would be able to adequately 'judge' some of the more subjective questions. It was also 
felt important to ensure that the intermediaries used the same 'language' as industrialists 
in order that questions could be transposed between the two surveys without alterations. 
Again, the relative success of this process can bejUdged by the few cases were respondents 
felt it necessary to deviate from the list of responses prepared for them. 
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CHAlyrER 5 
5.0 RESULTS AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF THE INDUSTRIAL SURVEY 
5.1 General Population Characteristics. 
5.1.1 Company Size: 
The size of companies is denoted here by their Turnover or Number of Employees 
according to the following categories: 
Percentage 
of 
Population 
Millions 
of 
Pounds 
Size 
Category 
Number 
of 
Employees 
Percentage 
of 
Population 
16.2% <1 1 Very Small < 20 26.3% 
50% 1-5 2 Small 20-50 27.6 
13.2% 5-10 3 Small/Medium 50-100 11.8% 
10.3% 10-20 4 Medium 100-500 23.7% 
10.2% 20+ 5 Large 500+ 10.5% 
Table 5.1. 
5.1.2 Sectors: 
The six main sectors covered by this survey were: 
SIC CODEDESCRIPTION 
32 Manufacture of metal structures, machinery, tools, hydraulic and process 
equipment, general engineering. 
33 Manufacture of office and DP equipi-nent (including computer software) 
34 Manufacture of electrical, electronic and telecommunications equipment and 
components. 
35 Motor Vehicle manufacture 
36 Aerospace manufacture 
37 Manufacture of precision instruments, medical and optical equipment 
0000' 
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5.2. The Demand For Technology. 
Figure 5.1, below shows the frequency at which the respondents launched new products: 
Figure 5.1 
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Some 82 % of all respondents launched three new products or less each year, with 22 % 
of that number launching less than one product every year. Obviously, the number of 
products in a company's portfolio is always likely to be linked to the size of company. 
Indeed, the figures showed that the two smallest size categories by either measure of size, 
were much more likely to launch less than one product per year than were the other size 
of companies. Despite this, the majority of all size categories launched between one and 
three products per year. 
10 11+ 
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Figures 5.2a & 5.2b 
Figure 5.2a 
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If we then look at Figures 5.2a and 5.2b (overleaf), we can see that the demand for new 
technology within the sample. Fig. 5.2a reveals the frequency at which companies upgrade 
their products with technology which is new to those companies. As would be expected, 
the demand for technologies to update existing products is slightly higher than the rate of 
productlaunch. 
The number of companies incorporating less than one new technology per year into their 
products is similar to the number launching that many products per year, at 27.0%. 
Noticeable, however, was the number of companies upgrading their product technology 
annually, at 43.5 %. 
The picture of changing technology in processes differed considerably. Here over 70% 
of all companies were involved in technological changes to their processing capability less 
than once per year. Obviously, it is expected that processes are changed less frequently 
than products because of the greater implications on the organisation of process 
innovation. 
However, in terms of measuring the demand for technology the figures say two important 
things. Firstly, Intermediaries intent on the sale or licensing of technologies will have to 
carefully gauge the balance of their technology portfolio between products and processes. 
Secondly, since product and process innovation are linked in the degree or level of 
technology incorporated in each, the lack of changes in process technology indicates the 
level of possible changes in product technology. Intermediaries dealing exclusively in 
high-tech may well corner a niche market, but the size of that market maybe too small to 
sustain business. 
The survey further showed that 80.0% of companies had some products in developed 
markets which required very low level technological innovation or no technological 
innovation. A further 42.0% of companies had products in markets where only the use 
of existing technology or incremental changes is suitable to their customers. Onlyl9.0% 
of companies had products in markets which required high levels of technology. 
Again, the picture which is emerging of incremental technological changes to existing 
products and processes which involve technologies which are either kown to the company 
or market, and which do not require dramatic changes to companies' technology bases, 
is further underlined when one looks at the state of development of technologies sought 
by industry (Figure 5.3 overleaf). 
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The level of technological input which industry prefers to expend on acquired technologies 
is relatively low. Figure 5.3 shows the state of development of technologies sought with 
respect to their readiness for use. The diagram dramatically shows that some 82.0% of 
companies are looking for technologies which are either ready for use immediately or 
which will need very limited development before use. Only 18.0% were looking for 
technologies which would need extensive development work before they could be matched 
to existing organisational and manufacturing structures. These factors also have important 
implications for Intermediaries working in the technology transfer field, since they will 
have to be dealing with technologies which are not beyond the technological competence 
of their potential customers. Further, industry is saying that on the whole it requires 
technologies which can be readily incorporated into predetermined industrial contexts. 
READY FOR USE NEEDING LIMITED NEEDING EXTENSIVE 
DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT 
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Figures 5.4a & 5.4b 
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The last aspect of technological demand considered by the survey was the time scale over 
which innovation is achieved. Figures 5.4a and 5.4b (overleaf) show over what period 
companies require product and process technologies to be acquired. The first point to note 
is that the two diagrams are, perhaps not surprisingly, almost identical. In both cases the 
majority of technologies are needed to meet medium and long-term needs. This may well 
reflect active technology strategies to meet perceived changes in future markets instead 
of the less desirable short-term strategy of making defensive changes to products on the 
basis of already changed markets. However, some 40.0% of companies required 
technology over the short-term and this will either reflect markets where constant change 
is a fact of life, or where market competition and pressure have lead to an urgent need for 
product or process upgrade. 
5.3 Reasons for Acguiring External Technologies. 
Figure 5.5 (overleaf) shows how respondents viewed the need for acquiring technology 
externally. Each column is split into three sections based upon the percentage of companies 
who considered that column to be either of No Importance, Low Importance or High 
Importance. Not surprisingly the three highest scoring factors were those which were the 
perceived benefits of acquiring technology externally. These were the possibility of 
maintaining the company's competitive advantage by either reducing the costs of 
production via process innovation or by launching new products. Not having to develop 
a technology internally means a faster route to product launch and sometimes to a new 
market. Improving the quality of existing products was also seen as an important method 
of maintaining a market share. 
Maintaining an awareness of the changing technological environment and what it has to 
offer scored remarkably well, with nearly 80.0% of companies giving this factor some 
ranking. What was particularly noticeable was that the smaller companies thought this 
to be of much greater importance than there larger counterparts. This reflects the nature 
of small growing companies who need either to meet small niche markets, or produce more 
technologically novel or superior products to compete with the benefits larger companies 
receive from economies of scale. 
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However, the fact that small companies appear to be more technologically aware does not 
imply they are more technologically able. This becomes apparent from the last two factors, 
the lack of in-house expertise and R&D funds. Problems with the availability of internal 
expertise to meet market needs seems to be directly related to the size of company (defined 
by Tumover). 
Company size in Millions of Pounds 
1-5 5-10 10-20 20+ 
Percentage of 
Companies 82% 81% 48% 49% 17% 
Table 5.2: Importance of the Lack of Internal Expertise in the 
Decision to Acquire External Technologies 
0,01*1 
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The two smallest categories of company size gave this a much higher rating than the other 
categories. This follows the logical sequence of problems faced by the small growing firm; 
where, initially, the company will have a closely nit organisation with a few people 
responsible for the majority of managerial tasks including R&D. With growth, increasing 
market share and competition, comes the need for a faster response to changing technology 
and the small company often finds itself with a gap between its technological needs and 
competence. Table 5.2 shows that such problems are not the exclusive property of the 
smaller firm, but also affect the two medium size categories. The situation of medium 
sized companies is not dissimilar to small companies, except that technological shortfalls 
may have less to do with the rate of technological change and more to do with the problems 
of diversification into new markets with the changes in technology that entails. 
Company size in Millions of Pounds 
<1 1-5 5-10 10-20 20+ 
Percentage of 
Companies 63% 85% 50% 50% 17% 
Table 5.3 Importance of the Lack of Internal R&D Funds in the Decision to 
Acquire External Technologies 
The availability of in-house R&D funds (Table 5.3) displays a similar pattern to that for 
technical expertise. Obviously, there is a critical firm size at which any degree of R&D 
activity can commence and this explains why the smallest size category found the lack of 
in-house R&D funds less important than internal expertise. Once that critical size has been 
reached, where theoretically the company should be involved in R&D, any shortfall 
becomes particularly important. The non-avialability of funds for R&D is shown to be 
of concern once again to all but the largest of companies. The relatively low percentage 
of turnover expended on R&D in the UK compared with our industrial competitors from 
Europe and beyond has become of particular notice over the last decade and, perhaps, 
reflects some of the problems of the UK's finance markets. 
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5.4: Preferred Methods of External Technology Acquisition. 
Figure 5.6 (below) shows that the direct purchase of technology is the most popular method 
or acquiring technologies from external sources. Direct purchasing is most appropriate 
for technologies which come as complete products and which have already been proven 
in some market. This is very much in line with the previous discussions on demand. 
Licence agreements were also very popular, with 70.0% of companies ranking this as an 
important acquisition method. This concurs with other available data which indicate an 
ever increasing worldwide licensing market, in which the UK plays a leading role. 
Technology licensing has the obvious advantage of providing the potential to enter new 
markets very quickly or to maintain an existing position in a market where technology is 
rapidly changing. This is going to be particularly important to the smaller companies with 
problems of cashflow and where financial risks have to minimised. Again the survey 
showed the marked preference of licensing for the smaller company categories. The two 
medium size categories also showed a preference for licensing, but to a lesser extent. 
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Joint ventures and Contract R&D tied in third place overall, with each being ranked by 
approximately 62.0% of companies. Potentially joint venturing has the advantage of 
splitting the costs of developing a mutually beneficial technology, and one that either may 
not have been able to develop on its own. This might make joint venturing a preference 
for smaller companies, but our survey showed that the smaller the company, the less 
preferential joint venturing seemed to be. This is almost certainly due to the time and 
organisational constraints ofjoint venturing. Joint venture projects tend to be projects with 
time horizons set in the middle distance and companies requiring technology on a regular 
basis or urgently, will not find this the quickest method. In addition, joint venturing 
requires management experience of inter-firm projects with their many pitfalls, and this 
can be very time consuming for senior management. 
The preference for contract R&D was slightly different, with all but the largest companies 
recording below average preferences. Contract R&D overcomes the problems of lack of 
in-house expertise and resources and can have some interesting spin-offs, but it suffers 
from similar organisational problems to joint venturing. Contracting out your R&D will 
involve complex processes such as briefing the R&D organisational. on your requirements 
and then to interpret and evaluate the output of the work. These processes are time 
consuming and potentially costly, and when combined with the degree of uncertainty 
always present in such work, will often prove unfavourable. 
Acquiring technological know-how by employing technically qualified personnel proved 
to be of interest to almost 60.0 % of companies, but only 53.0 % gave this a high rating. 
The interest that does exist is probably a reflection of the various problems encountered 
with obtaining technology via the other routes. New personnel can be a way of avoiding 
the time and organisational implications of joint venturing or contract R&D. The survey 
showed no strong connection between company size and preference for personnel and this 
emphasises the lower importance this method of technology acquisition plays. 
Company acquisition and merger was, not surprisingly, mainly the domain of larger 
companies, although all companies maintained a respectable interest in this option. Whilst 
this route may often be the most appropriate route to new and diverse markets, especially 
abroad, it is not usually a process embarked upon for purely technological reasons. 
The least popular route to technology proved to be turnkey projects which seem to be of 
equal disinterest to all company sizes. This will be, at least partially, the result of the nature 
of products sold under turnkey arrangements. They will tend to be technology or technical 
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systems for manufacturing processes not as inputs to new products; and, as discussed 
earlier, process technologies play a relatively less important role in most companies. 
Turnkey projects are most likely to be chosen only when internal expertise is totally lacking 
or when a particular technology cannot be obtained by any other route. 
5.5: The Special Role of Licensing Technology. 
Licensing-in technologies plays a special role in this survey since the licensing of 
technology is the route by which many of the Intermediaries have chosen to attempt the 
transfer of their technologies. Sources of licenceable technology will be Universities, 
Government Research Establishments and private sector companies with a good record 
with in-house R&D. It has already been shown that licensing-in technology is a route 
preferred by industry but there are potential drawbacks. Figure 5.7 (overleaf) shows the 
survey results for the most important factors in licensing and licence negotiations. Top 
of the rankings came the time scale involved in negotiations. This underlines the fact that 
whilst a key benefit of licensing is the possible time savings over other routes to 
technology, there are frequently protracted negotiations involved in licensing deals. As 
shown earlier, companies are looking for technology in the medium to long-term so time 
in this sense is not a constraint. However, lengthy negotiation procedures mean increased 
costs and senior management tied-up for unacceptable periods of time. 
The availability of internal expertise to cope with the technical discussions and evaluation 
necessary to test the feasibility of a potential licence technology is also of great concern 
to industry. A detailed technical evaluation will require indepth knowledge of the 
technology so that the technical advantages and disadvantages can be gauged, and so that 
any development necessary can be clearly identified and qualified in terms of time and 
money. This aspect of licensing can be worrying to many firms, since lack of in-house 
technical expertise is one of the main reasons for acquiring technology from external 
sources. 
The costs of both licenses and the development necessary to incorporate the new 
technology into existing structures and products was seen as being of equal importance 
by companies of all sizes. Again since the reduction of costs is a major contributory factor 
in the decision to seek external technologies, costs encumbered through licensing must not 
be excessive. This will include the importance of setting reasonable royalty payments and 
that any minimum payments are not counterproductive or have to be realised over too short 
a period. 
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The potential risk of project failure through the problems associated with integrating 
externally developed technology and the resultant financial loss were obviously of concern 
to all companies irrespective of size. It was, perhaps, encouraging that these factors were 
less important considerations than other and would denote a marked potential for licensing- 
in technology. 
Finally in this section, companies were asked to identify the number of licence deals 
negotiated by their company over the last five year period. Figure 5.8 (overleaf) shows 
the licensing activities of the respondents. 
What was surprising was that 32.0% of companies reported no licence deals in the last five 
years. Given the apparent popularity of licensing as a route to technology, this figure must 
reflect the problems in identifying licenceable products, appropriate licensors and in 
negotiating licenses which are acceptable to both parties. This is the domain of the 
technology transfer Intermediaries and will be the subject of analysis in the next section. 
Of the companies who did licence regularly, the majority only make one deal per year and 
most are below this level. 
5.6: Sources of Technology, 
5.6.1 The Number of Sources Used by IndusL[y, 
Having established something of the demand for new technology by industry, its reasons 
for acquiring that technology and preferred methods of acquiring the technology, it is time 
to consider which sources are used at present. 
Firstly, it is worth remembering that the survey distinguished between two distinct types 
of sources, Conventional and Third-Party. 
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These were sub-divided as follows: 
Conventional Sources Third-Party Sources 
Research Associations 
Companies in Same Market 
Companies in Other Markets 
Component Suppliers 
Universities 
Other Conventional 
Regional Technology Centres (RTC) 
Technology Transfer Agent 
Technology Consultant 
Applications Advisers 
Introduction Agencies/Marriage Bureaux 
4 Technology Fairs 
Other Third-Parties 
Table 5.4: Types of Technology Source. 
This division is not meant to be a definitive differentiation between the two groups, on 
the contrary it will prove a disadvantage in some areas of analysis and will then be dropped. 
The value of the distinction as it stands, is simply that the Third-Party sources are those 
which are considered to be 'newer' types Of SOUrces where the Third-Party is generally 
not selling its own technologies. 
Figure 5.9 (overleaf) shows the total number of. ' sources companies used to search for 
technology and how that was divided between tile two sub-divisions. Figure 5.9a describes 
the whole population or possible technology SOUrces and indicates a slight skewed normal 
distribution. That is, the population is not evenly distributed, but rather there is a tendency 
for companies to search only a small number Of Sources. If we group the number of sources 
searched into blocks of three we obtain the results shown in Table 5.5. 
Number Of SOUrces Searched. 
1-3 4-6 7-9 10-12 
Percentage of 
Companies 54.2% 33.7% 10.4% 2.4% 
Table 5.5: The Percentage of Companies Searching Each Group Of Sources. 
interestingly, there is no difference in tile number of sources searched by the various size 
categories. The only exceptions were the few cases where companies searched in the 10- 
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20 source category, and these were the very largest companies. Obviously, there were 
no companies who did not search for technologies at all. 
Figure 5.9b shows the number of Conventional sources used by the respondents. The most 
noticeable characteristic of this graph is its similarity to the Total Source graph (a). This 
indicates the high importance of Conventional sources of technology over their Third- 
Party rivals. However, the graph is more skewed to the left than the Totals graph, 
indicating some usage of the Third-Parties. The graph dipicting the use made of the Third- 
Parties (5.9c) shows that the majority of people using one of these sources, only use one 
of these sources. The case for the Third-Parties looks pretty poor in the light of these 
graphs, but in fact only 27.9 % of companies excl Lided the use of Third-Parties from their 
activities. 
5.6.2 Conventional Sources. 
Figure 5.10 (overleaf) shows how the various Conventional sources of technology were 
used. The most popular source of technology proved to be companies operating in the same 
market as the respondent, with 70.4% of companies using this source. This preference 
is easily explained when viewed in the context of demand, reasons for external 
technologies and thepreferred. methods of acquisition discussed earlier. Ifcompanieswant 
technology they know, can understand, is already developed and has been proven in the 
market place, the most obvious place to look for technology is companies operating around 
them. For this reason the use made of companies operating in other markets was only 
42.0%. These companies can offer many similar characteristics for their technology, but 
the level of knowledge about companies outside Your own and the understanding of their 
technologies is often reduced. 
Somewhat surprisingly, component suppliers were the second favourite source with some 
58.5% of companies receiving technology froin this source. The use of suppliers as 
technology sources implies a less active technology strategy based on reactive policies. 
However, in some subsections of various industrial sectors the requirement for change will 
be driven by the technology developed by companies higher up in the manufacturing chain. 
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Research associations and Universities whilst botli scoring in excess of 30.0% usage, were 
less favoured than other Conventional sources. I ii both cases the reasons for this will be 
clear. Negotiation with either one of these sources may involve problems of technical 
evaluation, unproven technology, inappropriate technology, lengthy projects, andawhole 
series of minor and major misunderstandings. 
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5.6.3 Third-Partv Sources. 
Figure 5.11 (below) shows the use made of the Third-Party sources. The most noticeable 
charactesistics of this graph are: firstly, that these sources are used very little compared 
to the Conventional sources, and; secondly, that the very noticeable exception are 
technology fairs. 62.9% of companies had used these fairs to search for technology and 
the reasons for this are closely related to the use made of Conventional sources. 
Obtaining technology from companies in the same or closely related markets is the most 
popular route to new technology and technology fairs are certainly a good way of meeting 
the necessary companies. The enormous use made of technology fairs is thus totally 
understandable. The same thing is less easily said of the lack of use made of all the other 
Third-Parties. Figure 5.9c showed that 45.3 %, o I* the 72.1 % of companies which used 
Third-Parties, only used a single Third-Party SOUrce. The survey further revealed that 
almost one-third of companies, who used Third-I)arties, used technology fairs. 
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How then can the low usage of Third-Party sources be explained? Firstly, consider the 
use made of Technical Consultants and Applications Advisers. In essence these two 
sources do not directly supply the technology, but rather carryout a technical evaluation 
and then make suggestions as to the appropriate technical solution. Logically then, these 
sources are likely to be used only when a company has decided that it has a technical 
problem which will require a technical solution that it is not capable of sufficiently 
evaluating in-house. We have already seen that it is the smaller firms which suffer from 
the lack of internal expertise to a much greater extent than larger companies and would 
thus appear to have more reason to use these sources. Having said this, there are, of course, 
occassions when large companies require speciric technical advice in areas where an 
external consultant is known to have special expertise. 
The three remaining sources, Regional Technology Centres (RTCs), Technology Transfer 
Agents (TTAs) and Introduction Agencies or Marriage Bureaus are all of a similar type. 
They all revolve around the idea that potential buyers of technology often find it difficult 
to identify and locate licensors of technology and hence these agencies provide information 
and technology to overcome this problem. Given this potentially useful service the lack 
of use is confusing at first. There are several aspects of the operations of these agencies 
which might be counting against them at present though. Firstly, such agencies, with a 
few notable exceptions, are a relatively new phenonerna and many companies will almost 
certainly not use them simply because they are unsure what the agencies do. This lack 
of understanding emerged clearly when the survey asked companies to offer an opinion 
on the services such agencies can profer. Over 70% of companies felt unable to answer 
that question and this shows a profound lack of communication between industry and the 
agencies at present. Those companies which have had some experience of the various 
agencies may well feel that unless the potential technology or licensor database is 
extremely large, the chances of finding any technologies from their own markets or to suit 
their situation is minimal. Given this gulf in appreciation the results of the survey with 
respect to the services respondents would like to see offered should be very interesting. 
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5.7 The Services Third-Party Agencies Should Offer. 
Figure 5.12 (below) shows how the survey respondents viewed the services they would 
require from any Third-Party Agent. 
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The most important single service which can offered is technical expertise with 75.0% and 
the second is technical evaluation with 66.7%. Technical inexperience and inability to 
assess and evaluate potentially useful technologies has emerged time and again as the 
biggest problem companies face in technology transfer. It has been shown that lack of 
in-house expertise is a key reason for obtaining external technologies and is one of the main 
problems in negotiating the purchase of those external technologies. If Intermediaries or 
Third-Parties have ajob to do, it is going to be to combine technical expertise with a wide 
knowledge of available technologies. Access to many technologies was the third most 
00*11 
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important service which could be offered, witli 65.0% of companies stating this as an 
important feature. Access to many technologies does not mean being spoilt for choice, 
but rather means being given enough possibilities for one to be appropriate. Of course, 
there is no point in offering many technologies Lin less you can help the potential recipient 
evaluate the options. 
The ability to undertake market research was deemed to be important by 50.0% of 
companies. Market research based upon the technical evaluation of a new product and 
its potential rivals in the market place is something which would not be an obvious goal 
of most Third-Party sources, but such research relies on comparing technology. This will 
also be an important factor when companies are using external technology to enter new 
markets and would be in need of special i st adice based upon a sound knowledge of the new 
market. 
Also of significance was the issue of the support offered by the licensor after the initial 
transfer is completed: 48.3 % of companies thought this was important. As part of a 
technology transfer where the basic technology is new to the licensee, must be theprovision 
of technical training of staff and sometimes the temporary movement of personnel between 
the licensor and licensee. This is often the only way that the transferred technology can 
be efficiently utilised. In addition, if post-traiisfer problems are encountered the licensee 
will wish to ensure that he is not left without technical backup. 
Finally, the availability of venture capital was seen as important by ony 13.3 % of 
companies. Presumably this fact is the consequence of the desire of all companies to 
purchase technologies which are not in need of development and will therefore require not 
financial support. It is also probably safe to assume that where more speculative 
programmes of technology transfer are undertaken, or where the potential licensee is a 
small company, this factor will become more important. 
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CHAITER 6 
6.0 RESULTS AND PRELLMDURY ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY OF 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER INTERMEDIARIES 
6.1 Technologies Offered by the Agencies. 
Each Agency was asked to categorise the technologies it transfers into three groups, those: 
Needing Extensive Development 
Needing Limited Development 
Near Market Ready 
Further, each Agency was asked to state what proportion of each of the above states of 
technology they dealt with. Figures 6. la and 6. lb show the results (overleaf). 
Figure 6. la shows the overall state of the technologies offered. It can be seen that nearly 
half of the technologies offered for transfer are nearly ready for market, nearly a third need 
limited development and a quarter need extensive development. This picture of the state 
of technologies on offer compares very favourably with the state of technologies demanded 
by industry (Figure 5.3 Chapter 5). 
Figure 2b shows the number of Agencies who had particular proportions of the three levels 
of technology on their books. Consider, for example, the spread of technologies needing 
extensive development. It can be seen that the majority of companies have less than one- 
third of the technologies they offer at that state of development. This fits nicely with the 
overall usage of technologies needing extensive development. However, there is a very 
small minority of companies who appear to specialise in this type of technology. They 
have somewhere between 61 % and 80 % of technologies in this condition. It is noticeable 
that none of the Agencies had between 31 % and 40 % of their technologies needing 
extensive development. 
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This would indicate that whilst such technologies do play a role for most Agencies, some 
Agencies have decided to specialise in encouraging the transfer of technologies which will 
only payback after a long period of subsequent development. It is reasonable to assume 
that such intermediaries either have different customer profiles to other Agencies, or offer 
different services to facilitate transfer. This will be analysed and discussed later. 
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The overall spread of technologies requiring limited development or no development, are 
much more evenly distributed as might be expected. No Agency had more that 60 % of 
its technologies needing limited development indicating that this was not a specialist area. 
This is to be expected since no agent can guarantee that technology offered to them for 
transfer will be near market ready. Indeed, given the argument expressed in this thesis 
that technology is a product of the environment in which it was developed and that the 
environment to which it will be transferred will seldom be identical, it is highly unlikely 
that there are many truly market ready technologies available. Such a scenario would only 
occur where a whole product or process has been developed for a particular need in one 
domain and is being transferred to another organisation for the same purpose. Examples 
of such transfer are not unusual where technology is simply implemented in a new 
geographical area. 
The survey also showed that there was a minority of companies who appeared to specialise 
in market ready technologies. It is worth noting that the portfolio of Agencies is 
determined by their technology sources and since some Agencies will have very particular 
sources, so then will their technologies be of a particular state of readiness, etc. 
6.2 Customer Proriles. 
The profiles of the customers serviced by the Agencies surveyed were defined by two sets 
of information: i) the size of the companies involved, and ii) the technological competence 
of those companies. These two basic measures gave an indication as to whether companies 
are already able to cope with technologies which might need development and whether 
they had the financial back-up to support costly or long-term projects. Evidence has 
already been demonstrated in the industrial survey that there is a relationship between 
company size and resources available for technology transfer, whether these be financial, 
technical or manpower based - 
Figures 6.2a and 6.2b show the size of companies serviced by the Agencies as a whole. 
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Figures 6.2a & 6.2b 
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The number of companies in each of the size categories is remarkably similar showing that 
there is no preference towards any particular size of company by Agencies as a whole. 
However, not all of the Agencies dealt with every size of customer. The overall spread 
of customers (Figure 6.2b) reveals that most Agencies dealt consistently with at least two 
customer sizes. Some specialist Agencies did appear , however. One Agency dealt 
exclusively with the very largest customer size, whilst another dealt almost exclusively 
with the very lowest customer size. 
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For the purposes of analysis in later sections, it was decided to limit the customer sizes 
to three basic groups instead of four. These groups are: 
Small f0-1 Million 
Medium fl-10 Million 
Large E10-100+ Million 
The groupings may not agree with some standard definitions of company sizes, but is 
consistent with the spread of company sizes recorded in Chapter 5. Since the size of 
customer is only relevant because of the potential this gives the customer to invest in 
technology transfer, the largest groups need not be sub-divided since this would serve no 
useful purpose, given the level of accuracy possible, and indeed required, for this analysis. 
Further, since the vast majority of firms potentially requiring the services of technology 
transfer agents are actually in the small and mediLim sized enterprise (SME) class, it was 
felt that grouping the two largest classifications together would not detract from the 
evidence to be produced here, nor unduly bias the results. 
It is important to comprehend that each agency described in this chapter is in effect a sample 
of a population of one as well as an indication of general trends. To this extent the main 
purpose of the presentation of data is to describe potential mismatches between services 
offered and required in an 'easy to understand' form. It is not intended to use heavy 
statistical analysis, but rather more qualitative techniques. 
The second customer profile indicator is the technological competence of that customer. 
Agencies were asked to categorise their customers into the following levels of competence: 
Low Technological Competence 
Moderate Technological Competence 
High Technological Competence 
They then reported the proportions of customers that fell into each category. 
Figure 6.3a shows the overall level of technological competence displayed by the Agencies 
customers. Somewhat surprisingly, this shows that over 50% of the customers were 
considered to be highly technologically competent and a further 35 % moderately so. This 
figure is not entirely consistent with the pattern which emerged in the industrial survey, 
where most companies said they required technical expertise and technical evaluation skills 
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Figures 6.3a & 6.4b 
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from the Agencies. This tended to imply that most companies felt that they had some 
degree of technical skills shortage. The figures reported by the Agencies must then, either 
reflect their dealings with a subset of the overall population, or reflect a lack ofjudgement 
about their clients. 
0*11 
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The spread of the technological competence of customers, shown in Figure 6.3b, also 
shows an interesting pattern. Firstly, where Agencies do have customers with low 
technological competence, these tend to make-up a very small proportion of their overall 
client base. There were no Agencies which sort to specialise in these less technologically 
able companies. Even companies with a moderate technological competence seldom 
make-up more than 40 % of the client base; whilst several Agencies heavily favoured the 
highly technologically competent. 
These figures did not seem to tally directly with the figures presented on the technologies 
Agencies were offering (Figs. 6. la & 6. lb). The technologies offered were generally near 
market and one might suppose that companies of all levels of technological competence 
would be able to recognise the benefit of such technologies and further, be able to take 
advantage of them. The picture emerging then is by no means clear and to aid analysis 
it is necessary to examine each Agency individually and then determine whether any 
6natural' categories emerge. 
6.3 Agency Categories. 
In order to judge and compare the Agencies against the variables discussed in the previous 
sections, it was necessary to devise a method of combining them to make comparison a 
relatively easy process. Figure 6.4 (overleaf) shows the pictorial representation achieved 
for these variables: in this case for the population sample as a whole. 
The diagram has two basic axes, the level of technological competence of the customers 
and the size of the customers. The combination of these two variables produces a three- 
by-three matrix, with each one of the nine resultant cells representing a combination of 
one category of technological competence and one category of customer size. Since we 
have the proportions of agency business that each of these categories represents, each cell 
could be plotted with the proportion of total business that it represented. That is, that the 
complete length of either axis (three cell widths for the horizontal axis, and three cell 
heights for the vertical axis) represents 100% of that Agency's business. 
However, to include the proportions of the three categories of technologies being 
transferred, the cells were further sub-divided. Each cell can thus inform the reader not 
only of the relative importance of the nine customer categories, but also how important 
the different levels of technology are in each of these (assuming an even distribution of 
the various technology types). 
000", 
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Figure 6.4 
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The diagrams are in fact easy to read but if we consider Figure 6.4 for the present this 
should become clearer. 
Figure 6.4 shows the varying importance of the custoi-ner size, technological competence 
and the level of transferable technologies for tile whole population. 
In order to understand what this diagram can tell us, it is initially best to consider a single 
axis. Consider the horizontal axis which represents the various proportions of customers 
of each size. 25 % of customers overall, were in the small size category. Therefore, a 
band representing 25 % of the width of an individual cell was marked vertically in the small 
companies cell, starting in the low technological competence cell and rising to the high 
technological competence cell. The same process was carried out for companies of all size 
categories, the result being three vertical bands who's total width was equal to one cell 
width. 
ooplý 
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An identical process was completed for the vertical axis which described the relative 
importance of the customers' technological competence. For example, roughly 22 % of 
customers overall were reported as having a low teclinological competence. Thus, a band 
representing 22 % of the height of a cell was drawn horizontally across all size categories 
in the low technological competence cell. Once again, this process was repeated for all 
levels of technological competence. 
In each cell the vertical and horizontal bands meet and this intersection represents the 
relative importance of the vertical and horizontal scales for that cell. So for example, the 
intersection of customers with a high technological competence with large customers (top 
right cell) proves to contain the largest intersectional area and thus shows how the single 
biggest type of customer for the Agencies are large companies with high levels of internal 
technological knowledge and know-how. Direct comparison between the intersectional 
areas is possible since the total combined intersectional areas should exactly equal the area 
of any individual cell. 
There is one further modification to this matrix which appears as shaded stripes within the 
operating bands. Each band is sub-divided into three stripes which represent the 
proportion of technologies held by the Agencies which either require extensive or limited 
development, or else are near market ready. The relative size of these stripes represents 
the proportions of each of the technology levels as part of the total business identified by 
the Agencies. In order to add these stripes to the bands it was necessary to assume uniform 
distribution of technology types across all cells. This assumption is bound to be incorrect 
to some degree but this represents only minor error when considering individual Agencies 
in the following sections. The benefits are that at a glance the extra information is available 
and gives an added insight into the operations of the Agencies. 
This graphical technique has two purposes pertinent to this analysis. Firstly, it allows for 
fast analysis of individual Agencies which would otherwisebe dependent upon interpretation 
of tables of figures. Secondly, it offers quick comparisons between different Agencies, 
and hence aids Agency categorisation. 
It would not be sensible to present such graphical analysis of all the Agencies here, but 
a few examples will be used as examplars for the categorisation. 
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Figure 6.5 
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Figure 6.5 (above) shows the representation of the case study agency presented earlier, 
Defence Technology Enterprises (DTE). The first thing to note about this diagram is that 
there are intersections in all the cells. In other words, DTE are involved with customers 
of all sizes and all technological capabilities. However, the size of these intersectional 
areas varies considerably between the different levels of technological competence, 
indicating a marked preference for dealings with higher technology based companies. The 
question then arises as to whether this preference is a direct result of the technologies they 
have to offer or is a reflection of a perceived benefit of interacting with companies of an 
established technological stature.. The intra-band striping shows that the technologies on 
offer are generally in need of limited or extensive development, with only 20% being 
perceived as near market ready. As a short-hand version of DTE's operations then, it can 
be said that they generally deal with undeveloped technology for highly technologically 
developed companies. 
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However, to leave this particular diagram without further comment would be rash since 
a significant proportion of their activities also involve companies of all sizes and 
technological capabilities. One would assume that the needs of these less technologically 
developed companies would be significantly different from those of their better developed 
rivals. This should have implications for the service provision offered by the Agency. This 
question will be explored in a later section, but for now it is important to note the diversity 
of company types serviced by DTE. As we will see, many of the Agencies are considerably 
more specialised than DTE so for the present it is useful to note DTE as an exemplar for 
an Agency type which we will call TYPE ONE. 
Figures 6.6a & 6.6b (overleaf) show the graphical representations of the activities of the 
Thames Valley Regional Technology Centre (TVTC) and the West Midlands Technology 
Transfer Centre (WMTTC). In the case of TVTC (Figure 6.6a) the diagram clearly shows 
that their client base consists mostly of small and medium sized companies with low to 
moderate technological capabilities. They, like DTE, have intersections in all the cells 
but are much more specialised in their activities. An important attribute of their operations 
can be seen from the bands which describe the offered technology. There is no band for 
technologies requiring extensive development and even the band for technologies 
requiring limited development is relatively small. This re-emphasises the specialist nature 
of the Agency, but also causes a problem in Agency categorisation. 
Consider now Figure 6.6b which deals with the activities of the WMTTC. Again, the 
intersections are clearly grouped in the lower left corner of the diagram. Further, there 
are no intersections in the cells describing either high technological competence or large 
companies. Does this fact imply that the WMTTC is significantly different from the 
TVTC? After considering the graphical representations of all the Agencies it becomes 
clear that even though the two Agencies have soine differences, their similarities far 
outweighthis. It is possible then to consider that this type of picture might describe a type 
of Agency which can be called TYPE TWO. 
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There is, of course, a major difference between these two Agencies which is a function 
of the technologies they supply. Although having technologies of all three levels, 70% 
of the WMTTC's technologies are in need of extensive development. On this scale then 
the operations of the two companies could not be further apart, and this difference in the 
technology supply should manifest itself in the methods of operation of the two Agencies. 
This anomaly serves to illustrate an important point about this form of graphical 
representation and categorisation; ie. the representation only shows the operating 
environments of the Agencies not the methods of operation devised to meet the needs of 
those environments. This point understood it is permissible to continue the categorisation 
process. 
The third type of Agency is one which mainly specialises in servicing large companies with 
moderate or high technological competence (ie they occupy the top right of the diagram). 
Figures 6.7a and 6.7b show the graphs for two examples of this type of Agency, Pax 
Technology Transfer (PAXTT) and the British Technology Group (BTG). These two 
diagrams are less alike than other pairs already discussed but once again this difference 
raises an interesting point. In the case of PAXTT the primary operating environment is 
with large companies with a moderate technological capability, whilst in the case of the 
BTG it is centred on large companies with a high technological capability. Despite this 
difference it is still maintained that the two Agencies are of the same type (TYPE THREE), 
but that the technologies they supply alter the centre of gravity of their operating 
environments. 
In the case of PAXTT 60 % of the technologies dealt with are nearly ready 
for the market place and since this asks less of the customer in technological terms, they 
can trade with the less technologically articulate. The BTG, on the other hand, trade with 
70 % of their technologies requiring extensive development and this in turn places a burden 
on the customer that the less technologically able may not be able to manage. 
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Figures 6.7a & 6.7b 
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6.3.1 Some final thoughts on Agency Categorisation. 
So far the survey population has only uncovered three major types of Agency - defined 
by the operating environment. Examining the basic nine cell matrix, Type One operates 
over a wide range of environments but specialises in companies who have a high 
technological capability irrespective of the size of the companies. Type Two Agencies 
are more specialised overall but the specialism is reserved for small to medium size 
companies with low to moderate technological skills. Finally, Type Three specialises in 
large to medium companies with a high to moderate technological base. 
Within this matrix there are a number of other possible combinations of cells which do 
not appear to be serviced. One obvious combination would be a specialisation in smaller 
high-tech companies or perhaps a specialism in large organisations of lesser abilities. The 
model of innovation being developed over the first few chapters of the thesis has not 
identified any type of company that will be totally free of the need for external 
technological assistance at some stage in its operations, since companies evolve along 
growth curves which require technological change. There are, however, companies which 
need less technological aid than other areas of business. It is quite conceivable that some 
small high-tech firms might be more adept at technological skills than management skills, 
for example. However, it is equally as likely that any such omissions from the types of 
agencies described here represent an incomplete survey. 
6.4 The Service Provision of the Auncies. 
Having identified three basic types of operating environments maintained by the Agencies 
and realising that these environments are not necessarily characterised by similar 
categories of technology, it is logical to expect that differences will be explained by the 
services provided by the relevant Agencies. 
Figure 6.8 (overleaf) shows the importance of the various services provided across the 
entire Agency population. 
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Perhaps not surprisingly the Agencies all agreed that the most important service they 
provided was access to technologies: every Agency gave this service either a high or 
medium ranking. Since their inception, the role of technology transfer Agencies has 
always been seen as making available to industry technologies which it might not otherwise 
be aware of and this position seems to have changed little. No one would argue that such 
Agencies are in any other business, but it is the methods of achieving this access and 
subsequent transfer which are of fundamental interest in this thesis. It is interesting to note 
that the customers view of Agency services (Chapter 5 Figure 5.12) did not emphasise 
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access. Information on technology sources was a service option which was not offered 
to the customers in the industrial questionnaire but reflects the fact that many Agencies 
not only offer technologies from their own regular sources, but will also offer information 
on where else a customer might look for a particular type of technology. This service was 
rated second with 72.5 % of Agencies offering alternative sources to their customers. This 
figure just emphasises the importance the Agencies put on access related issues. 
The provision of technical expertise was only demonstrated by 54.5 % of the Agencies, 
the others presumably maintaining that this is the preserve of the customer. The industrial 
survey showed that the potential customers rated technical expertise as the most important 
service that should be provided by an Agency scoring (75 %). Industrial survey results 
constantly refer to the fact that lack of internal technical expertise is the biggest barrier 
that most companies face in technology transfer. It is an ironic paradox that companies 
seeking to improve upon a technically weak position in their market may be deterred from 
doing so because they are technically weak and are thus unable to effectively scan for 
technologies, evaluate technologies, or implement technologies. This point was amplified 
because theprovision of technical evaluation was seen as the second most important service 
by industry, scoring 66.7%. This perception is not shared by the Agencies themselves, 
as is obvious from their provision of technical evaluation in only 36% of cases. If this 
point needs further clarification, and it should not, the industrial survey showed that nearly 
half the companies would require support after any initial transfer was completed. Such 
support would include aid in overcoming the organisational and technical implications of 
the new technology which had not been foreseen. The potential customers, therefore, 
indicated that they perceive the transfer of technology as a process over an extended period 
which does not stop simply when the technology leaves the source and passes to the 
recipient. It is recognised by the customer that lie may require additional technical aid 
throughout the project life-cycle. It is sornewhat concerning, therefore, that only one-third 
of Agencies offer such post-transfer support and even more so that so few thought it ranked 
highly. 
What constitutes a misconception of the needs of industry in general is further clarified 
by the large discrepancy between the number of Agencies offering venture capital and 
business planning services and the demand for those services in the market place. Over 
half the Agencies offered both of these services and yet the industrial survey showed them 
to be almost inconsequential with 11.7 % and 13.3 % of companies ranking the two services 
respectively - 
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It has become obvious in this discussion that there appear to be a number of anomalies in 
the service provision of Agencies taken across the whole population, but it is conceivable 
that another picture might occur if the individual types of Agency were analysed 
separately. This point will be addressed in the next section. 
6.5 Agency Types and Service Provision. 
The analysis of service provision, by the type of Agency offering technology, can be 
achieved in two ways. Firstly, simple cross-tabulations can be taken to observe, for 
instance, whether certain services correspond to particular characteristics of either the 
customer or the technology being offered. Secondly, the separate Agency Types already 
established can be examined to see whether Agencies with similar overall operating 
environments actually operate in a similar mode. 
6.5.1: Analysis by Characteristics. 
(a) Access to technologies: 
As was discussed earlier, all the Agencies provide this service and it is to be expected 
that no startling sub-patterns will emerge from its examination. However, the only two 
Agencies who did not give this service a ranking in their top three were both Agencies 
which specialise in smaller companies and both gave other services more relevant to small 
customers their higher rankings. 
(b) Technical Expertise: 
This was the variable which scored much lower than was expected. However, some 
patterns have emerged from the Agencies which did provide this service. Of the 40% of 
Agencies which did not provide this service, some 66.67% specialised in dealings with 
large customers. It is entirely conceivable that these Agencies consider that such large 
companies already have enough internal technical expertise to adequately cope with any 
demands transferring technology might make. Of the remaining 60% of Agencies who 
did rank technical expertise as an important service, all gave it either a high or medium 
rank. In addition, 85.7% of these Agencies specialised in either small companies or the 
transfer of technologies requiring extensive development. In the case of small companies 
it is often the case that lack of internal expertise will prevent technological development 
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and similarly must affect the chances of being able to assimilate information on the 
technologies offered to them by Agencies. Indeed, over 80% of smaller companies 
surveyed earlier (Chapter 5 Table. 5-2) cited lack of internal expertise as the main reason 
for acquiring externally generated technology. Such companies would expect the 
transferring Agency to be able to understand the technology and consequently pass on the 
relevant information to the customer. 
On the other hand, the Agencies dealing with technologies which require extensive 
development will naturally be required to fully understand the technologies and the 
implications that state of development would have on the time scale prior to a new product 
launch. 
(c) Technical Evaluation. 
One might well expect the arguments advanced for the previous service would still 
hold true for the case of technical evaluation, and that a similar pattern of usage would 
arise. It is thus very interesting, and not a little significant, that the pattern is far from 
the same. The Agencies which provide a technical evaluation service cannot be 
distinguished by the size of their customers nor the technical capabilities of those 
customers. Rather, it appears that the important component is the state of development 
of the technologies being transferred. All of the Agencies who provide technical 
evaluation deal heavily in technologies which are near market ready. This fact is most 
easily explained by the reality that evaluating a known technology is considerably easier 
than attempting to evaluate something that is yet to be fully developed. However, this has 
two important implications. Firstly, evaluating market ready technologies is only easier 
than evaluating other technologies if the evaluation is primarily concerned with the 
question of suitability to the customers product portfolio and not its suitability to the 
customer. By this it is meant that there are many other considerations apart from the market 
which must be evaluated prior to accepting a new innovation. That it is only Agencies 
dealing with this one category of technology which offer evaluation as a service, also 
implies that evaluation is based purely upon market related issues. This statement is again 
supported by the perceived importance of market research to the Agencies, something that 
was not substantiated by the wishes of the customers themselves. 
(d) Post-Transfer Support. 
This service proved to be unusual since no correlation could be found between its 
provision and characteristics of either the ciistoniers or technologies. It is also unusual 
since it is difficult to define exactly what post-transfer support might entail. It certainly 
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implies technical support which is relevant to companies buying technologies needing 
development work, and yet Agencies supplying such technology were no more likely to 
supply this than Agencies supplying other type of technology. It is worth considering that 
this service might have more to with a state of mind of the Agency, or at least a reflection 
of some articulated intent to be involved throughout the life-cycle of the transferred 
technology. The lack of overall support for this type of service by the Agencies may well 
reflect a perception of the technology transfer process which is very short-term oriented. 
This picture would sit comfortably with the general lack of enthusiasm for technical 
evaluation. Both services require a commitment overtime and would involve considerable 
interaction within the potential customer's organisation. 
(e) Market Research and Business Planning. 
Firstly, these two services are being considered together because the population of 
Agencies that offer them are almost identical (they are the same in 82 % of cases). These 
services appear to be offered by companies who operate within a wide variety of 
environments, which in turn are characterised by companies of all sizes and technological 
abilities. The common theme among the Agencies is that they only deal in market ready 
technologies, or those needing limited development. Market research was seen by 50% 
of industry as being a valuable service, though only 36 % of the Agencies offered it. Again, 
it is probably fair to assume that many Agencies consider that the benefits of technologies 
which are near to the market will be self explanatory to the right customers for that 
technology. This would tend to imply that the Agencies might well be developing too 
narrow a definition of the reasons industrial companies would seek the services of 
intermediaries to aid technology transfer. 
Business Planning was offered by 54.5 % of the Ageilc ies but was only required by 11.7 % 
of the potential customers surveyed. On the surface it appears most peculiar that so many 
Agencies offer a service for which there seems such little demand, but this may reflect the 
Agencies desire to keep some control over the subsequent use of the technology. Since 
many Agencies receive payment as a royalty based upon the success of the innovation, 
there is perhaps a desire to ensure that the transfer will yield the maximum benefit for the 
Agency, especially if the licence agreement is exclusive. 
(e) Venture Capital. 
The provision of venture capital or access to such funds was a service for which no 
discernible pattern has emerged. Over half the Agencies provided this service although 
only 13.3 % of industrial customers appeared to need it. Whether this reflects a concern 
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used widely throughout the media in recent years, that the lack of venture capital for even 
medium term projects is hindering innovation is not clear. Certainly one might expect that 
Agencies specialising in dealings with small companies or technologies which may require 
extensive development, would be more likely to provide funds to increase the chances of 
a successful project. Though some of the Agencies did specialise in these areas, they 
seemed no more likely to provide access to venture capital then any other Agency types. 
6.5.2: Analysis by Agency Types. 
Having established that there are different types of Agency which are characterised by their 
operating environments, and that many of the services provided by Agencies can be 
correlated against either the companies serviced or the technologies provided, it is now 
relevant to see whether the patterns can be logically combined. If such combination is 
possible, then the services which an Agency isIi kel y to offer could be deduced from the 
graphical techniques used previously. 
TYPE ONE. 
Generalists working in all cells. 
Majority operating environments are Companies with High Technological 
Competence. 
Bias towards Large companies. 
The first noticeable characteristic of this type of Agency is the emphasis placed upon access 
to technologies. Although all Agencies offer this service by their very definition, the Type 
One Agencies gave this a very high rating. This helps to explain why they also offer fewer 
services, in general, than some other types. It appears that this type of Agency seeks to 
become less involved in protracted contact with its customers than other types, preferring 
to rely upon the technical competenceof the recipient to effectively transferthe technology 
itself. Hence, technical expertise scored a lower ranking with this type than Type Two 
Agencies, where the customers are less technically able. Again, none of the Type Ones 
offered technical evaluation as a service, despite the fact that they do transfer technologies 
requiring limited and extensive development. Perhaps surprising then, is the presence of 
post-transfer support as a service offered by two out of three Type One Agencies. Post- 
transfer support is a function of the necessity for development of the technologies 
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transferred and here the Agencies will be offering access to the originating technology 
source. Thus, the one Agency in this category who did not offer post-transfer support, 
specialised in market ready technologies and would thus not expect any requirement for 
such support. 
TYPE TWO. 
Specilaists working in fewer cells. 
Majority operating environments are small to medium sized companies 
with Low to Moderate technical skills. 
Type Two Agencies are less dependent upon their customers ability to be able to readily 
understand and evaluate the technologies on offer. This characteristic is displayed in 
several ways not least of which is the lower importance placed upon access to technologies 
as the primary service. Technical expertise within the Agency replaces access as the most 
important service in two out of three Agencies as does technical evaluation. The exception 
to this rule is the one Agency of this type which almost completely specialises in market 
ready technologies (80 %). All the Agencies deal with customers who are less technically 
able, but the specialist Agency will presume that near market technologies need less 
evaluation and the customers existing technical skills will be directly relevant. Againthis 
specialist is the only Agency of this type which does not include post-transfer support 
amongst its services; the other two gave this a mediLffn rating. Since these other Agencies 
deal with technically inferior customers and technologies which often require development, 
post-transfer support must be seen as a necessity. 
TYPE THREE. 
Specialists working in fewer cells. 
Majority operating environments are large to medium sized companies 
with high to moderate technical skills. 
Type Three Agencies are particularly notable for their very few services, obviously 
depending heavily on the internal expertise and financial resources of their customers. 
Access to technologies and alternative sources of technologies are the highest rated 
services in all cases. Only one Agency offered any technical services and this was the 
Agency with the highest proportion of technologies in need of extensive development 
(70%). This group is most striking in its 'hands-off' approach to technology transfer 
relying more heavily on the customers than any other group. 
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6.6 Some conclusions on the categorisation of Agencies. 
In the preceding sections three sets of generalisations have been applied to the data on 
technology transfer Agencies. Initially, the Agencies were examined according to their 
operating environments which were determined by the proportions of that Agencies' 
activities which were conducted with large or small companies, and the technological 
capabilities of those companies. It was shown that there were several distinct types of 
Agencies operating according to this classifying technique. Secondly, the services which 
were offered by the Agencies as a whole were analysed to uncover any trends which might 
be dependent upon either the operating environnients or technologies on offer. Again it 
was shown that certain services tend to be related to either the customer or the level of 
technology. Lastly, the initial categorisation of Agency types was analysed against the 
service provision to ascertain whether the logical patterns of service provision uncovered 
still applied to the Agency types. 
It is maintained here, that there do indeed appear to be different type of Agencies in 
operation and that these can be defined by a coi-nbination of their operating environments 
and the technologies which are offered for transfer. This point is significant both because 
a classification of Agencies appears possible, but also because the existing service 
provision within those Agencies follow logical patterns which all the Agencies seem 
agreed upon. That is, there would appear to be a common set of perceptions about the 
needs of industry and a common set of criteria on which the choice of services is 
determined. There is, however, concern regarding the overall approach to technology 
transfer and its relevance to the needs of industry articulated in the industrial survey. At 
the present time most Agencies cater for the needs of those companies best able to help 
themselves either by being technologically superi or, or by offering near market technologies. 
As outlined earlier, it is difficult to believe that there are many technologies on offer which 
are exactly appropriate to the needs of a particular company. Technology transfer is 
discussed in this thesis as a complex innovation process but outwardly it would appear that 
many Agencies working in technology transfer at present still regard the process as a 
relatively simple technology fixing exercise or consider that their potential customers 
require little aid. 
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CHAPTER 7 
7.0 FINAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 A Model for Technology Transfer 
The fundamental approach taken to technology transfer within this thesis has been to 
explore transfer events as a series of complex processes rather than simple movements of 
technology from one point to another. To this end it was proposed that technology transfer 
needs to be viewed from a number of perspectives. Essentially, it is necessary to 
understand the technology, the organisations undertaking technology transfer and the 
principle individuals within those organisations. The discussion in Chapter 2 which was 
expanded in Chapter 3, lead to the formation and proposal of a conceptual framework 
consisting of three elements. 
: )D 
ID 
INTERMEDIARY 
0 
:T 
TECHNOLOGY 
SOURCE / 
POTENTIAL 
RECIPIENT 
Fig 3.4 
By examining the figure 3.4, which is presented above again, the elements of the 
framework become clearer. 
The idea of Accessibility has been used to describe that series of issues and processes 
concerned with obtaining physical, cultural and technical access to technology. It was 
recognised that providing information on technology involved more than simple technical 
descriptions of generic technology bases or potential uses. Technology needs to be 
understood within the context of it's origin and subsequently needs to be described, or 
understood, within the context of the recipient organisation. Thus, accessibility explores 
those processes which determine the relationship between the potential user in Fig 3.4 and 
the external sources of technology. These technology sources include not only the generic 
source, such as a university research department or the R&D department of another 
industrial organisation, but also many intermediary organisations. Wnere the role of an 
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intermediary is as an agent of access itself, then accessibility becomes an important issue 
in the relationship with it's clients. 
The idea of Receptivity described the technical, organisational, cultural and personal 
issues and processes which determine how the technology will be received within the 
recipient organisation. The concept of organisational Receptivity to any form of change, 
but particularly technological change has been shown by other authors to be the critical 
element in both the level and success of technology transfer (see Chapter Two Section 2.6). 
These internal processes are occurring continually in response to both internal and external 
stimuli. However, they become clearer when a particular stimulus is examined. For 
technology transfer involving intermediaries, organisational Receptivity may become 
apparent as an issue either when that organisation is faced with an individual technology 
or when the intermediary attempts to interface with that organisation in order to establish 
technological requirements and areas of permitted technological exploration. Thus, in Fig 
3.4, a two-way relationship is shown between the potential recipient and intermediary. 
However, in the context of this research, it is the concept of Mobility which is explored 
in this thesis. Mobility of a given technology goes beyond the simple idea of attempting 
to identify the few cases of potential technology transfer, where the organisational. needs 
and existing technology package offered by the source, are perfectly matched. The 
transferability of the technology package can be greatly enhanced by presenting the 
technology, information or knowledge in the form most appropriate to the needs of the 
particular recipient organisation. Mobility thus concerns maximising the efficiency of the 
exchange processes by understanding the nature of the relationships between source, 
intermediary and recipient and thus adopting the most appropriate exchange mechanisms. 
1.1 AMR as an Alternative to Traditional Models. 
The AMR framework was presented as an alternative to either the traditional linear 
theoretical models of technology transfer discussed in Chapter 3, or those based on case 
study discussed briefly in Chapter 1, but which fail to say enough about technology transfer 
to be useful. Section 1.2.2 in Chapter 1 outlined a number of 'models' of technology 
transfer operating around the world which were brought together in the paper by Professor 
Richard Dorf (1988). It was proposed in Section 1.2.4 that whilst a seemingly wide 
diversity of practical models for technology transfer existed, in reality many exhibited 
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fundamentally similar characteristics. The AMR framework now allows that proposition 
to be examined and supported. 
The AMR framework shows the elements which constitute all technology transfer events 
irrespective of the types of source, technology, mechanisms or recipients involved. In so 
doing it can distinguish the differences or similarities between previously incomparable 
practical models, like those discussed within Dorf. Hence, justification is possible for the 
assertion that the four 'models' for exploiting technology from Federal laboratories do in 
fact emphasise very similar concepts. The Information Dissemination model used the 
principal of 'natural' dissemination via the scientific grapevine; the Licensing Model 
emphasised information dissemination to those best able to use it; the Venture Capital 
Model allows venture capitalists to decide which technologies are worthy of 
commercialisation; and finally the Large Company - Joint Venture Model encourages 
collaborative projects between Federal laboratories and large companies. 
The AMR framework provides the insight which allows one to reconceptualise these four 
models and in so doing uncover their propensity to maximise Accessibility to technology 
rather than to encourage efficiency and appropriateness in technology delivery. At first 
examination the four models differ widely in their attempts to increase the flow of 
information from the Federal laboratories, in that they each adopt a different approach to 
the problem of ensuring the dissemination of information. However, overlaying the AMR 
framework it becomes apparent that the emphasise of these models is simply that process 
of taking the technology from the source and making it available to external organisations. 
Irrespective of the rational for targeting the potential users, whether it be universal 
dissemination or to those organisations which can afford to use the information, no attempt 
is made to attack problems of Receptivity within those organisations. Even the Venture 
Capital Model, with its more interventionist approach, still considers the transfer of 
technology to be a case of minimising the problems of Accessibility. 
7.1.2 Limitations of the AMR Framework. 
It is important to understand that AMR as a concept has it's limitations. These limitations 
are a consequence of the fact that whilst it expresses the nature of transfer processes, and 
identifies the three key areas that constitute such processes, it does not itself operationalise 
those processes. To this extent AMR is not a formal operational model of technology 
transfer in the traditional sense, but rather functions as a conceptual framework. 
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The framework at this stage is not operational in that it does not lend itself to any form 
of prescription. It is nonetheless powerful because it firstly allows the observer an 
appreciation of the essential processes which constitute technology transfer and secondly 
it provides a vantage point which uncovers flaws or i nibalances in the potential exchange 
process. Within this thesis it has proved most useful both as a tool for describing 
technology transfer, the various participants and their roles, and the problems which can 
occur when those participants misunderstand those roles. 
AMR has also shown itself as a useful descriptor of any exchange process, not just one 
which involves intermediaries. It thus has potewit, i] for providing understanding of the 
processes which occur within a single orgi, liflstatioii diii-ing techi-iological innovation. The 
movement of an innovation frorn 1W. ) to 1)roduclioii and iiiadwling or the introduction 
of a new computer system by the fifforiuation techiiology department, can equally be 
examined using this framework. In the latter example, the recipient is the computer user 
and the source is the information technology department. Questions of Accessibility to 
technical knowledge by the recipient, the Receptivity or openness to the new technology 
and theprocesses of matching technology to existing sldlls will all existin such situations. 
7.2 A Question of Congruence 
An important research theme of technology transfer taken in this thesis has been to consider 
the process where an intermediary fulfils a role, as a service delivery problem. A 
fundamental concept in such an approach concerns 'congruence'. That is, there must be 
congruence between the services required by industrial organisations and the services 
provided by the intermediaries. It was in order to esi i niate the level of congruence between 
these two parties that the research nielhodology tised here consisted of the two surveys, 
one to each group. By extracting sinilliti- infoniiiilion froni ho(h sides of the technology 
transfer process it became feasible to niake direct coinl)arisons between, for example, the 
services required by industry and those offered by intermediaries (see Figs. 5.12 & 6.8). 
Though a formal measure of congruence, however that might be achieved, has not been 
attempted here due to constraints which will be disciissed later, nonetheless an indication 
of such congruence or lack of it has been ichieved. An understanding of congruence can 
be attained by looking at some of the main findings of the two surveys. 
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The industrial survey uncovered a direct, inversely-proportional, relationship between 
company size and the level of research and development activities undertaken. This was 
also reflected in the importance of the lack of internal R&D funds played in the decision 
to acquire external technologies (see Chapter 5 Fig 5.3). Though not surprising, this trend 
in turn means that smaller companies have a lack of internal technological skill. Such a 
skills shortage does not just affect the technology used within an organisation at any 
moment in time, but also determines how that organisation can subsequently assess and 
implement any new technologies which come to it's notice. 
Direct purchase, licensing and joint ventures were all viewed favourably as mechanisms 
for acquiring technology and the latter two, at least, are mechanisms encouraged by 
intermediaries (see Chapter 5 Fig. 5.6). However, although a preference has been 
displayed by industry to use licensing as a form of technology acquisition most companies 
have equally displayed a very low usage of this mechanism (Chapter 5 Fig. 5.8). The 
industrial survey has clearly demonstrated that industry sees licensing as a risky business 
(see Chapter 5 Fig. 5.7). Equally clear seems to be the reason for this analysis. Many 
companies, especially SMEs, have neither the time nor technical expertise to evaluate 
potential technology (see Fig. 5.12). Problems of timescale and cost of development can 
be reduced by careful management of resources and sufficient initial assessment to 
eliminate inappropriate or insufficiently developed technology. The fundamental problem 
is that if companies cannot reduce risk because they do not have the skills necessary for 
suitable technology assessment then they will incur unacceptable costs or delays. 
However, something even more fundamental emerges from this discussion. It isjust those 
companies who most need technology that are ill-equipped to acquire it and it is just those 
companies who may need to acquire technical skills needed to achieve the above that can 
least afford it. This phenomenon can be referred to as the 'technology gap'. It is this 
'technology gap' that is seen by most companies as the required focal point of intermediary 
activity (see Chapter 5 Fig. 5.12). 
Congruence between service demand and service supply should aim to bridge this 
'technology gap'. The survey work showed that intermediaries see their role primarily 
as providing access to technology and this was broadly in agreement with industries 
requirements (see Chapter 5 Fig. 12 & Chapter 6 Fig. 6.8). However, there is far less 
agreement concerning the methods by which access and subsequent transfer can be 
achieved. 
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7.2.1 The Case of DTE. 
The general argument forwarded above equally applies to the case of Defence Technology 
Enterprises Ltd (DTE), who have formed a mini case study throughout this work. To 
recap, DTE had the task of outward technology transfer from the Ministry of Defence 
(MoD) research establishments which, to all intents and purposes, are inaccessible to most 
companies. Further, the nature of the environment in which the technology was developed 
produced a very technologically sophisticated output. In this sense too, much of the MoD 
technology was inaccessible. This latter point was not entirely appreciated in the early 
days of DTE, or at least it was not foreseen as a particular problem. 
Initially DTE's role was as a collator and repository of technical information appertaining 
to the technological results of the defence research and it's potential civilian uses. It was 
considered that the undeniable quality of the research work would produce equally 
undeniably useful technology which would be sought by the majority of technologically 
aware organisations. The low throughput of the system was in part due to the restrictive 
practice of the Membership scheme which limited the number of potential clients to 
approximately 300. The problem was exacerbated by the low take-up of the available 
technology even by those organisations which had become Members. 
Once again it had been assumed that if access to the technology could be provided that the 
quality of the technology would demand it's application. Such a belief concentrated efforts 
on increasing the number of technologies that could be made available to the Members. 
When this strategy began to produce only minor results, DTE switched to providing spin- 
off by financing the re-development and commercialisation of a very small number of 
potentially valuable technologies. To this extent the emphasis had moved away from 
providing access to technology. However, the imperative for their activities had not 
changed; they were still technology driven. Activity which is technology-centred rather 
than human-centred or organisationally-centred fundamentally produces an Accessibility 
lead process. 
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7.3 Technioue Critioue 
The requirement in the research methodology to have a quantitative or qualitative measure 
of congruence between industrial demands and intermediary service provision, lead to an 
approach which demanded information retrieval from the two groups. In Chapter 4a short 
justification for information retrieval via postal questionnaires was presented. In short, 
the number of respondents required for a reasonable coverage of British manufacturing 
industry precluded all but remote questioning. Despite this, it was possible through careful 
piloting to include questions which would be relevant to industrialists and to present the 
questions with the options that would be most relevant. 
This technique allowed an examination of the characteristics of some industrial organisations 
in terms of what has previously been described as macro indicators (see Chapter 4). In 
addition it has been possible to examine the potential demand for technology and the 
possible services required to deliver technology. It was not, however, possible to discuss 
how those services might actually be delivered to either individual companies or groups 
of companies. An in depth understanding of the actual processes needed to be undertaken 
to achieve successful technology transfer is vital if intermediaries are going to fulfil this 
role. 
For example, it has emerged quite clearly that many industrial organisations do not feel 
well positioned to evaluate technology that is made available to them. Equally clear has 
been their wish to see technical evaluation as one of the services which should be provided 
by intermediaries. What remains less well articulated is exactly how one might provide 
this service or indeed how companies might chose to use it. Questions still remain about 
the level of knowledge that is needed by different companies, the time over which that 
knowledge and support needs to be provided and the level of involvement desired by the 
companies. 
The limitations of the postal questionnaire also had implications for information retrieval 
from the intermediaries. Again, though it was possible to uncover the basic profiles of 
the customers serviced by the intermediaries and the types of services offered, it was not 
possible to closely examine how the services were provided. Consequently, the nature 
of the relationship between intermediaries and industry, where they existed, could not be 
directly analyzed. Such analysis would have shown more clearly exactly to what the nature 
of the mismatch between industrial demand and services offered, could be attributed. To 
this extent case study based research has the advantage of providing a closer insight. 
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Case study work would also have aided another fundamental area of investigation. That 
is the interaction that is necessary between the two parties to affect technology transfer. 
The kind of involvement necessary to actually affect technology transfer in an organisation, 
rather than just to supply information on technology sources, is likely to be prolonged and 
involve several iterations. These iterations will define the nature of the technology transfer 
processes. It is this point of interaction with an organisation that defines the boundaries 
of Mobility and Receptivity. 
The concept of attempting to measure internal factors within an organisation, and in so 
doing to be able to say something more regarding Receptivity, also has implications for 
surveying techniques. In particular, such internal investigations require careful targeting 
of the recipients for questionnaires or interviews, etc. The investigation undertaken for 
this thesis raised similar questions, in particular who should be targeted within the 
industrial organisations. Evidence presented in Chapter 2 has shown the existence of a 
number of key individuals in innovative activity; the product champion and technological 
gatekeepers, for example. However, identifying such individuals from outside the 
organisation would have been unrealistic and, even if possible, such individuals would no 
doubt change in each case of technology transfer: this is probably less true of gatekeepers 
than champions. 
It was therefore decided to approach the managing director of most of the industrial 
organisations. Within SMEs, particularly at the smaller end of the scale, it would be 
expected that the managing director would assume the key role in technology transfer. In 
larger organisations it had to be accepted that this might not be true, but also that the 
managing director would be very aware and involved in all innovative activities within 
the organisation. To alleviate potential problems in this regard, and in accordance with 
the previous argument, the information gathered had to be more 'factually' based, or 
perhaps more easily judged by the respondent. It is recognised, however, that some of 
the qualitative data and 'colour' was lost, both from the potential data and subsequent 
analysis. 
7.4 Implications for Future Research 
The previous discussion has highlighted problems with the research techniques which 
caused weaknesses in methodology, information gathering and thus subsequent analysis 
in two major areas: understanding Receptivity issues in industrial organisations and; the 
mechanisms required to actually facilitate technology transfer into those organisations. 
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These areas are therefore appropriate for further research and investigation and the 
possible nature of such investigations are discussed in the following sections. 
7.4.1 Understanding Receptivity. 
Research based on the concept of Receptivity would have to tackle a wide range of separate 
factors including: the role of technology strategy in technology transfer; a closer 
examination of the so called 'technology gap', how it results and how to overcome the 
problem and; how organisational. culture, individuals and attitudes towards technology 
affect innovative performance. 
In addition, although some evidence on the above has already been presented in Chapter 
2 from a number of authors who have considered similar problems, it is felt that 'best 
practice' in large multi-national companies will not necessarily prove most useful in 
understanding problems which, are closely related to organisational size, capability and 
resources. 
It is understood that a variety of such investigations are being undertaken within a number 
of institutions. Two particularly interesting projects have been undertaken within the 
Innovation and Technology Assessment Unit (INTA) at Cranfield. The first was a three 
year project, completed in 1991 (Holden, 199 1). The research carried out within GEC 
Traction concerned the selection and application of expert systems and explored the role 
of an externally based researcher as a Mobility channel in the process of inward technology 
transfer. The project demonstrated that the effects of such technology acquisition need 
to be considered not only from a purely technological perspective, but also the demands 
made on individuals and the organisation to adapt to enable the changes to occur. It is these 
latter considerations which may finally determine the completion of the acquisition, 
irrespective of potential technical or economic benefits (see also Seaton & Cordey-Hayes 
1993). 
The second project started in 1990 within ICI Chemicals and Polymers. The investigation 
concerns technology scanning and evaluation within inward technology transfer. The 
project continues the development of a process theory of inward technology transfer 
including the roles of individuals and their formal and informal networks outside the 
organisation and the contribution such networks make to technological awareness and 
evaluation. The essential contribution of individuals will depend upon their perception 
of the objectives of the organisation and their understanding of the commercial market 
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place for the organisation's products; their formal and informal networks and the extent 
to which the organisation recognises and facilitates these; and the extent to which 
information is effectively channelled to and from the commercial decision makers (see 
Seaton & Cordey-Hayes 1993). 
7.4.1.1 Technology Strategy in Technology Transfer. 
An investigation of technology strategy is vitally important since its' implications are 
wider reaching than simply technology transfer and the role of intermediaries. 
Fundamentally, an understanding of technology strategies in industry is a study of attitudes 
towards technology and the perceived benefits of technology based innovation. Questions 
that need to be answered include: how many companies have a clearly articulated 
technology strategy; where they exist are these strategies formal or informal; how does 
a strategy, or lack of it, affect functions and individuals within the organisation and; 
importantly, does industry actually conceptualise problems in terms of technology at all? 
It is not possible to give a detailed research design of any of the research areas discussed 
in this Chapter, but it is worth saying something. Investigations of technology transfer 
of the type described here will require both approaches that produce data collection at 
distance from the respondents and those which involve much closer relationships. An 
overall evaluation of how many companies have a 'technology strategy', or indeed any 
strategy, might be initially measured by a postal questionnaire, for example. Further 
analysis of the role of strategy in general and technology strategy in particular, will need 
the sort of relationships and closeness of understanding that comes from case studies. 
Work is also being conducted in this and closely related areas and one interesting project 
is being undertaken within the INTA at Cranfield. A project started in 1990 in 
collaboration with the Eastern Region Technology Centre (ERTC), is considering the 
importance of problem diagnosis within industrial SMEs. Research includes an 
understanding of how SMEs perceive business problems and how they articulate their 
needs; the extent to which technological change is seen as a potential contribution to fulfil 
those needs and to what extent technology could actually play in business development; 
and an examination of the information networks available to SMEs compared with larger 
organisations. Preliminary results indicate that SMEs do not articulate their needs in terms 
of technological innovation, but rather see purely commercial issues. This characteristic 
reduces the vision of organisations to potentially entrepreneurial activities in new 
approaches to existing markets in addition to potentially new markets. 
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7.4.1.2 The Technoloav Ga 
The current work has identified the possibility of a technological, financial and skills trap 
which may prevent many SMEs from fully utilising available technology (see Figs. 5.5, 
5.7,5.12&6.8). In this area of investigation there is a great need for research work based 
on case study material. Existing materials, some of which were discussed in Chapter 2, 
provide case studies on successes and failures of innovation and technology transfer 
through an entire event life-cycle. However, they fail to sufficiently address the lack of 
existing technical, personnel, skills and financial resources, on the processes of technology 
scanning and evaluation prior to the initial acceptance of the technology. This approach 
can then be extended to look at successes and failures in technology acquisition as a result 
of the utilization of existing resources. 
Further investigation in this area could consider how an understanding of mismatches 
between desired innovation and ability to achieve that innovation with existing resources, 
should determine the future role of technology transfer intermediaries. An in depth 
analysis of where industry is failing in it's attempts to acquire technology would produce 
the strongest evidence yet for the direction intermediaries must follow (see also the 
discussion on mechanisms for technology transfer in 7.4.2). 
7.4.1.3 Organisational Culture and Attitudes 
Research in this area would be a wider look at the concept of Receptivity. It should generate 
case studies of the conditions necessary for successful technology transfer. The research 
would be similar in concept to the work presented in this thesis in that it would need to 
take a more general approach to the subject rather than investigating a single element. To 
that extent therefore, it would cover both the concepts of technology strategy and the 
'technology gap'. However, it would be a more in depth study of organisational culture, 
individual and group attitudes and how these are determinants of organisational Receptivity. 
Such research should address itself to a more fundamental question. How can 
organisational Receptivity be manipulated to produce the right culture and conditions for 
technology transfer? The output of such an investigation would have consequences in two 
areas. Firstly, it would add to the understanding of how the concept of technological 
Mobility could be extended to directly influence Receptivity. Service provision by 
intermediaries would then involve not only manipulation of technology to suit industrial 
organisations, but also the manipulation of industrial organisations to suit technology and 
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technologies. In reality, it is only this latter mechanism which is really a viable option 
for intermediaries. Secondly, understanding and being able to positively change 
organisational Receptivity should lead to a more effective management consultancy. The 
issues to be explored in such research would include the role of the entrepreneur within 
an organisation and the mechanisms available to such individuals to effect change; the 
physchology of individuals, groupings and the workforce as a whole and how these can 
positively or negatively affect innovative activity ( i. e. the concept of organisational 
culture); and how the concepts of organisational culture and formal and well articulated 
technology strategies can lead to a coherent approach to technological change with the full 
cooperation of all employees. 
7.4.2 Mechanisms for Technology Transfer. 
The previous discussions on understanding Receptivity issues in organisations have 
already shown that further research is necessary into the mechanisms for technology 
transfer and in particular maximising Mobility through understanding, and manipulation. 
of Receptivity. These concepts will not, therefore, be discussed further here. 
Additional research is necessary to examine the whole debate over the future of the 
technology transfer intermediaries. Two interconnected researchable areas have emerged: 
*The categorisation of Intermediaries 
*Intermediary Networks 
7.4.2.1. Cateeorisation of Intermediaries. 
This first area of research deserves considerable attention and is a natural progression from 
this thesis. However, it was not possible within the constraints of this work to tackle this 
problem in detail, since the research would require a closer relationship with the 
intermediaries than was possible. The lack of congruence displayed by the intermediaries 
to industrial needs must be explained by a lack of understanding of those needs. It is 
considered that an investigation of how individual intermediaries conceptualise technology 
transfer, the idea of organisational Receptivity and their own role in these processes, would 
provide a valuable insight in this area of knowledge. 
This understanding should be extended to provide a more in depth categorisation of 
intermediaries than was possible in Chapter 6. More detailed categorisation would be 
possibleif quantitative measuresof service provision and service delivery were constructed. 
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However, it is also considered that purely quantitative measures will fail to express the 
nature of the relationships developed by some intermediaries and their clients. 
7.4.2.2 Intermediarv Networks. 
There exists a need to better understand the intermediary sector as a whole and especially 
the connectivity between intermediaries themselves. Investigation here should cover 
issues such as the nature of intermediary networks, the perceived benefits of such networks 
by intermediaries, the nature of the information or service flow between the network nodes 
and the effectiveness in terms of technology transfer and financial viability. 
Such a research undertaking would closely concern the increase in Accessibility gained 
by networking, but should also consider how Mobility could be enhanced by the linkage 
of intermediaries with different service profiles. 
Finally, no investigation of intermediary networks wou Id be viable unless the issue of State 
support was examined. Since the current thesis was originally undertaken, it has become 
apparent that Government and EEC funding has been the prime initiator of networks and 
its' impacts would therefore need to be considered. 
7.3 Policy Issues - Investigation in a Wider Setting. 
Though not strictly the province of this thesis, the opportunity will be taken here to briefly 
highlight some of the policy issues which have emerged from this research. This discussion 
is offered to recognise that a wider setting exists for the discussion of technology transfer 
and to signal potential problems which may affect industry in the near future. 
Firstly, technology transfer is not an apolitical subject. Government has been concerned 
with the issue since the effects of military R&D expenditure on the civilian economy was 
first highlighted (see Centre for Defence Information 1985, C. S. S. 1986, Dunne, J. P et 
al 1984, Fink, P. T 1986, Gansler, J. S 1987, Gummett, P 1986, Gummett, P 1986a, H. M. 
Government 1987, Lichtenberg, F. R 1984, Maddock, Sir 1 1983 & ReppyJ 1985). 
However, it is only more recently that technology transfer has been seen by Government 
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as a problem with wider ramifications than exploitation of military R&D. 
The Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) runs a wider number of initiatives to support 
industry under the overall heading of "Support for Industry". Within this overall policy 
block a number of separate schemes run in groups directed towards technology transfer, 
innovation and more general research and development activities. In brief such schemes 
tackle problems as diverse as the need for suPporti ng technological development in SMEs, 
the introduction of new materials technology, Pan European collaboration as well as 
various advanced technology programmes. 
In addition the Government, under the auspices of the DTI, have aided the formation of 
a number of regionally based enterprises charged with the task of increasing technology 
transfer and innovation, including the Regional Technology Centres (RTCs) and the soon 
to be formed One-Stop-shops (OSS). 
Government agencies are not alone, however, in promoting technology transfer. The 
European Community (EC) is funding innovation both by direct grants to industry and also 
in its' support of intermediary networks. In general direct grants to industry are made 
under the various technology programmes which cover everything from social and 
environment policy to solid state physics and biotechnology. Such funding would 
normally require a consortium of industrial companies from at least three countries to be 
working on an approved project. 
Funding to the intermediaries is broadly divided into proj ect based funding and longer term 
core funding for general activity aimed at fostering European business. Many intermediaries, 
for example, are part of information and technology transfer networks funded under either 
the Technology Transfer Days Scheme or the Strategic Programme for Innovation and 
Technology Transfer (SPRINT). 
Though it is not possible to undertake a closer examination of the workings and results 
of these activities here, since that is the work of future researchers, it should be recognised 
by the reader that such funding has raised a strong debate based on the effectiveness and 
distribution of Government and EC monies. (see The Engineer 1991 , ACOST 1990, 
Rothwell 1990 & CBI 1990). 
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Since central funding plays an increasingly important role both to those attempting 
technology transfer and innovation, and to those attempting to facilitate the process, it is 
certain that such agencies will become a more central focus of future work in this area. 
OOP" 
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Questionnaire used for Industrial Survey 
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Dear Sir, Re: Technology Transfer in British Manufacturing Industries. 
Background: 
Every company has its own technology aquisition strategy, but all companies 
are under ever increasing pressure to use Technology Transfer as a key element in that 
strategy. In response to these factors, many Agencies have established themselves with the 
objective of aiding the transfer process; but do they meet your needs? 
Who am P: 
As part of our work on this problem, I am undertaking a3 year research 
project sponsored by the Science and Engineering Research Council (SERC). In this last 
phase I am undertaking a number of investigations into the use made of Technology 
Transfer, of which this survey is one. 
Objective: 
It is the objective of the enclosed survey to discover the role that these 
Transfer Agencies or Intermediaries fullfill at present, and to assertain how they could best 
operate to meet the needs of companies such as yours. 
What's in it for you?: 
I propose to send to all participating companies a summary report of the 
findings of the entire survey, plus comments on how their company compares, in its 
technology aquisition, with its main competitors. The total survey size will be approximately 
1200 companies, at least 200 of which will be operating in your sector(s). 
Confidentiality: 
All the responses you give in this questionnaire will be treated in the strictest 
confidence and under no circumstances will the information be released in any form other 
than statistical data. 
How you can help us. 
Bearing in mind the potential benefits of this survey to both you and industry 
in general, I would appreciate an early completetion of the questionnaire in order to shorten 
the time it will take to feedback the results to you. Preferably the questionnaires should be 
returned not later than November 20th, 1989. 
Thanking you in anticipation of your valuable time and effort, 
Yours sincerely, 
David Lefever. BSc (Hons). 
SERC Total Technology Programme. 
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CRANFIELD INSTITUTE 
OF 
TECHNOLOGY 
INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY 
ASSESSMENT UNIT 
COMPANY NAME: 
CONFIDENTIAL 
001, 
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IMPORTANT!! PLEASE READ 
COMPLETION INSTRUCTIONS. 
The purpose of this questionnaire is 
to discover how companies such as 
yours can be aided in their search for 
technologies to meet the needs of the 
1990's. In particular, it is designed to 
provide information on how Third- 
Party Technology Agents can be 
made to respond to the needs of 
British manufacturing companies. 
Such Agents include: 
" Regional Technology Centres 
(RTCs) 
" Technology transfer agencies 
" Technology Consultants 
" Applications advisers 
Company-to-company Introduction 
Agencies 
Technology Fairs 
Please attempt to answer all 
questions, but if you feel unable to 
answer a particular question then put 
a line through it. 
If your company is a division of a 
larger organisation, then please make 
all your answers specific to your 
division. 
If in any doubt please ring me on: 
0234 750111 Ext: 2685. 
FAX: 0234 750875. 
PLEASE RETURN TO: 
D. B. LEFEVER. 
INTA. 
BUILDING 38, 
CRANIFIELD INSTITUTE OF 
TECHNOLOGY, 
CRANFEILD, 
BEDFORD. MK43 OAL. 
Thanking you in anticipation of your 
time and effort, David Lefever. 
ALL RESPONSES WILL BE 
TREATED WITH COMPLETE 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
Product Devel opment /Market Derinition. 
This first section is designed to 
-stablish the overall pattern of 
demand for new technologies. 
Q. 1. 
Is your method of production: 
a. Mass Process? 
b. Batch Process? 
-c. 
One-off /Job Process? 
abc 
please circle as appropriate 
Q2. 
At what rate have you launched new 
products onto the market over the last five 
, years? 
------- per year. 
Q3. 
What is the frequency at which you update 
your products by incorporating technology 
ichisnewtovourcompany? 
------- per year. 
Q4. 
How many new technologies have you 
incorporated into your production 
-Drocesses over the 
la t five years? 
I1 -1 
1 
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Q. 5. 
In general would you describe your 
products as: 
a. Incorporating state-of -the-art 
technologies? 
b. Incorporating known technologies but in 
a new and novel fashion? 
c. Incorporating own technological 
developments which characterise the 
market? 
d. Meeting th 
,e needs of a well 
developed 
arket requiring no new technology? 
abcd 
please circle as appropriate 
Q6. 
In general, do your products make your 
company/division: 
a. A market leader? 
b. A market follower? 
-c. 
A market developer? 
abc 
please circle 
External Technology Aeguisition. 
The objective of this section is to 
identify where the British 
Manufacturing Industry obtains its 
new product and process 
technologies. 
Q7. 
What are the most important reasons for 
your company to acquire new technologies 
from external sources? 
Please rank your choices in order of 
importance from 1, the most important, 
UUWf1WUf"1). 
a: No In-House Expertise 
b: No In-House R&D Funds 
c: Explore new technologies 
d: Increase product range 
e: Faster route to market 
f. Maintain competitive 
advantage 
g: Improve quality 
h: Other? 
i: Other? 
Q8. a 
Which conventional sources do you search 
for new technologies? 
Please tick appropliate boxes. 
Conventional sources 
a. Research associations? 
b. Other companies in your 
market? 
C. Companies in other markets? 
Component suppliers? 
L Other? 
From which of the above have you 
. obtained technology? 
abcdef 
please circle as appropriate 
154 
Q8. b 
VVhich Third-Part Technology Agents do 
you search for new technologies? 
Please tick aDr)roDriate boxes? 
9. Regional Technology 
Centres 
h. Technology Transfer 
Agencies 
i. Technology Consultants 
j. Applications Advisers 
k. Company-to-company 
Introduction Agencies. 
1. Technology Fairs. 
m. Other? 
From which of the above have vou 
. obtained technology?. 
ghijkIm 
please circle as appropriate 
Q9. 
Are the technologies you are looking for 
either: 
a. Ready or nearly ready for 
use by your company? 
b. In need of limited 
development? 
C. In need of extensive 
development or g daptation? 
abc 
please circle 
Q10. 
Are the Product technologies you are 
searching for intended to meet: 
a. Immediate needs? 
b. Short-term needs? 
C. Medium-term needs? 
d. Long-term needs? 
abcd 
please circle as appropriate 
Q11. 
Are the Process technologies you are 
searching for intended to meet: 
a. Immediate needs? 
b. Short-term needs? 
C. Medium-term needs? 
d. Long-term needs? 
abcd 
please circle as appropriate 
Q12. 
Which methods of external technology 
acquisition are preferred by your 
company? 
Please rank your choices in order of 
importance from 1, the most important, 
downwards 
a. Direct Purchase 
b. Licence Agreement 
c. Joint Venture 
Project 
d. Company Acquisition 
or Merger 
e. Contract R&D 
f. New Personnel 
g. Turnkey Projects 
h. Other (specify) 
Q. 13. 
Are there any skills which you feel your 
company lacks in order to achieve any of 
the above? If there are, then state these 
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Q14. 
How many times have you actually 
negotiated a licence agreement or joint 
I 
enture over the ast five years? 
Q15. 
What do you consider are the most 
important factors when negotiating a 
licence or joint venture agreement? 
Please rank your choices in order of 
importance from 1, the most important, 
downwards. 
a: Existence of internal expertise 
to cope with the new technology? 
b: Time scale of product? 
c: Costs of licence? 
d: Costs of development? 
e: Risk of failure in market? 
f. - Risks of potential financial 
loss? 
g: Other? 
h: Other? 
Perceptions of Third-Party Transfer 
Agents. 
This section is designed to identify 
the type of contribution that Transfer 
Agents are making to British 
Manufacturing Companies. 
Q16. 
If you have had any dealings with Third- 
Party Transfer Agents, can you please 
Q. 17. 
What advantages over conventional 
technology sources should Third-Party 
Q. 18. a 
What customer services should a Third- 
Party Technology Transfer Agent offer? 
Access to many technologies 
Technical Expertise 
Market Research 
Business PI i 
Venture Capital 
Technical Evaluation 
Post-Transfer Support 
Other? 
Other? 
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Q18. b 
What customer services do Third-Party 
Access to many technologies 
Technical Expertise 
Market Research 
Business PI ig 
Venture Capital 
Technical Evaluation 
Post-Transfer Support 
Other? 
Other? 
Q. 19. 
What are your main problems in dealings 
with Third-Party Technology Agents? 
a: Complexity 
b: Lack of Communications? 
c: Type of Licence Offered? 
d: Lack of Technical Support? 
e: Unrealistic Pavments Reauired? 
f: Other? 
g: Other? 
h: Other? 
abcdefgh 
please circle as appropriate 
Factual Details. 
Please can you give a few details 
about yourself for reference. 
Company/Division Name: 
Name of Respondent: 
Job Function: 
- elephone 
Number: 
Can I take this opportunity to thank 
you again for completing this 
questionnaire. I hope the process of 
answering the questions has proved 
useful to you, and I am sure your 
answers will be of great benefit to the 
study. 
Once again, I stress that 11 the 
information you have given will be 
treated in strictest confidence, and 
that only non-company specific 
statistical data will be released. 
Please return in the self-addressed/ 
post-paid envelope. 
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Questionnaire used for Survey of Intermediaries 
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Dear [named executive], 
Re: Survey of Technology Transfer Agents in the UK. 
Your organisation and Technology Transfer: 
Companies are under an ever increasing pressure to innovate, and while every company 
has its own methods of acquiring technology, it makes increasing sense for companies to 
find a faster and cheaper route to new technology under licence from, or via, third-party 
sources, such as yourself. However, my research has already shown that far too few 
companies yet know of or understand the services that compardes such as yours offer. 
Qbjective of Survey:. 
It is the objective of this survey to discover what range of services and technologies are 
available from 'Transfer Agents' and to pass on this information to industry, so that it 
can make better use of those Agents. 
What's in it for you ?: 
Firstly, you will receive a summary of the findings of this survey. Secondly, you will also 
receive a summary of the survey of UK manufacturing industry and its views on 
acquiring technology. 
How you can help me: 
Since the current research project is soon to end and to increase the speed of response 
to you of the findings, I would ask you to please complete and return this questionniare 
at your earliest convenience. 
Thanking you in anticipation of your positive response, 
Yours sincerely, 
D. B. LEFEVER. 
SERC TOTAL TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMME. 
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CRANFIELD INSTITUTE 
OF 
TECHNOLOGY 
INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY 
ASSESSMENT UNIT 
COMPLETION INSTRUCTIONS 
The purpose of this questionnaire is to discover the different ways technology is transferred 
to manufacturing industry in the UK. In particular it attempts to identify your basic 
methods of operation and to whom you transfer technology. 
Please attempt to answer all questions, but if you feel unable to answer a particular question 
then put a line through it. 
If you have any doubts or wish to talk about related issues, please do not hesitate to contact 
me on: 
Tel: 0234-750111 EXT: 2685 
Please return to: 
D. B. LEFEVER. 
I. N. T. A. 
BUILDING 38, 
CRANFIELD INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, 
CRANFIELD, 
BEDS. MK43 OAL. 
Thanking you in anticipation of your time and effort, 
Total Technology Programme. 
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SECTION ONE. 
04. TeleDhone Number: 
SECTION TWO. How you operate. 
Q5. For how many years has your company/agency been 
orking specifically in T chnology Transfer? 
Years 
I 
06. Does vour comvanv: 
a: Transfer Technologies 
b: Transfer Information about 
Sources of Technology 
c: Transfer Information about 
Technologies 
d: Negotiate licences on behalf of 
another technology source 
e: Other ýpiease specify) 
please tick as appropliate 
Q7. Does your company transfer technologies/information 
a: An Exclusive Membership Basis. 
b: Open Access to All Companies. 
please tick appropfiate box 
Q8. What proportion of your business activity serves the 
The Immediate Vicinity (City/County) 
A Specific Region of the Country (North-East, ect) 
NationaRy 
International 
SECTION THREE. Your Technology Sources. 
Q9. Which of the following sources of technology do you 
Manufacturing Companies 
Research Associations 
Universities/Polytechnics 
Government Establishments 
Other Transfer Agencies 
Other (please specify) 
Other (please specify) 
please tick andproportion as appropliate 
Q10. What types of technology do you supply or provide 
Given that this might be a long and/or varied list, you 
will probably find it more appropriate to include your 
standard company literature to answer this question. 
Q11. Do you have any links with other Technology 
Transfer agencies? 
ves no 
If YES: 
Does this involve: 
Cooperative Venturing 
Access to their Technologies 
Access to their Services 
Access to their Sources 
Access to their Customers 
please tick as approptiate 
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SECTION FOUR. Your Services. 
012. What services do you offer? Please Tick and then 
Rank your answers in order of their relative importance to 
ur COM Dany. TicK KanK - 
Information on Technology Sources 
Access to many Technologies 
Technical Expertise 
Market Research 
Business PI g 
Venture Capital 
Technical Evaluation 
Post-Transfer Support (Implementation, etc) 
Other (please specify) 
Other (please specify) 
please tick and appoition as approphate 
Q13. What proportion of the technologies you deal with 
a: In need of extensive developement? 
b: In need of limited development? 
c: Market or near market readiness? 
014. Do you have the ability to make 
technical/technological changes to technology to suit a 
particular customer? 
. 
YES NO N/A 
Q15. Do you have the capability to ease the transfer of a 
particular technology by non-technical means: eg. Training; 
Lending technical staff to recipient; etc? 
. 
YES NO 
-N/A- I 
--j 
SECTION FIVE. Your customers. 
016. What proportion of your prospective manufacturing 
rmanmers have the following Turnovers? %- 
f 0-1 Million 
fl-10 Million 
f 10-100 Million 
f 100 Million Plus 
Q17. What proportion of your prospective manufacturing 
customers have the following Number of Employees? 
Less than 20 
20 to 100 
100 to 500 
500-1000 
1000 plus 
018. What proportion of your prospective manufacturing 
High Technical Competence 
Moderate Technical Competence 
Low Technical Competence 
019. What are your company's objectives in technology 
a: As the donor? 
b: For the recipient? 
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Q20. How does your organisation judge its success in Technology Transfer: 
For example: No. of Successful contacts initiated; No. of successful technologies transferred; 
Q21. In your experience what factors most affect the success or failure of All stages of Technology 
Can I take this opportunity to thank you again for completing this questionnaire, and I am sure 
your answers will prove to be of benefit to the study. 
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